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Abstract 
The central research question of the thesis concerns the bargaining and negotiating 
strategy, as well as the negotiating process, at the GATT and the WTO in relation to 
developing countries. The key questions this study set out to answer were: considering 
the vast power disparity developing countries face in multilateral trade negotiations in 
the GATT/WTO institution and among a number of available strategies, what is, then, 
the most effective bargaining strategy, under what conditions?  
 
The thesis has sought to make a principal argument corresponding to the research 
question of this study, based on the findings of the case of Thailand’s participation at 
the Uruguay Round negotiations. Firstly, the thesis shows that Thailand, along with 
other developing countries with the same level of economic development and a similar 
level of experience in multilateral trade negotiations, has not been able to rely on 
merely one negotiating strategy in order to attain the sought after outcomes. The thesis 
then illustrates that bargaining strategies have to be exercised in all channels. To 
further systemise, bargaining strategies could possibly be grouped into three levels: (1) 
international, where coalition building and mixed strategy of distributive and 
integrative tactics can be utilised; (2) regional, where regional agreements/regional-
based coalitions can be utilised as a springboard for bargaining; and (3) domestic, 
where the role of individual officials and ministers can feed into the effectiveness of 
the bargaining strategies being conducted. Therefore, the thesis argues that the limited 
bargaining power of developing countries makes coalition-building an especially 
crucial and most appealing tool for their effective diplomacy. The thesis also argues 
that the most effective bargaining tactics are those of a mixture of distributive and 
integrative tactics, as stipulated by Odell.  
 
The thesis contends that Thailand’s experience seems to throw light on the 
inadequacies of the conventional accounts of domestic-driven negotiation analysis that 
assume the great role of domestic institutional inputs in the trade policy formulation 
process. They assume that trade negotiators and officials arrive at the negotiating 
position after having calculated and balanced inputs from diverse interests within the 
state. It is believed that negotiation alternatives for any country are direct outcomes of 
the particular alignment of domestic actors and interests. However, the finding 
suggests that a very different dynamic is at work in Thailand. Finally, the thesis has 
maintained that the driving force in trade policy and negotiating strategy in Thailand 
remains in the hands of the state, mainly via bureaucratic officials. Therefore, new 
development in negotiation analysis is needed that is of relevance to developing 
countries’ experiences, since many developing countries with very different political 
structures and societies have reacted in very similar ways at the international level. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The main theme of the thesis is the opportunities and constraints of bargaining 
strategies that developing countries faced in the trade negotiation process in the 
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, namely the 
WTO. The thesis aims to address the question:  
 
• What negotiation strategies have developing countries attempted and 
have they made any difference, considering the vast power disparities 
they face? 
• Among a number of available strategies that developing countries can 
employ to enhance their participatory abilities in the GATT, and 
consequently, the WTO, which is the most effective? And under what 
conditions? 
  
To a large extent, the voice that developing countries were able to exercise in the 
Uruguay Round was unprecedented. Therefore, obtaining a greater understanding of 
the role that developing countries played at the Uruguay Round, as well as the 
negotiating strategies they used, is worthy of investigation. The evidence for this 
study will be gathered from a case study of Thai participation at the Uruguay Round 
negotiations in general, with reference to agriculture issues in particular. Examining 
the strategies of Thailand will hopefully at least shed some light on which bargaining 
strategies will yield more advantages to other developing countries. It will inevitably 
be risky to assume that Thailand can represent the vast group of developing countries. 
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Yet, it is hoped that the knowledge gained from the study could fill the gap in the 
literature on developing countries’ experiences of bargaining and negotiations.  
 
The problem (and assumptions) 
It is undeniable that the WTO now stands right in the centre of international political 
economy, side by side with other Bretton Woods institutions. Yet, it is accepted by 
many that most institutions of international economic governance, especially the 
WTO, inevitably reflect the interests of the powerful states, not the weaker ones. This 
is apparent in the fact that, while the WTO has become involved in activities directed 
towards developing countries more and more, the neo-liberal values associated with 
the industrial countries still retain a dominant influence. It is believed that the GATT, 
as well as its offspring (the WTO), was not an institution created for free trade, 
notwithstanding its strong free trade orientation. As a result, the developing countries 
remain the only ‘rules-takers’ of the prevailing order in the institution.1  
 
In addition, it is very difficult for developing countries to get their interests onto the 
negotiating table, as well as defend their welfare in ongoing WTO activities and 
negotiations. Hence, it is not surprising that most developing countries have voiced 
their frustration at their inability to express their views and protect their interests in 
ongoing WTO activities and negotiations. Coupled with the lack of resources at home, 
many developing country delegations find the experience of participating in 
international negotiations at the WTO rather stressful, although it is probable that 
major countries also find the experience stressful, regardless of their ample resources. 
                                                 
1 Hurrell, Andrew and Woods, Ngaire eds., Inequality, Globalisation and World Politics, Oxford: 
Oxford Press University, 1999. 
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In the seven previous GATT rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, developing 
countries focused most of their attention on obtaining preferential access to industrial 
country markets; few of them participated actively in the core business of 
negotiations.2 In the past, they had been bystanders, using the Most-Favoured Nation 
(MFN) rule to benefit from tariff reductions among developed countries. By contrast, 
since the Uruguay Round, many developing countries have been very active 
participants in the world trading system, both individually and in coalitions with other 
countries. Yet, their influence on the agenda of the negotiations has not increased 
accordingly. Thus, many developing countries now claim that the WTO remit intrudes 
more substantially into the domestic politics and economies of their countries. 
Undoubtedly, the WTO is now facing a lot of criticism as a result of a legitimacy 
deficit.3  
 
At present, most observers agree that the role of developing countries has been 
improved and become more innovative in the realm of participation and strategies 
used in negotiations, as is evident in the Doha Development Round. According to 
some scholars, the voice that developing countries are able to exercise is, to a large 
extent, a result of their effective coalition formation.4 Indeed, this is indisputable in 
many respects, since there are several coalitions which developing countries use for 
exchange of information and discussion, as well being a channel for gaining 
                                                 
2
 Martin, Will and Winters, L. Alan, ‘The Uruguay Round: a milestone for the developing countries’, 
in Martin, Will, and Winters, L. Alan, eds.,  The Uruguay Round and the developing countries, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 2. 
3
 Hoekman, Bernard and Kostecki, Michel, The Political Economy of the World Trade System: The 
WTO and Beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.5. 
4 Narlikar, Amrita and Tussie, Diana, ‘The G20 at the Cancun ministerial: Developing countries and 
their evolving coalitions at the WTO’ in World Economy.  Oxford: Blackwell publishing, 2004, 947-
966. 
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bargaining leverage; for example, the G20 on agriculture. Nevertheless, the improved 
role of developing countries is not only a consequence of coalition formation, but is 
also the result of careful and strategic planning by developing countries, both 
individually and jointly. Of course, the process of careful and strategic planning is 
derived from the previous experience of past negotiation processes in the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and its predecessor institution, the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT). 
 
To date, it appears that solutions to the disadvantages that the developing countries 
face in participating in international trade remain rather elusive. Notwithstanding their 
efforts, developing countries still struggle with the imbalanced power structure of 
international trade politics. Hence, finding what instruments are best for gaining 
advantages for developing countries in international negotiations is a challenging task. 
It is this challenge that provides the main impetus for this research. The strategies or 
the instruments on which the research will focus are, for example, coalition building, 
bilateral and regional free trade initiatives, and domestic initiatives to increase 
national capacity to allow more informed participation at the WTO.  
 
Optimally, the purpose of the research ought to be to analyse the bargaining strategies 
of developing countries at the inter-state level, particularly in the context of 
international trade to see which strategy works best to offset the bias of current trade 
negotiations. However, this ambitious aim needs a greater degree of well-focused 
empirical investigation, on a larger scale than this thesis can provide. Yet, the study 
wishes to draw some insightful implications for developing countries participating in 
international trade negotiations by looking at the case study of Thailand. With a high 
Chapter 1: Introduction  5 
dependence on exports, it is intriguing and at the same time fruitful to see how 
developing countries manage to introduce some of their concerns regarding 
agriculture onto the negotiations at the GATT, and subsequently the WTO, as well as 
observe whether their demands lead to desired outcomes.  
 
Analytical Framework 
To help explain what strategies are likely to be more successful, the thesis will first 
engage with theoretical issues and will focus on the IPE literature including works by 
John S. Odell, J.P. Singh, and Amrita Narlikar which specifically deal with 
bargaining, negotiation and coalition. Therefore, the analytic framework used in the 
research will be mainly adapted from their works. In fact, the game theoretic 
perspectives also offer valuable insight by using models to explain how developing 
countries can recognise bargaining problems and how many available strategies are 
possible, as well as how they identify the best alternative that offers the best chance of 
achieving the desired goal(s). However, in practice, bounded rationality is more 
typical in the process of negotiation; this concept entails the premise that the 
international negotiator will theoretically lack complete information about the 
situation of market and the other sides’ true objectives.5 Thus, the rational decision-
maker assumed by game theoretic perspectives is often more an idealised standard 
than an accurate description of real-world behaviour.6  
 
                                                 
5
 Odell, John S., Negotiating the World Economy. New York: Cornell University, 2000, p.19. 
6
 Kegley, Charles W. Jr., and Wittkopf, Eugene R., World Politics: Trend and Transformation. 
Bedford: St. Martin’s, 2001, p.65. 
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Furthermore, available information is frequently incomplete and insufficient to make 
a precise decision. However, it is also important to note here that, although the rational 
choice perspective does not purport to offer a description of real world behaviour, it does, 
however, offer robust models that have some explanatory and possibly predictive value. By 
taking these assumptions of bounded rationality as the starting points, Odell also 
points to another crucial problem for policy-makers, which is their susceptibility to 
cognitive dissonance.  
 
Secondly, the thesis presents an empirical account of the bargaining process of 
Thailand in the Uruguay Round, from 1986 to 1995, with a focus on the issue area of 
agriculture. To support the argument, evidence from the case study of the Thai 
participation in the Uruguay Round was gathered and collected, particularly regarding 
the agreement on agriculture. Using IPE bargaining literature as an analytical 
framework, the study identifies the strategies that Thailand used during the 
negotiations of the Agreement on Agriculture in the Uruguay Round:  which 
negotiating strategies did Thailand use most during the Round?  And what were the 
main principles behind the choice? Nevertheless, more often than not, any strategy 
used in international negotiation will not be made overtly public, unless some years 
later. Official secrecy will make direct, uniform observation of the negotiators’ 
interaction exceedingly difficult.  
 
According to Odell, every official trade negotiator will have three types of objectives: 
economic gain, relational power, and domestic political popularity. 7 These goals may 
not be fully consistent with one another. As a consequence, negotiators for any 
                                                 
7
 Odell, John S., Negotiating the World Economy, London: Cornell University Press, 2000, p. 25. 
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country may vary their priorities according to the issue, environmental conditions, or 
experience. And it is within these environmental conditions that all government 
economic negotiators are embedded in complex two-level games.8 Odell also makes 
it clear that different domestic political conditions have different impacts on the
effectiveness and success of the strategies used in international negotiations. For that 
reason, the prawn and poultry industries in Thailand were chosen to see if there was 
any active domestic lobby group affecting the process of trade policy and bargaining 
strategies formation in Thailand. Also, if there were such groups, what were their 
roles and importance to the domestic political conditions for negotiations at the 
Uruguay Round?  It is essential to point out that the main hypothesis of the thesis is 
that the driving force in trade policy and negotiating strategy in Thailand, and 
supposedly in many developing countries, still remains in the hand of the state, 
mainly via bureaucratic officials, since domestic actors and interests are not yet well 
organised and developed in a way that can effectively influence the trade policy 
process, as assumed by many negotiation analyses and theories. Most private sector 
organisations remained passive in the trade policy making process and the 
formulation of Thailand’s negotiating positions. The only business sector that was 
aware of the negotiations in the Uruguay Round was the textile manufacturers. This is 
due to the fact that they had to monitor the negotiations under the MFA anyway. It is 
important to note here that the reason why this thesis did not choose to study the 
textile sector was because it has already been studied.
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8
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Methodology and Research Techniques 
 
What is the principal research method used in this study? The principal research 
method is to learn more about the multilateral negotiating process in the globalised 
world economy through a single case study. The research will then attempt to make a 
potential generalisation about the process and possible agenda for future research.  
 
Although case-study methods have long been stereotyped as a weak sibling of social 
science research methods, the single case-study method is actually a research design 
that contributes uniquely to the body of knowledge.10 The case-study method is one 
of several ways of performing social research. Other ways of conducting research 
encompass surveys, experiments, the analysis of archival information and history etc. 
In general, the ‘soft option’ of case-study methods receives more traditional criticism 
than statistical methods of social research. Yet, the case-study methods enjoy many 
inherent advantages over the statistical methods. In actual fact, it is erroneous to 
believe that relying heavily on merely one family of research methods is sufficient. 
Hence, the two methods – statistical and case-study - should ultimately be combined 
since they complement one another. 11 
 
According to Yin, ‘case studies are the preferred strategy when “how” or “why” 
questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and 
                                                 
10
 Yin, Robert K., Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2nd, Applied Social Research Methods 
Series, Volume 5. London: SAGE Publications, 1994, pp. 1 - 15. 
11
 Odell, John S., ‘Case Study Methods in International Political Economy,’ in International Studies 
Perspectives, 2001 (2), pp. 161-176. 
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when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context.’12 
The above statement shows one of the reasons why the case study method was 
preferred in the conduct of this research. This is because the thesis aims to understand 
the bargaining strategies in trade negotiations, in which the author has little control 
over such events and the thesis tries to find an answer to the question: which 
strategies have worked most effectively, and why?  
 
Another justification for the case-selection of Thailand is to provide analytic and 
prescriptive insights into the bargaining strategies of other developing countries is 
because the author believes that Thailand’s learning experience in the GATT bears 
implications for new entrants into the WTO. A good example of this would be how 
Vietnam could benefit from learning from the Thai experience. Moreover, the choice 
of case-study is affected by personal reason - Thailand being the author’s home 
country. However, as a rule, a clear justification for the case-selection can be made 
much more persuasively if it is substantiated by more systematic engagement with 
case-study methods.  
 
In general, a ‘case’ or a unit of analysis refers to a single instance of event or 
phenomenon. There are different types of case studies in relation to theory: 
exploratory, explanatory and descriptive.13 However, according to Odell, a single-
case study can be typified into many categories, ranging from the descriptive to the 
deviant. A descriptive case study aims to document an important event. Another 
                                                 
12
 Yin, Robert K., Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2nd, Applied Social Research Methods 
Series, Volume 5. London: SAGE Publications, 1994, p. 1. 
13
 For more information regarding case-study research design, see, for example, David A. De Vaus 
(2001), Diane Kholos Wysocki (2004), and Robert Yin (1994). 
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common type is an illustrative case of a theory. With this type of case study, the aim 
is to illustrate a theoretical idea in a manner which confirms that theory is relevant to 
a real situation. The disciplined interpretative case study is used to interpret and 
explain an event by applying a theory to the particular event; whereas, a hypothesis-
generating case study uses a case method to generate a new hypothesis which is valid 
and introduces a new line of investigation. The other two types of case-study methods 
are the least-likely (theory-confirming) and the most-likely (theory-infirming). The 
former is used to illustrate the relevance of a theoretical stance. This is achieved 
through applying an analytical idea to the least-likely case, and finding that even the 
least-likely case still confirms the idea or theory. Nevertheless, the latter seeks to 
prove if a theory was invalid by showing that if the theory failed even in a most-likely 
case, it is evident that that particular theory would be even more likely to fail in less 
favourable situations. Finally, the deviant case study is used to shed light on the 
theory’s limitation by showing all the necessary main causes why the expected effect 
does not occur. This can sometimes lead to new hypotheses.14  
 
It is misleading to only suggest the advantages of the single case-study method. 
Therefore, it is important to note that any single case study, alone, is unlikely to be 
able to test whether a theory is valid or invalid. However, this inadequacy can 
sometimes be corrected by the method of difference or comparative case methods.   
 
All in all, considering the close relationship that the empirical analysis bears with 
theory building, the research method should be guided by the research question of the 
enquiry. Given the nature of the enquiry of the thesis, as well as its argument, the 
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 Odell, John S., ‘Case Study Methods in International Political Economy,’ in International Studies 
Perspectives, 2001 (2), pp. 161-176. 
Chapter 1: Introduction  11 
country of Thailand was selected to be an illustrative case that the most effective 
bargaining tactic in trade negotiations for developing countries would be a mixed-
strategy at all levels, international, regional, or domestic. It is used to show that the 
analytical frameworks on bargaining strategy provided by Odell, Singh, and Narlikar 
are useful in capturing the developing countries’ experiences at the WTO. Meanwhile, 
the agriculture negotiation in the Uruguay Round has been selected to illustrate the 
use of coalition-building by the developing countries, especially Thailand. In addition, 
since it is less likely that trade officials will reveal the true agenda and bargaining 
strategies employed in current negotiations, it is more fruitful to look at past 
negotiations where trade officials are more willing to share their experiences. Also, 
the intellectual argument for the agriculture-case choice is that it is the most 
prominent illustration of how mixed-strategy was being played out at all levels by 
Thailand, notwithstanding the also very important new issues such as TRIPs and 
services in the Uruguay Round.  
 
The Uruguay Round was a crucial multilateral trade round for many countries, 
especially low-cost agricultural exporters since, in a sense, it was designed in part to 
bring agriculture into greater conformity with the GATT. Prior to the Round, it was 
clear to everyone that a significant reform of agricultural trade rules and practices was 
needed for the conduct of agricultural trade negotiations. It is useful to remember 
where the agricultural trading system was previous to this event. While agriculture 
was in principle covered by the 1947 GATT Agreement, in practice it was outside 
GATT disciplines until the Uruguay Round.15 From the beginning, agriculture was 
treated differently from other sectors under GATT rules. The rules applying to 
                                                 
15
 Jawara Fatoumata and Kwa, Aileen, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: the real world of international 
trade negotiations. London: Zed Books, 2003, p.26. 
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agricultural trade under GATT 1947 were weaker than those for manufactured goods. 
Whereas non-tariff barriers are prohibited for non-agricultural goods, in agriculture 
quantitative restrictions were permitted under certain circumstances. These 
circumstances, limiting agricultural imports, were later extended to include protective 
measures such as quotas, variable levies, voluntary export restraints (VERs), and 
minimum import prices.16 This is because managing agricultural trade was not only in 
the developing countries’ interests, but was in that of their developed counterparts as 
well. 
 
In fact, during the negotiations, while all participants displayed a willingness to bring 
about substantive agricultural and trade policy reform, disagreements over the extent 
and speed of reduction in trade-distorting domestic and export subsidies and border 
protection almost led to the breakdown of the Round.17 Even though the developing 
countries more actively participated in the Round and tried very hard to influence the 
outcome directly, the inability of the EU and the US to reach agreement on the 
treatment of agricultural trade was the most obvious cause of its breakdown. The 
Uruguay Round eventually ended with a success – the Final Act signed in Marrakesh 
provided for the establishment of the World Trade Organisation.  
 
As pointed out, the important role of agriculture to developing countries and the 
significance of the Uruguay Round Agricultural Agreement to the participation of 
developing countries in international trade are of special relevance to this research. 
                                                 
16
 Hathaway, Dale E. and Ingco, Merlinda D., ‘Agricultural liberalisation and the Uruguay Round’ in 
Martin, Will, and Winters, L. Alan, eds.,  The Uruguay Round and the developing countries, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 30. 
17
 K. A. Ingersent, A.J. Rayner and R.C Hine, eds., Agriculture in the Uruguay Round, Basingstoke: 
The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1994, p. 4. 
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Agriculture is important because the agreement on agriculture is a result of the 
convergent interests of the most powerful states, but the distinctive role of agriculture 
has been shaped by the evolution of the trading system, just as the trading system has 
been shaped by the compromises made for agriculture.18 Agricultural trade has 
become drawn into globalising processes in the economy. Production and trade in 
agricultural commodities, once rooted in place and dependent on the climate, have 
become enmeshed in global linkages and have become one sector among others 
contributing to economic growth.19 As for the Uruguay Round, the agenda for the 
round was a reflection of the need to respond to a changing trading system, as well as 
being influenced by the increased participation of developing countries in the system. 
These provide a critical turning point for the bargaining strategies available to 
developing countries and how they use them.  
 
The other point the thesis argues is that the conventional accounts of domestic-driven 
negotiation analysis are inadequate in trying to explain the bargaining and negotiating 
experiences of the developing countries at the WTO. To this end, the particular sub-
sectors of prawn and chicken-farming were selected. The thesis aims to conduct a 
detailed or systematic examination of the participation of the sub-sectors of chicken 
and prawn farming. This choice of the comparative-case-study between the two sub-
sectors, as opposed to other key sectors, for instance rice, is justified by the facts that: 
(1) other key sectors such as rice and cassava have been previously studied20, (2) 
                                                 
18
 Wolfe, Robert, Farm Wars, London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998, p. 5. 
19
 For more discussion on globalisation and agriculture see Coleman, William, Grant, Wyn, and 
Josling, Tim, Agriculture in the New Global Economy. Cheltenham; Northampton, Mass.: Edward 
Elgar Publication, 2004. 
20
 สาํนกังานเศรษฐกิจการเกษตร, การตลาด/ราคาสินค้าเกษตร: ผลกระทบจากการเจรจากลุ่มสินค้าเกษตรในรอบอุรุกวัย ในกรณีข้าว. 
กระทรวงเกษตรและสหกรณ์, 2534. [Office of Agricultural Economics, Marketing/Price of Agricultural 
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frozen prawn export was also the key sector in agricultural politics, whereas poultry 
export had just started to gain importance, (3) the prawn sector is to be used as a 
deviant case study of the literature of domestic-driven bargaining analysis. 
 
The selection of the two agricultural industries was more to observe their inputs in the 
trade policy formulation process than to examine which sector has more influence in 
domestic politics, as is common in the practice of the politics of agriculture.  
The rationale for this selection is as follows: during the Uruguay Round negotiations, 
chicken and prawn increasingly became major agricultural export products for 
Thailand. Frozen fresh chicken and relevant products, the main livestock agricultural 
export commodities, accounted for 6.22% of total agricultural exports in 1994, 
creating revenue of more than 10,400 million Baht (US$416 million); fresh frozen 
prawns were the key business of aquaculture exports, accounting for 18.96% of all the 
total agricultural exports, creating revenue of 31,709 million Baht (US$1,268.3 
million).21 Therefore, further probing into the influence of these two industries on 
Thailand’s trade positions and bargaining strategies could at least yield insights on 
how negotiators balance farm interests at home, if any. It may also be possible to 
observe if the trade positions and interests are indeed the results of officials having 
calculated and balanced inputs from diverse interests at home, as assumed by two-
level game literature. Or rather, are the positions and strategies influenced and 
formulated by the policy makers themselves? The decision to include these two 
different agricultural industries in the study is based on an understanding that 
                                                                                                                                            
21
 นิพนธ์ พวัพงศกร, ผลกระทบของการเจรจารอบอุรุกวัย ต่อสินค้าเกษตรในตลาดโลก และภาคเกษตรของไทย. สถาบนัวจิยัเพ่ือการ
พฒันาประเทศไทย. ตุลาคม 2539, pp. 22-24.  [Puapongsakorn, Nipon, The Impact of the Uruguay Round 
Negotiations on World Agricultural Products and the Agriculture Sector of Thailand. Bangkok: 
Thailand Development Research Institute Foundation, October, 1996, pp. 22-24.] 
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participation in the globalising world is no longer the privilege of state actors. Rather, 
it also includes non-state actors such as NGOs and civil societies, although the WTO 
remains very much a government driven negotiating process.  
 
This single case-study research undertaking is also underpinned by a number of 
techniques. The principal techniques of investigation are analyses of primary and 
secondary documents, semi-structured elite interviews, and group interviews. 
 
Primary sources consulted for the study include official government policy documents 
such as white papers, diplomat conference materials and ministerial statements, 
annual reports of governmental departments, national statistics, the GATT 
agreements, and proposals submitted in the negotiations by Thailand, both 
individually and with other countries (coalitions). Another essential primary resource 
is the Trade Policy review submitted to the Trade Policy Review Body at the WTO. 
Although the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) did not come into being until 
after the Uruguay Round, the trade policy statements of the year 1995 and 1999 
(reports both by the Secretariat and the Government of Thailand), at least in the 
Overview, give some useful pictures of what happened during the Uruguay Round. 
These sets of data are directly accessed from various sources, including the library of 
department of trade negotiations (DTN) at the Ministry of Commerce, the national 
library of Thailand, the library of Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI), 
WTO Watch at Thammasart University, the library of the Bank of Thailand (the 
central bank), and the Thai Chamber of Commerce.  Also, relevant useful materials 
were gathered from the official websites of government departments, regional 
organisations, and the WTO itself. However, it is necessary to note that not all the 
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documents and information are available in English, although most materials on the 
official websites are available in both English and Thai. The majority of the Thai 
government policy documents are available only in Thai, the official language of 
Thailand. Secondary sources encompass books, both Thai and English, articles, 
academic journals and newspapers.  
 
In total, there were thirty interview respondents. In order to ensure that the cross-
section of relevant respondents was as representative as possible, interviewees were 
divided into three categories and two methods of enquiry were used, namely the semi-
structured and group interviews. 
 
The first category consisted of ten interviews held with government officials 
including the former and current negotiators in the Ministry of Commerce, but also 
involved officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives. As for semi-structured elite interviews, twenty 
interviews were undertaken in total (a full list of all interviewees can be found in 
Appendix A).  
 
The interviews conducted with the first group of interviewees were very useful 
because they were able to provide further contacts. By using this ‘snowball’ 
technique, sources for a good number of official documents were identified.22 Some 
of the interviewees were so helpful that they even took the trouble to contact the 
potential interviewees and actually arrange further interviews. However, it must be 
pointed out that it was initially very difficult to get in touch with the interviewees in 
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 Grant, W, ‘Elite Interviewing: A Practical Guide’, p.3, quoted in Grix, Jonathan, The Foundations 
of Research. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 128.  
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the first category. With the norms of social connections and hierarchical statuses in 
Thai culture and politics, resorting to ‘cold calling’ renders it almost impossible to get 
in touch with interviewees at an elite level in the first place. However, it was later 
achieved through personal connections and networks. As said, once connected to the 
first interviewees, he/she could introduce the next appropriate interviewees. The 
second group of interviewees consisted of discussions with non government 
organisations and actors such as the Executive Director of the International Institute 
for Trade and Development, a telephone interview with the Vice Chairman (Foods& 
Pharmaceuticals Cluster) of the Federation of Thai Industries (F.T.I.) and semi-
structured interviews with officials at the Thailand Research Fund (TRF) and chicken 
and prawn exporters. This group also encompassed academic circles and policy think 
tanks. The decision to incorporate this group of interviewees was based on the notion, 
widely accepted in IPE, that participation in the globalising political economy is no 
longer the preserve of state actors, but rather includes non-state actors as well. 
 
A key source of primary data, the technique of semi-structured elite interviewing was 
selected for two reasons. Firstly, the fact that a semi-structured elite interview does 
not follow a rigid format allows greater scope for interviewees to answer questions on 
their own terms. The advantage of this method of interviewing is that it permits a 
certain degree of flexibility and allows for the pursuit of unexpected lines of enquiry 
during the interview.23 Therefore, elite interviews can inject a qualitative depth to the 
information collected from other research sources. Secondly, elite interviews can help 
the researcher to understand “actors’ perceptions of the world in which they operate.  
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The advantages of elite interviews are numerous. For example, they can assist in 
interpreting documents or reports, as well as in understanding the motives of decision-
makers. In addition, they can yield information not documented or available 
elsewhere.24 Nonetheless, choosing elite interviewing as a method of data collection 
and enquiry has its drawbacks. Some of the disadvantages of this technique are the 
subjective nature of the selection process of respondents and the accounts of 
interviewees, as well as the disputable reliability of the interviewee, stemming from 
memory failure or ideological partisanship.25 Another widely recognised concern has 
to do with access, particularly how to make direct contact with senior officials. As 
mentioned above, this presented a problem early in the process of the study when the 
interviewer resorted to ‘cold-calling’. After realising the ineffectiveness of ‘cold-
calling’, the interviewer chose to use personal contacts and networks. Hence, the issue 
of access became less of a problem given the acquaintance of the interviewer. 
 
The last category of interviews was semi-structured group interviews or small focus 
groups with prawn and chicken farmers. The interviews were tape-recorded in the 
same way as the one-to-one interviews. The rationale behind using the group 
interview technique was that an individual farmer would be too shy to be in a one-to-
one interview, as well as too afraid to give out the wrong information. Hence, the role 
of the researcher was different from when conducting a one-to-one interview. The 
researcher acted more as a moderator to encourage a dialogue between group 
members. 
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Most interviews took place in Bangkok, although a number of interviews were held in 
Prajinbury and Saraburi provinces. Three were conducted over the telephone. All 
except one were tape-recorded. In general, the duration of the interviews ranged from 
half an hour to one hour. The twenty-six respondents who agreed to be tape-recorded 
consented to this arrangement prior to the actual interview session, thus meeting any 
ethical concerns. A taped interview is beneficial since it enables the researcher to 
concentrate more on what the interviewee is saying rather than worry about the speed 
of transcribing the interview. In addition, it provides a verbatim transcript of the 
interview for the researcher to later access when needed.26 None of the interviewees 
specifically requested anonymity. All taped interviews were later transcribed and 
analysed. Where additional information was required, later communication with 
interviewees was achieved through telephone calls or e-mail. 
 
Finally, this research also uses general hypotheses and comparison to link its finding 
to a wider enterprise. Thus, it is hoped that the study will make at least some 
contribution to the understanding of broader issues of politics of international trade 
and developing countries at the WTO. To be more specific, it is hoped it will derive a 
greater understanding of Thailand’s participation in the trade negotiations in the Doha 
Round. More importantly, the thesis intends to make a contribution to IPE by 
throwing light on the inadequacies of the conventional accounts of domestic-driven 
negotiation analysis and the gap of negotiation analysis with regard to developing 
countries.  
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The argument 
By looking at the empirical case study of international negotiations at the 
GATT/WTO, the thesis shows that developing countries like Thailand would not be 
able to rely on only one negotiating strategy in order to attain sought after outcomes. 
Instead, they have to strategically rely on several available strategies: agenda-setting, 
coalition with other developing and/or developed countries, bilateral or regional free 
trade initiatives, or even the empowerment of national economic negotiators both at 
home and in Geneva. Ideally, it would be best to place more focus on the 
empowerment of national economic negotiators both at home and in Geneva.  
However, the thesis argues that the limited bargaining power of developing countries 
in international trade talks makes coalition-building an especially crucial and most 
appealing tool for their effective diplomacy in the short term.  
 
Nevertheless, before one can say which strategy works most effectively, one must 
have a way to assess the effectiveness of that particular strategy. In this regard, the 
thesis assesses the effectiveness of strategies in two respects: in terms of “internal” or 
subjective assessment i.e. as per the goals enunciated by the negotiators themselves, 
and “external” or objective assessment.  
 
The thesis then also argues that bargaining strategies have to be exercised in all 
channels. To further systemise, bargaining strategies could possibly be grouped into 
three levels: (1) international, where coalition building and mixed strategy of 
distributive and integrative tactics can be utilised; (2) regional, where regional 
agreements/regional-based coalitions can be utilised as a springboard for bargaining; 
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and (3) domestic, where the role of individual officials and ministers can feed into the 
effectiveness of the bargaining strategies being conducted.  
 
The increasing size of the GATT/WTO can also render multilateral negotiations more 
contentious and harder to conclude by expanding the range of interests that need to be 
accommodated. Thus, heightened bargaining power is especially useful during 
multilateral trade negotiations. As the size of GATT/WTO grows, its members may 
find it useful to enter bilateral or smaller agreements, comprising states with common 
economic interests. In addition, establishing a regional arrangement/regional-based 
coalition can strengthen developing countries’ bargaining position vis-à-vis non-
members by providing them with insurance against the round stalling or 
developments within the multilateral regime that threaten their interests.27 
Furthermore, this type of regional agreement may also boost bargaining power by 
giving states - both powerful and emerging powers - a greater voice in international 
trade fora and by enhancing their market power. Also, many developing countries 
have considerable difficulty maintaining sufficient expertise on a wide range of issues 
of concern and policies in order to participate effectively in multilateral trade 
negotiations. Both coalitions and regional-based coalitions offer the pooling of 
bargaining resources from members to improve how they research, articulate, and 
represent their common interests in trade talks with non-members. 
 
As the effectiveness of each strategy depends on the negotiating environments and 
other countries’ strategies, the fact that weak states seek bilateral options to secure the 
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greatest possible benefits from the multilateral regime can be seen as another response 
to the unilateral strategies pursued by the other powerful countries such as the US and 
the EU, who are increasingly turning to bilateral free trade. The international context 
during the Uruguay Round also lowered the incentives for the EU and the US to push 
for multilateral agreements and prompted them to seek bilateral deals. To be more 
concrete, the way developing countries seek bilateral trade agreements can be viewed 
as a reaction to the powerful countries’ carrots and sticks approach, particularly the 
US. An increase of US interest in bilateral trading arrangements reflects a way for it 
to exercise its power. This can be seen as an attempt to impair the working of 
developing countries’ coalitions. As a result of the mentioned bilateral carrots and 
sticks, developing countries, depending on the composition of the group concerned, 
are less likely to achieve a greater internal cohesion in the group.28 Hence, it is more 
challenging for developing countries to maintain coalition-building as an effective 
bargaining strategy. 
 
Finally, the last and equally important tool that developing countries can employ to 
enhance their participatory abilities in the GATT/WTO lies at the national level. This 
is because domestic politics can also affect the developing countries’ trade 
delegations, involved officials, and ministers’ perceptions of their alternatives to 
international agreements, which raises the other point that the thesis is keen to 
examine. It is argued that the conventional accounts of domestic-driven negotiation 
analysis are inadequate in trying to explain the bargaining and negotiating experiences 
of the developing countries at the WTO. Prior to and during the Uruguay Round, local 
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businesses displayed poor awareness of the international trade rules, and how they 
affected the way they trade; this was even truer for the farmers.29 When compared to 
their counterparts in trade superpower countries, the input of farmers and business 
lobby groups in trade policy in developing countries were weaker than those in the 
industrialised states, although this has significantly improved after the WTO rules 
were implemented.   Among the causes that weaken their abilities to participate in 
international negotiations is the weak interest that domestic capitals have in 
international trade policy matters. Although it is generally the case that trade rules 
seldom have election making or breaking potential in both developed and developing 
countries (with the exception of the USA and the EU), domestic capitals in 
developing countries tend to choose not to invest adequate resources in capacity-
building at home or at the delegation level. As Narlikar points out: 
 
‘there exists little policy coordination between the capitals and the delegations 
in Geneva for many countries, which means that while delegations can 
exercise considerable negotiating leeway due to their independence from 
domestic pressures, but they are also deprived of the research-based and 
political back-up that is needed to negotiate effectively.’30  
 
In the past, in most developing countries there has hardly been any national structure 
for international trade policy-making. Furthermore, whatever technical expertise that 
did exist was difficult to relate to the GATT/WTO context, especially with the 
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vastness and complexity of the issues covered within its mandate. This is why 
developing countries began to recognise that they needed to somehow increase their 
Geneva presence, increase coordination between Geneva and their capitals, and 
increase interest, resource, and research commitments at the national level to allow 
more informed participation in the GATT/WTO. Thus, since the Uruguay Round, 
many developing countries have put a great deal of effort into the empowerment of 
national capacity. Many emerging powers have committed themselves to greater 
representation in Geneva and better research dedication. The increased presence in 
Geneva may allow developing countries more informed participation.  
 
Nevertheless, the increased presence in Geneva does not necessarily guarantee that 
developing countries will enjoy the additional influence in negotiations in the 
GATT/WTO. As is obvious in the case of Thailand, a larger size of delegation in 
Geneva does not simply translate to additional influence in the negotiations. Another 
good example is when Dr Supachai Panitchpakdi (Thailand) took over his duties as 
new Director General (DG) of the WTO on 1st September 2002. As the organisation's 
first leader from the developing world, a great deal of pressure was put on him to 
champion the causes of the poor. While his speeches indicated that he certainly 
intended to push those causes to the top of the agenda, some comments prompted a 
few developed country delegates to comment that a danger existed that he would be 
marginalised and ignored by the larger powers if not more careful with his words.31 
Therefore, this is an important point to make: not even the most adequately funded 
technical assistance programmes in or by the developing world can be completely free 
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from the influence of the great powers and their agenda. Nevertheless, it must be 
accepted that it is a necessary condition for progress. 
 
To sum up, the effectiveness of each bargaining strategy that developing countries are 
able to exploit in international trade negotiations depends, in a large part, on the 
possible availability of the strategies, other countries’ strategies, including those of 
alliances and opponents, as well as the negotiations’ contexts: economic, political, 
domestic, or international .    
 
Plan of the thesis 
As outlined, this thesis is about international trade negotiations, more specifically, 
about how to utilise the bargaining strategies available if they are to bring more 
advantages to the developing countries. Whether or not the developing world can 
directly influence the negotiations is a subject for further debate and investigation. 
Rather, what this research aims to offer is an understanding of how developing 
countries can maximise their influence in any negotiations given the inconsistent 
contexts of negotiations. 
 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters and the organisation is as follows.  
Following this introduction, the second chapter elaborates on the key theoretical 
frameworks of bargaining and negotiations. It clarifies and expands upon the principal 
assumption that underlies this study, namely that bargaining strategies which best 
provide developing countries with a critical instrument for expanding their bargaining 
power are the ones that react well to other countries’ strategies and the context of 
negotiations. To this end, it identifies and explains how each strategy - coalitions, 
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bilateral/regional-based trade coalitions, and a better domestic information network - 
can assist in overcoming some of these weaknesses. Secondly, the chapter also 
engages with theories on bargaining and negotiation to assist in understanding what 
kinds of strategies work, as well as their limitations and in what circumstances.  
 
Chapter 3 identifies the context of negotiations or the historical background to the 
case study. It explains why the inclusion of agriculture into the pre-negotiation phase 
of the Uruguay Round marked a very important phase in the participation and activity 
of developing countries in the GATT. It also clarifies why focusing on the Uruguay 
Round is preferable in terms of gaining an insight into the trade strategies of 
developing countries. Firstly, the chapter looks at the background to the Uruguay 
Round, namely what were the origins of the Round. Next, it tries to identify the key 
actors in the agricultural negotiations in the Round, their interests, and the economic 
contexts during negotiations.  
 
Chapters 4-5 encompass the case study of the participation of Thailand in the 
Agricultural Negotiations of the Uruguay Round. Chapter 4 studies the contexts of 
negotiations for Thailand; for example, the market and political conditions at both 
global and domestic levels, to demonstrate the contexts for agricultural negotiations. 
By establishing that agriculture plays a central role in both Thai politics and economy, 
the key bargaining objectives of the Thai government are identified. Later, the chapter 
seeks to specify and analyse the bargaining strategies available to the Thai 
government at the time. It then explores the formation of Thai Trade Policy. As 
strategies are essentially made within the realm of trade policy as a subset of the 
foreign policy, it will be useful to also learn how trade policies are formulated. In 
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essence, the strategies available to the trade diplomats have to conform to, or at least 
be in line with, the national trade policy. Thus, the trade policy on one hand provides 
the context for negotiators, and on the other hand virtually limits the possibility of 
bargaining strategies that trade representatives are able to exercise. Equally vital  is 
learning which actors have more influence over the formation of trade policy at the 
domestic level, by focusing on two domestic commodities, namely prawns and 
chickens to see to what extent they have influence – direct or even indirect - on 
agricultural domestic politics and the formation of Thai trade policy. It is necessary to 
sensitise the differences between commodities because this issue is very important in 
agricultural politics.  
 
Chapter 6 examines and summarises the key outcomes of the Uruguay Round and the 
Agricultural Negotiations. Chapter 7 is an analysis of the Thai case study. It assesses 
the achievement of Thailand’s participation in Uruguay Round trade negotiations and 
the outcomes of the strategies utilised by the Thai economic negotiators in the 
Uruguay Round. By encapsulating the main issue areas of the agreement, the chapter 
will then consider the result of the strategies used by the Thai government during the 
Uruguay Round; hence, it assesses what strategies work best under what 
circumstances. The chapter tries to discover what Thailand achieved in the 
negotiations, and also what strategies contribute to the attainment of the sought after 
outcomes.  
 
Then, chapter 8 will look at the present strategies of Thailand to see if they have 
changed as a response to the lessons learned. It analyses whether any bargaining 
strategy used during the negotiations in the Round has been reinforced or dismissed 
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afterwards in the hope that it will leave behind a trail of clues as to which strategy 
type works and why. It also explores the implication of the case study on other 
developing countries. 
 
The conclusion summarises the empirical findings through an analytical framework 
for conceptualising and classifying bargaining strategies. Finally, it specifies the 
contribution of the study to IPE and gives suggestions for a future research agenda. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review: bargaining, negotiations 
and strategies 
 
In this chapter, attention turns to the study of bargaining and negotiation and 
bargaining strategies. Relevant bargaining strategies and negotiation theories are 
reviewed, particularly concerning economic trade negotiations. Additionally, the 
chapter touches upon the basic elements of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTNs) 
especially the GATT and the WTO, in which bargaining strategies are played out. 
Finally, the chapter turns its attention to the role of coalitions as a bargaining tool in 
trade negotiations, as well as determinant factors of strategies chosen. 
 
Negotiations 
Negotiation is an effective instrument for solving both international and domestic 
problems. Many studies have been devoted to its analysis, be it the process itself or 
the strategies used in negotiations. Most contributions on the subject attempt to 
identify the key elements that help clarify its definition, analysis, and evaluation. 
Insofar as this thesis is concerned, international negotiations on international trade are 
the main focal point.  
 
Traditionally, international negotiations have been viewed as an array of loosely tied 
autonomous situations in which sovereign partners meet to find a joint and mutually 
acceptable solution to a dispute. However, they have undergone significant changes. 
As they grow in number; they become more complex, technically and politically. The 
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overlap of these developments with the persistence of the traditional approach creates 
impasses and deadlocks and results in widespread discontent among theoreticians and 
practitioners.32 It is often said that negotiations become lengthier, but no more 
effective. The outcome is frequently regarded as unbalanced or unjust, even when an 
agreement is signed. 
 
This section, therefore, centres on a discussion of the elements and the aspects of 
international negotiations. When outlining the different characteristics between 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations, the distinct features of multilateral negotiations 
will be used as the starting point of an analysis of international trade negotiations 
under the aegis of the GATT. Then, attention turns to the literature of a number of 
contending analytical approaches to negotiation. 
 
Elements of a Negotiation 
No matter what size or how complex it is, the basic elements highlighted below can 
be found in any negotiation, be it between monolithic parties or in the most complex 
coalitional interactions with varied communication and decision rules. Essentially, it 
is useful to identify these elements prior to carrying out any negotiation analysis. 
Parties/ Actors 
In the domain of international relations, it can be argued that, in order to understand 
the factors that contribute to effective negotiation, one must take into account the 
actors. Thus, the crucial first step for an effective negotiation analysis is to map the 
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full set of potentially relevant parties in the context of the decision processes.33 In the 
least complex negotiation, two principals negotiate with each other. Yet, potentially 
complicating parties and other agents may be present, as may multiple internal 
factions with very different interests. Multiple parties tend to be the norm in most 
international negotiations, as is apparent in the GATT and the WTO. 
 
Traditionally, the actors who have participated in multilateral negotiations have been 
states and their governmental representatives. One of the most significant 
developments since the end of World War II is the dramatic increase in the number of 
independent states. This quantitative change in the nature of the international system 
has had a profound impact on world politics. In particular, it also has led to greater 
complexity in the conduct of multilateral negotiations. Interestingly, although the 
sovereign equality of states is a fundamental principle of the international system, 
there are vast disparities between different states in terms of their military strength, 
economic resources, and diplomatic leverage. Similar or unequal capabilities between 
states may result in symmetrical or asymmetrical negotiations.34 Nonetheless, there is 
an effort to reduce unequal capabilities between states in international economic 
institutions such as in the case of the WTO.  Unlike the weighted voting system of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the WTO is a one-member-
one-vote organisation, thereby allowing equal status to all members, irrespective of 
trade shares or general economic size. This can be seen as an attempt to simplify 
complexity in the conduct of multilateral negotiations. However, it also receives 
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criticism, since the one-member-one-vote membership does not always achieve 
simplification of the complexity of multilateral negotiations. Rather, it means that one 
has to resort to ‘green room’ negotiations, which are generally less transparent.  
 
Green room meetings were exclusive small group meetings which were traditionally 
called at the initiative of the Director-General of the GATT to hammer out possible 
deals on contentious issues involving principals and interested parties. The term to 
describe such small group meetings became the Green Room gatherings, originally 
based on the decoration found in the green meeting room adjacent to the Director-
General’s Office. The Green room process became very controversial in 1990s since 
it worked by invitation only, and merely a small number of ‘important’ delegations 
would be invited to these meetings. Also, the fact that only a few developing countries 
were invited to be represented around the negotiating table raised objections from 
many developing countries that were excluded. 
 
To complicate matters further, an increasing number of non-state actors are now 
involved in multilateral negotiations and have become more active over the decades, 
although states are still the primary participants. These non-state actors range from 
international organisations, regional organisations and NGOs, to multinational 
corporations.  
 
Finally, it is true that most international negotiations take the form of bargaining 
among governments; yet, most take place through representatives. Each government 
is represented by individuals or agents who are empowered to act for a constituency 
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and to develop possible agreements with their counterparts on the other side.35 While 
the actors between whom international negotiations take place are often individuals, it 
is rarely the case that the principals are free to work directly with each other. In 
international relations they are usually groups or organisations, with complex internal 
workings of their own.36  
 
Interests/Objectives, Issues, and Positions 
Issues means subjects discussed explicitly and not underlying purposes or objectives. 
Such subjects appear as points covered by agreements when explicit agreements are 
reached.37 Multilateral negotiations cover a broad range of issues: security, 
economics, trade and finance, environment, human rights, science and technology. 
This reflects the growing complexity of world affairs.38 
 
An important first analytic step, suggested by game theorists, is to probe deeply for 
interests, distinguish them from issues and positions, and carefully assess trade-offs. It 
is often important to distinguish parties’ underlying interests from the issues under 
negotiation, on which position or stands are taken. However, the connections among 
positions on issues and interests are rarely simple. 39 Decision-makers in negotiations 
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often do not have complete information about the situation and, therefore, may 
misunderstand the true intention of their opponents. The difficulty is compounded 
when individuals or groups with different concerns make up one side in a negotiation 
because it is generally no longer possible to specify overall trade-offs. However, 
carefully tracing of which set of interests is ascendant, according to the internal 
bargaining process of given factions, may continue to provide insights.40 
 
Every official or negotiator will have specific types of objectives or positions. These 
objectives can be political, economic, or social. Typically, an international trade 
negotiator will have at least three types of objectives, which are economic objectives, 
relational influence over negotiation, and domestic political popularity. 41 These 
objectives may not be fully consistent with one another, however. Thus, negotiators 
usually vary their priorities according to issue, environmental conditions, or 
experience. 
 
Rules of Procedures 
Another strategy to cope with the challenges of size is the adoption of formal rules of 
procedure, which provide the framework within which negotiations are conducted. 
Generally, rules of procedure include the following: the number and rank of the 
parties; the languages to be used and the rights of the participants; the length and 
frequency of the sessions; and the method of decision-making.42 Bearing in mind that 
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procedural arrangements can influence the outcome of negotiations, shrewd 
negotiators regularly use them to their advantage. This is why many negotiators from 
developing countries are trying to enhance their abilities to push the agendas of their 
countries’ interests onto the table for negotiations in the early stages, if possible. As in 
bilateral negotiations, the order of items on the agenda is crucial, as this can also have 
an effect on the outcome. Crucially important to what is placed on the agenda at all in 
the multilateral setting, the agenda order takes on added significance, for it is more 
difficult to change earlier decisions because of the number of participants. 
  
Negotiating phases  
Multilateral negotiations vary, not only in the kind and number of parties involved 
and the issues that are the subject of negotiations, but also in the form and process of 
the actual negotiations themselves. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify certain 
phases in the negotiation process that are characteristic of many multinational 
negotiations. For analytical purposes, any trade negotiation process can be 
decomposed into four distinct negotiating stages: catalyst, pre-negotiation, 
negotiation, and post-negotiation.43  
Catalyst 
Even before the concerned parties in a given negotiation make contact, they have 
explored the pros and cons or even the mere possibility of negotiating. Policy vision is 
often implied at the catalyst stage, starting with a country or leader acting as a catalyst 
and defining in broad terms the issues to be negotiated. 
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Pre-negotiation 
With a plethora of issues and problems that demand multilateral solutions, multilateral 
negotiations are essential in solving these problems and in dealing with 
unpredictability and change in the international system. In the pre-negotiation phase, 
therefore, discussions (negotiations) take place on the possible agenda for the formal 
negotiations. These discussions then lead to the establishment of the agenda to be 
negotiated. In fact, the agenda that is established places constraints on the parameters 
of the formal negotiation that will follow. 44  
Negotiation 
At the negotiation stage, formal government-to-government bargaining takes place, 
occasionally with interest-group participation. Negotiators have to take into account 
not only the positions of their respective governments and domestic interest groups, 
but also those of the regional bloc or coalition to which their country belongs. 
Ultimately, depending on bargaining strategies, tactics, and time constraints, a formal 
draft of an agreement emerges. One interesting point to note is that negotiators have 
specific tricks to salvage a seemingly hopeless situation when negotiations reach a 
crisis point or when the parties cannot extricate themselves from their mutually 
irreconcilable positions.45 The easiest way is to offer a deliberate compromise 
through the use of vague language. To allow opposing sides to save face and to avoid 
contentious references, the language used may be blurred and ambiguous. However, 
this technique is more often implemented in multilateral than in bilateral negotiations.  
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Another trick is simply to agree to disagree. Leaving the thorny issue aside, lack of 
resolution may, under certain circumstances, be the best way to manage a problem 
that seems otherwise insurmountable.  
 
During many multilateral negotiations, the final elements of a treaty or agreement are 
usually hammered out under significant time pressure and in the last stage of the 
process.46 The setting of deadlines and the awareness that time is limited often create 
a certain momentum, leading the different parties to shift their positions and 
compromise. A good example is the Uruguay Round negotiations, where parties 
shifted positions at the last stages of the negotiating process, resulting in an agreement 
being reached.  
 
It is during this phase of negotiations that final decisions are usually reached. Yet, 
there is no simple relationship between the process of negotiation and its outcome. 
 
Post-negotiation (outcome) / Implementation 
The final stage of a multilateral negotiation is the post-negotiation. Particularly in the 
case of international trade negotiation, the post-negotiation is the implementation 
stage, which determines how the agreements are embodied in a country’s law and 
enforced by its administration, judiciary and legislature.47 It is important to note here, 
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though, that there will frequently be an imperfect correspondence between what was 
negotiated and what is actually implemented, as well as the enforcement problems. 
 
Bilateral versus Multilateral Negotiations 
In the area of diplomacy, still dominated today by sovereign states as the key actors, 
international negotiations take place either bilaterally or in a multilateral framework.  
Although there has been a plethora of studies on negotiation generally, and on 
bilateral negotiations in particular, relatively few have concentrated on multilateral 
negotiation. This, to some degree, is a reflection of the difficulty involved in having to 
take into account the many relevant variables that affect the nature, process, and 
outcome of multilateral negotiations. The difficulties associated with bilateral 
negotiations are often compounded in multilateral negotiations, involving as they do a 
greater number of parties with varied interests, goals, and objectives, as well as 
different national, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds. Although it is generally 
recognised that there are differences between bilateral and multilateral negotiation, 
multilateral negotiation is often regarded as merely an enlarged version of what 
occurs bilaterally.48 
 
Hence, it is customary to define a multilateral negotiation as a negotiation involving 
more than two participants. Because multilateral negotiations usually include 
numerous parties, they are potentially cumbersome and thus must contend with the 
problems that result from their size and number. To name just a few: there are a 
greater number of objectives to be reconciled; many different cultural and political 
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attitudes to be accommodated; and more voices to be heard. Frequently, the formation 
of blocs is one mechanism that is employed to cope with difficulties that stem from 
size. 
 
In a negotiating pattern characterised by many participants, there is always a tendency 
to lean toward compromise solutions. More often than not, these compromises reflect 
the lowest common denominator solution acceptable to the largest number of actors, 
rather than what might be considered the optimum outcome. According to Simon, 
agents lack not only full information and true priorities, but also the capability to 
perform the calculation required to optimise.49 Although actors involved in 
negotiations are rational in the sense that they aim to achieve set objectives as 
effectively as they are able, their rationality is bounded by the two shortcomings 
mentioned above.   In multilateral negotiating involving a great number of 
participants, consensus-based decision appears to indicate general acceptance of the 
agreement in question. Consensus-based decisions are simply those that are 
considered favourably at first sight. Nevertheless, on a second look, it may well turn 
out that the price of consensus is high. As is the case with any compromise solution, a 
consensus often hides dissenting views and positions that were simply swept under 
the carpet in the overall move to find an agreement at last. 
 
Whereas bilateral negotiations are more flexible in terms of procedure, multilateral 
negotiations, in theory, are generally characterised by a high degree of formalism. In 
theory, multilateral talks use rules-based principles to build an atmosphere of dialogue 
and trust during the negotiation process and should, therefore, tend to strengthen 
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relationships among participants.50 Normally, multilateral negotiations are conducted 
either in the framework of international diplomatic conferences or within international 
organisations, always following a well-regulated pattern strictly in line with the 
applicable rules of procedure.51 Nevertheless, there is an exception in the way 
multilateral trade negotiations are being conducted at the GATT/WTO. Due to its 
consensus building nature, the decision-making process, therefore, relies considerably 
on a network of informal processes to facilitate the derivation of consensus. In fact, 
this behind-the-scenes or club-like activity of the Green Room consultative process 
has generally been criticised for being inaccessible for developing countries and 
hence leads to developing countries’ marginalisation in the decision-making process 
at the WTO. In addition, from a legal point of view, the setup of multilateral 
negotiations is a world apart from bilateral talks. Within the framework of 
international conferences or organisations, negotiations are conducted in accordance 
with rules or procedures which have decisive legal implications for the conduct of the 
proceedings and their outcome.52 In contrast, bilateral talks, more flexible in 
character, are more conducive to finding solutions that are tailored to the needs and 
interests of the parties. It is important to note, though, that there may be an asymmetry 
problem, e.g., the US and developing countries. In most cases, the participants 
themselves are the masters of the agenda and of the procedures to be obeyed.53  
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One of the defining distinctions of a multilateral negotiation is that parties can and do 
tend to form coalitions as one way of cutting down the complexity, promoting their 
preferences, and learning. Generally, a coalition is a set of governments that defend a 
common position in a negotiation by explicit coordination.54 Also, multilateral trade 
negotiation fora like the GATT and the WTO offer developing countries better 
prospects than bilateral negotiations. Nevertheless, a multilateral trade negotiation 
does not by itself neutralise inequalities in bargaining power or remedy disparities in 
information and organisational resources because multilateral trade negotiation fora 
like the GATT and the WTO also provide opportunities for strong nations to form 
coalitions, just as they do for the weak. However, it is important to recall that 
multilateral negotiations cannot be viewed in isolation. Instead, they have to be seen 
as an integral part of a broader negotiation space, along with bilateral and regional 
negotiations.  
 
International Trade Negotiations 
Negotiation is the driving force of the multilateral trading system. Negotiations are 
used by nation states to agree on rules and procedures. For instance, they are 
convened to periodically reduce trade barriers and to resolve trade conflicts.55 
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The GATT and WTO 
The establishment of the GATT was driven by the concern to avoid a repetition of the 
disastrous mistakes of the 1920s and 1930s. Midway through the Second World War, 
the United States and the United Kingdom discussed plans for a post-war framework 
of international economic cooperation involving three organisations that would 
operate as agencies of the United Nations. Two of these organisations – the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (or the World Bank as it has become known) – came into being. 
However, the third – the International Trade Organisation (ITO) –barely saw the light 
of day. Despite the failure of the ITO, it was to prove historically significant in that 
preparations for its establishment resulted in the creation of the GATT. As a result of 
the bilateral talks between US and UK officials to establish a multilateral and non-
discriminatory trading system, the US Department of State in 1945 published a set of 
proposals for an international trade organisation. The proposals were subsequently 
elaborated into a draft charter. The final version of the ITO Charter, drawn up in 
Havana, became known as the Havana Charter. The world trading system since then 
has operated under the GATT. 56 
 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was a commercial treaty that 
embodied a number of generally accepted principles of commercial policy which its 
signatories had agreed to. The GATT/WTO is sometimes recognized as a “free trade” 
institution, but that is not entirely accurate.57 The GATT was not a charter for free 
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trade because the key aim of the GATT was to achieve freer and fairer trade.58 Even 
though it was widely acknowledged that the GATT perpetuated managed trade, it was 
also accepted that its achievement was to dismantle (some) protectionist barriers. The 
GATT has a strong free trade orientation, but also allows for the temporary protection 
of troubled industries in order to allow for their adjustment. The trading system under 
the GATT rules still allows tariffs and other forms of protection. To be more specific, 
the core principle of the GATT is non-discrimination, in the shape of most favoured 
nation treatment and national treatment. Compliance with these principles, through 
reduction of tariffs and elimination of other trade barriers, does not necessarily mean 
that the GATT played a crucial role in facilitating the progressive liberalisation of 
international trade.59 More precisely, it is a system of rules dedicated to open market 
and free trade. From the beginning, the GATT did not act in opposition to the 
interventionist policies of states; it is rather the instrument by which national policies 
are reconciled.60 The GATT’s purpose was to provide a general framework of rights 
and obligations for countries participating in the tariff negotiations supported by the 
United States. This general framework corresponded fairly well to the American view 
of how international trade relations should be organised.61  
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The scope and speed of liberalisation is negotiated among the contracting parties in 
the GATT (now WTO).  The GATT also encourages negotiation based on reciprocal 
reductions or the balancing of benefits and concessions. Obviously, it is easier to get 
signatories to lower their barriers if their trading counterparts are prepared to do 
likewise. 62 The whole exercise of negotiating rounds since the inception of the 
GATT has been based on this notion. However, certain unfair trade practices should 
not be tolerated. Liberal economists would argue that the fact that trade is subjected to 
a series of rules, therefore, results in trade that is ‘managed’ and falls within a neo-
mercantilist approach. With a range of exceptions and loopholes that weaken its 
liberal character, the GATT/WTO approach seems to have a mercantilist flavour 
insofar as it proceeds by negotiation of mutual and balanced concessions.63 Hence, 
the GATT was best known as a forum for consultation, discussion, and negotiation. It 
was also a code of behaviour upon which countries based their commercial relations; 
GATT, however, was never intended to be more than a flexible and pragmatic 
document representing the maximum that countries were prepared to agree upon 
when it was signed.  
 
The second half of the twentieth century has indeed witnessed considerable opening 
of borders in the world economy. A succession of interstate accords through the 
GATT since 1948 has brought major reductions in customs duties, quotas, and other 
measures that previously inhibited cross-border movements of merchandise.  
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To date, nine rounds of MTNs have been held under GATT/WTO auspices. These 
include Geneva (1947), Annecy (1949), Torquay (1951), another negotiation in 
Geneva in 1956, the Dillon Round (1960-1), the Kennedy Round (1964-7), the Tokyo 
Round (1973-9), the Uruguay Round (1986-94), and the Doha Round (2001 – present) 
under the WTO.  
 
The history of the GATT can be roughly divided into three phases. The first phase, 
from 1947 until the Torquay Round, was largely concerned with which commodities 
would be covered by the agreement and to freeze existing tariff levels. The second 
phase, encompassing three rounds from 1959 to 1979, focused on reducing existing 
tariffs. The third phase, consisting only of the Uruguay Round from 1986 to 1994, 
extended the agreement fully to cover new areas such as intellectual property, 
services, capital, and also brought back agriculture to the GATT.64 
 
 
 
Rounds of GATT negotiations 
1946 – 1948 Geneva, Switzerland While the ITO charter was still being drafted and debated, the first 
round of negotiations was conducted among 23 countries. In 1947, 
GATT entered into force and the first round of tariff reductions was 
completed. The first version of GATT, developed in 1947 during the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment in Havana, 
Cuba, is referred to as "GATT 1947". On January 1st, 1948, Twenty-
three nations signed a comprehensive free-trade agreement to 
implement many of the rules and negotiated tariff reductions that 
would have been overseen by the ITO.65  The round resulted in 45,000 
tariff concessions affecting $10 billion in trade (which comprised 20% 
of the total global market at the time).  
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1949 Annecy, France The second round took place in 1949 in Annecy, France. The main 
focus of the talks was more tariff reductions, which were around 5000 
tariff-concessions in total and thirteen countries agreed to additional 
tariff reductions. 
 
1951 Torquay, United 
Kingdom 
The third round occurred in Torquay, England in 1951. 8,700 tariff 
concessions were made and thirty eight countries agreed to additional 
tariff reductions. 
 
1956 Geneva, Switzerland The fourth round returned to Geneva in 1955 and lasted until May 
1956. $2.5 billion in tariffs were eliminated or reduced and twenty six 
countries agreed to additional tariff reductions and set strategy for 
future GATT policy toward developing countries and improving 
developing countries’ positions as treaty participants. 
 
1960 -1961 Dillon Round 
 
The fifth round occurred again in Geneva and lasted from 1960 to 
1962. This round of trade talks was named after the Under Secretary of 
State General of the US, Douglas Dillon, who first proposed the 
negotiations. Along with tariff reductions of over $4.9 billion, it also 
yielded discussion relating to the creation of the European Economic 
Community (EEC). 
 
1964 -1967 Kennedy Round The sixth round was the last to take place in Geneva from 1964 until 
1967 and was named after the late US President Kennedy in his 
memory. Concessions were made on $40 billion worth of tariffs. 
Sixty-two countries agreed to comprehensive across-the-board tariff 
reductions rather than product-by-product specification as in previous 
rounds. Some of the GATT negotiation rules were also more clearly 
defined. 
 
1973 -1979 Tokyo Round One hundred and two countries agreed to reduce non-tariff trade 
barriers and further reduce tariffs on manufactured goods. Also, this 
round of trade talks established new regulations aimed at controlling 
the proliferation of non-tariff barriers and voluntary export restrictions. 
 
1986 -1994 The Uruguay Round The Uruguay Round began in 1986. One hundred and twenty three 
countries agreed to create the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
replace the GATT Treaty. The Round resulted in reduced tariffs on 
manufactured goods and began extending GATT provisions to 
agriculture products. It also resulted in reductions in export subsidies, 
import limits and quotas, an agreement to enforce intellectual property 
rights (TRIPS), an agreement to open foreign investment, and an 
agreement extending international trade law to the service sector 
(GATS). 
 
Table  2. 1: Rounds of GATT Trade Negotiations. 
 
The first five rounds dealt almost exclusively with tariffs. Starting with the Kennedy 
Round, attention began to shift towards non-tariff trade restrictions and to the problem 
of trade in agricultural products. The hallmark of the GATT system of rounds has 
been its multi-country negotiations, conducted within the wider framework of agreed-
upon-multilateral rules and disciplines. The continuity of this negotiation process and 
major-power commitment to GATT rules were at stake during the Uruguay Round.  
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In some ways, the process the round came to represent became almost as important as 
the round itself.66  
 
When the Uruguay Round was launched in 1986, it was seen as the most far-reaching 
GATT negotiating effort yet undertaken. One of its main aims was to stem the erosion 
in the multilateral system by dealing with long-standing issues in agriculture and 
textiles, as well as the “new” issues of services, investment, and intellectual property, 
which had never been addressed in a multilateral forum. Initially, the United States 
focused on services because this was seen as an area of emerging US comparative 
advantage in which there were no trade rules.67 In parallel, the United States 
simultaneously focused its efforts more on agriculture, with a primary focus on 
Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The negotiations took place against a 
background of spreading regional trade arrangements involving the larger powers and 
the potential threat of unilateral actions by those same powers. The best example of 
this is section 301 cases in the US.68 
 
The clearest illustration of the evolution of the globalised world economy is to be 
found in the content and the context of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, concluded at the end of 1993 under the aegis of the GATT.  The 
coverage of the Uruguay Round is far greater than that of previous rounds.69 
Following the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1986-94), the 
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GATT was replaced by the World Trade Organisation. This successor agency has 
greater competences both to enforce existing trade agreements and to pursue new 
avenues of liberalisation.70 Ministers at Marrakesh were entitled to claim that the 
establishment of the World Trade Organisation ushers in a new era of global 
economic co-operation.  
 
The outcome of all major collective decisions in GATT is strongly influenced by a 
few important countries. Their power to shape the course of decision making in 
GATT is directly related to the extent of their participation in world trade. Not only 
that, they were able to impose their will upon the others regarding later decisions to 
hold tariff negotiations or to grant the United States its unconditional agricultural 
waiver.71 
 
It is important to note that the GATT/WTO is a bargaining forum and negotiations in 
the GATT/WTO can take different forms.72 The most obvious in terms of 
negotiations on market access is the so-called request-offer technique. The so-called 
request-offer negotiations have been used very frequently and continue to be a core 
mechanism in trade negotiations conducted at the WTO. With this mechanism, one 
member asks another to make a specific concession, e.g. reducing a tariff on a certain 
good or set of goods, limiting expenditure on production subsidies, and removing 
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barriers to foreign participation in a service market. Then, the other responds with an 
offer and a request of its own. This quid pro quo bargaining is a central element of the 
GATT/WTO negotiations. Request-offer negotiations may also be supplemented or 
instead replaced with formula approaches, which revolve around a specific rule that 
will be applied to reforming a specific policy area.73  The MFN rule ensures that all 
concessions that are eventually agreed are extended to all other Members. 
 
Principles of the GATT and WTO  
The General Agreement contained a lengthy and complex framework for the mutual 
reduction in tariffs between the contracting parties and a code of conduct regulating 
governmental interference in international trade. However, a number of fundamental 
principles underpin the foundation of the multilateral trading system. These basic 
underlying principles are outlined below: 
 
• The principle of non-discrimination is operated in two forms. Firstly, the 
most-favoured-nation treatment (MFN) principle outlined in Article I of the 
GATT1947 requires each member country or contracting party to treat trade 
with all other member countries equally; that is, any advantage given to one 
member must be given immediately and unconditionally to all other GATT 
members. The second form is through the “national treatment” principle – set 
out in Article III of GATT1947 - which means giving others the same 
treatment as one’s own nationals. National treatment or treating foreign and 
locally-produced goods equally only applies after the imported goods have 
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entered the market. Therefore, charging customs duty on an import is not a 
violation of national treatment, even if local products are not charged an 
equivalent tax.74 
 
• Open markets or freer trade (gradually through negotiation) is another 
important fundamental principle underlying the trade practice in the GATT. 
Lowering trade barriers is one of the most obvious means of encouraging free 
trade. The barriers concerned include customs duties (or tariffs) and measures 
such as import bans or quotas that restrict quantities selectively.  
 
• Predictability through binding and transparency promises a clearer view of 
international trade for businesses and investors, creating a more stable and 
predictable environment for businesses as well. When countries agree to open 
their markets, they ‘bind’ their commitments. However, a country can change 
its binding, but only after negotiating with its trading partners. More often than 
not, this could mean compensation to the trading partners for loss of trade.75 
Also with tariff rates and market-opening commitments bound, foreign 
companies, investors and governments are assured that trade barriers - both 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers – should not be raised arbitrarily. In fact, under 
the umbrella of the WTO, governments are now required to make trade rules 
as clear and public (transparent) as possible by disclosing the policies and 
practices publicly within the country or by notifying the WTO. The regular 
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surveillance of national trade policies through the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism provides a further means to encourage transparency in domestic 
and at multilateral levels. 
 
• Reciprocity reflects a desire to limit the scope of free-riding that may arise 
because of the MFN rule, as well as a desire to obtain better access to foreign 
markets. The rationale behind this principle is that for a nation to negotiate, it 
is necessary that the gain from doing so must be greater than the gain derived 
from unilateral liberalisation. Reciprocal concession is an assurance that such 
gains will materialise. 
 
Bargaining VS Bargaining Power VS Bargaining Strategies 
Before proceeding further, one must fully appreciate the differentiation between the 
three terms: bargaining, bargaining power and bargaining strategies. As the words 
suggest, these three terms are closely interconnected.  
 
Bargaining 
Bargaining is an essential aspect of politics in general and international politics in 
particular. Apparently, bargaining is much more prevalent in world politics than any 
other alternative interaction modes such as fighting or voting.76 Bargaining is often 
described as one identifiable mode of joint decision-making, to be distinguished from 
coalition. In bargaining, the parties are left to themselves to combine their conflicting 
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points of view into a single decision.77 Another thing to consider is a bargaining 
situation. A bargaining situation is characterised by the coincidence of cooperative 
and conflicting elements, as well as interdependent decisions.78  
 
Although there is a need to clarify the distinction between bargaining and negotiation, 
the terms are used interchangeably in this thesis. Negotiation is arguably the most 
important function of the diplomatic machine. The term negotiation is usually 
reserved for explicit bargaining. Negotiation then refers to a formalised process in 
which a fair amount of verbal signals, as well as non-verbal ones, are involved and 
exchanged.79 This covers a variety of activities ranging from simple consultation – 
known as an ‘exchange of views’ – to detailed negotiation on any specific issue. In 
general, formal negotiations are characterised by direct, face-to-face, verbal 
communication; whereas, informal bargaining proceeds through indirect verbal and 
behavioural communication.80 Therefore, international negotiation is treated as a 
subclass of bargaining. 
 
Briefly, negotiation and bargaining refer to a sequence of actions in which two or 
more parties address demands and proposals to each other for the ostensible purposes 
of reaching an agreement and changing the behaviour of at least one actor. 
Concretely, the process of international economic negotiation refers to what happens 
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when trade ministers and diplomats as a group, joined sometimes by others, do 
business with one another. 
 
To begin with, two elements must normally be present for negotiation to take place: 
there must be both common interests and issues of conflict.81 Without common 
interest there is nothing to negotiate for, without conflict nothing to negotiate about. 
When parties are interested in an exchange, they want different things and cannot 
obtain them by themselves, but can only grant them to each other. 
 
The prevalence of bargaining in social life can be applied to relations between 
sovereign states which do not recognise any authority above and beyond themselves. 
Nor do they consider themselves bound by decisions to which they have not 
consented.82 The ability to persuade other governments is central to the art of 
diplomacy.83  
 
Bargaining Power 
The concept of bargaining power varies according to the context in which it is 
applied. For instance, bargaining power in industrial relations is conceptualised in 
terms of results. The result will be counted as a success when one group is able to 
obtain compliance with its wishes, regardless of the opposition of the other or others. 
However, many theorists of international relations view the concept of bargaining 
                                                 
81
 Iklé, Fred Charles, How Nations Negotiate. London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1987, p. 2. 
82
 Jönsson, Christer, Communication in International Bargaining. London: Pinter Publishers Ltd, 
1990, pp.2-3. 
83
 White, Brian, ‘Diplomacy’, in John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., The Globalisation of World 
Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p.258. 
Chapter 2: Literature review: bargaining, negotiations and strategies  54 
power in structural terms. Bargaining power is seen as the ability to bring the 
opposing party to the negotiating table and exchange concessions, which are the least 
unacceptable to both parties. This concept is generally associated with strategic 
realism, which is exemplified by the thought of Thomas Schelling. The definition of 
power by Thomas Schelling, while formally referring to the arena of military strategy, 
is applicable to most issue areas. For Schelling, diplomacy is seen as a form of 
bargaining and the power to hurt is thus bargaining power. Bargaining power derives 
from a threat of violence, rather than an actual use of violence. It is assumed that each 
party in any given negotiation has unequal bargaining weight, in other words, 
‘bargaining power’. Without doubt, deficiency of bargaining power inevitably affects 
the negotiating position of developing countries in most international deals. In order 
to level or to increase bargaining power in the negotiation, each deploys some kind of 
strategies and tactics. Hence, those strategies are called bargaining strategies. On the 
other hand, bargaining strategies are a way or means used to enhance bargaining 
power. 
 
Bargaining power in the context of a trade negotiation comes from various sources. 
First and foremost, bargaining power comes from a state’s share of market power. 
When a state controls a large domestic market to which other countries want access or 
upon which other countries are already dependent in terms of trade, the state then 
acquires a powerful tool and bargaining power in a trade negotiation. This is because 
it is in a position to make credible threats. This capacity to make credible threats is a 
critical negotiating tool in a trade negotiation. The best instance of this claim lies in 
the case of the US Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) during the Uruguay 
Round. A number of developing countries had the benefit of duty-free trading 
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privileges in the United States via the GSP under the 1974 Trade Act. However, the 
United States amended its 1974 Trade Act, in 1984, by linking the grant of these 
privileges to the adoption and enforcement of adequate intellectual property 
standards.84 During the course of the Uruguay Round, the US used the suspension of 
GSP privileges as a threat to a number of developing countries if they failed to enact 
adequate standards of intellectual property protection. Another source of bargaining 
power in trade negotiations is, in Drahos’ terms, ‘a state’s commercial intelligence 
networks’.85 According to Drahos, these commercial intelligence networks are the 
networks that ‘gather, distribute and analyse information relating to a state’s trade, 
economic and business performance as well as similar information about other 
states’.86 These networks include a wide range of actors ranging from the state’s 
trade bureaucracy to business organisations, individual corporations, and policy think 
tanks. Drahos argues that the more integrated the network is in terms of information 
sharing and analysis, the more effective the particular country is likely to be in 
negotiation. This ‘commercial intelligence network’ underpins the capacity of a 
negotiator to enter into an informed and persuasive dialogue with the other party.
a trade 
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degree to which other sources of bargaining power can be utilised. From this analysis 
of bargaining power, it is not difficult to understand why the United States and the 
European Union have strong bargaining powers and why developing countries have 
comparatively weak bargaining powers in a multilateral forum like the WTO.  
 
Indeed, the issue of bargaining power matters. It is generally assumed that, when two 
or more parties/countries voluntarily agree to an economic deal, economic theory 
would characterise the deal as a Pareto improvement because of its underlying 
economic efficiency. Usually, the voluntary nature of the deal is taken to be a reliable 
guide to the personal valuations of utility that underpin the idea of Pareto 
optimality.88 However, when bargaining power is unequal or so imbalanced as to cast 
the shadow of domination, it becomes much more difficult to claim that the bargain 
struck is in fact a Pareto improvement. 
 
Theory strives to give a general understanding of how an international negotiation 
functions. It may also have implications with regard to how parties should perform 
and interact in order to make negotiation effective. General theoretical propositions 
about negotiation should, in principle, be valid regardless of who negotiates with 
whom and about what. However, in reality, a particular issue on the table may even 
have an impact on the negotiation process itself. In fact, there are indications that 
there may be an association between process characteristics and certain issue areas.89 
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There is no single approach to negotiation and there are a number of analytical 
approaches to negotiation and bargaining. Influenced by the tradition of economics, 
some scholars of negotiation view it in terms of a “game” with its own set of “players 
and rules.” A deductive method of analysis is usually employed, with a strong 
emphasis on bargaining strategies utilised by rational individuals. In contrast to game 
theorists, authors of these practical guides favour the inductive method, and a wide 
array of case studies inform their analyses. A third socio-psychological approach 
focuses on the character of the individual negotiator and the impact of their 
personalities, worldviews, and philosophies on the conduct of negotiations. 90  
 
Most bargaining models have a common game-theoretical heritage; in particular, 
game theory has contributed to a better understanding of bargaining situations and 
their possible solutions. This group highlights the importance of interests – collective 
or aggregated. 
 
According to Odell, ‘rational Choice in its most influential variant assumes the actor 
has coherent and stable preferences; that he has a fixed set of alternative courses of 
action and stable preferences; that he has a fixed set of alternative courses of action; 
that he knows the probability distribution of outcomes for each alternative; and that he 
chooses the one he expects to maximise his utility subject to constraints.’ This agent 
suffers from no limits on his capacity to make complex calculations.91 
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Scholars describe rational choice or rationality as a sequence of decision-making 
activities involving the following intellectual steps: problem recognition and 
definition – where the search for the information must be exhaustive; goal selection; 
identification of alternatives; and, finally, choice of a strategy.92 Goal selection 
requires the identification and ranking of all values such as security, democracy, and 
economic well-being. It also requires the compilation of an exhaustive list of all 
available policy options and an estimate of the costs associated with each alternative. 
Finally, rationality requires selecting the single alternative with the best chance of 
achieving the desired goal(s).  For this purpose, negotiators must conduct a rigorous 
means-end, cost-benefit analysis guided by an accurate prediction of the probable 
success of each option.93 
 
Thomas Schelling is a prominent representative of this approach. The manipulative 
conception is based on the assumption of uncertainty rather than complete 
information on the part of the bargaining actors, as in game theory. Change in a 
bargaining process is the result of successful manipulation of the opponent’s 
calculation of utilities and probabilities. Schelling focuses centrally on foreign policy 
decision-making.94 When state diplomats confront basic diplomatic, military, or even 
economic issues, they are obliged to think strategically if they hope to be successful. 
He views diplomacy and foreign policy as a rational-instrumental activity that can be 
more deeply understood by the application of a form of logical analysis of ‘game 
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theory’. A central concept that Schelling employs is that of a ‘threat’ and how a 
statesperson can deal rationally with that threat. For him, the activity of foreign policy 
is technically instrumental and thus free from moral choice. According to Schelling, 
‘diplomacy is bargaining: it seeks outcomes that, though not ideal for either part, are 
better for both than some of the alternatives.’95 The decision-making processes of 
unitary actors that determine national interests are typically described as rational. 
Rational choice is not overly concerned about what is good or what is right. It is 
primarily concerned with the question: what is required for our policy to be 
successful. In brief, he seeks to provide analytical tools for strategic thought. 96 
 
To emphasise, outcomes mostly depend on how the game is structured and what the 
rules of the game are, the information available to the players, and the way that 
players form expectations about the actions of other players. There are two types of 
games: cooperative and non-cooperative.97 
 
However, when it comes to the study of bargaining processes, game theory has certain 
shortcomings as an analytical tool. It is essentially static in nature; it tends to 
homogenise actors; and it envisages unitary and perfectly rational actors.98 In fact, 
bounded rationality is more typical in real-world negotiations. Bounded rationality is 
the concept whereby decision makers’ capacity to choose the best option is often 
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constrained by many human and organisational obstacles.99 Also, available 
information is often insufficient to recognise emergent problems accurately, resulting 
in decisions made on the basis of incomplete information. Moreover, it is even more 
complicated to guarantee that the available information is all accurate.100 
Compounding the problem is the negotiators’ susceptibility to cognitive dissonance – 
they are psychologically prone to block out negative, or dissonant, information and 
perceptions about their preferred choice and to look instead for information that 
justifies that choice.101 In addition, it is difficult to determine what goals best serve 
national-interests. Decision makers’ inability to rapidly gather and digest large 
quantities of information constrains their capacity to make informed choices. 
Decision-makers rarely make value-maximising choices; instead of selecting the 
option with the best chances of success, they typically end their evaluation as soon as 
an alternative appears that seems superior to those already considered.102  
 
The assumption that states are unitary actors partially explains the discrepancy 
between the theory and practice of rational decision making. Most leaders must meet 
the often incompatible demands of domestic politics and external diplomacy, and it is 
seldom possible to make policy decisions that respond rationally to both sets of goals.  
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Bargaining Tactics and Bargaining Strategies  
In practical terms, bargaining is about resolving conflict through compromise. The 
negotiator’s behaviour is described as his/her strategy, a set of behaviours that are 
observable in principle and connected to a plan to achieve the set out objective 
through bargaining.103 Tactics are particular actions that make up strategy. The 
number of ways in which that compromise can be reached is infinite, but broadly they 
fall into two groups.104 
 
Negotiation analysts classify tactics across the two ends of a continuum. At one end 
lies the strict distributive strategy, also known as the value-claiming strategy. It 
comprises a set of tactics that are functional only for claiming value from others and 
defending against such claiming, when one party’s goals are partly in conflict with 
those of others. Examples of strict distributive strategies include: high opening 
demands, refusing all concessions, exaggerating one’s minimum needs and priorities, 
manipulating information to others’ disadvantage, taking others’ issues hostage, 
worsening their BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement), issuing threats 
and imposing penalties. 105 
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Distributive 
In the first group of tactics, the parties anticipate the outcome in terms of relative 
success or failure and so each negotiates to get the best possible settlement.  In this ‘I 
win-you lose’ situation, negotiators pursue their goals by trying to persuade the other 
party to concede.106 This strategy/tactic is sometimes called contending, competition, 
distributive bargaining, or claiming value.107 Primarily, at some points in the 
bargaining process, this distributive aspect increases value claimed by one party, 
which at the same time implies less for others.  
 
Integrative 
In the second group, the parties anticipate that the settlement will be one which can be 
of mutual benefit, and negotiate to reach it using problem solving techniques. This is 
called ‘integrative bargaining’, as well as problem solving, collaboration and creating 
value. And its total contrast to distributive bargaining is indicated by its outcome, 
even though in most negotiations, the potential value of joint action is not fully 
obvious at the outset. It represents the best settlement possible for both parties, as 
opposed to the one which suits the party which happens to be in the stronger 
bargaining position.108  
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The two tactics must be implemented by means of both covert and overt tactics. Such 
distributive tactics include shaping perceptions of alternatives to agreement, making 
commitments, influencing aspirations, taking strong positions, manipulating patterns 
of concessions, linking issues and interests for leverage, misleading other parties and 
exploiting cultural and other expectations. By means of these tactics, one party seeks 
advantage by influencing another’s perceptions of the zone of possible agreement. 
Contrary to the tactics used in the first strategy, the most effective problem-solving 
tactics involve a joint effort to work together, exchange information, sharpen and 
reframe the issues to reflect both parties’ needs and priorities. In short, negotiated 
agreements may improve on the alternatives by cultivating shared interests, exploiting 
scale economies, and dovetailing differences. However, joint problem solving is often 
hard to achieve because of the hostile and distrustful nature of the negotiating 
environment. 
 
However, in practice, many bargaining situations cover a variety of issues. And in 
such ‘mixed’ situations, a combination of strategies and tactics of distributive and 
integrative bargaining will probably have to be used to maximise the bargaining 
position. This often poses a dilemma for the negotiator, as he or she has to assess the 
impact of these strategies and tactics to manipulate the outcome of the negotiation and 
decide the best tactics to employ. It is often necessary to employ both distributive and 
integrative strategies in the same negotiation. According to Odell, a mixed strategy is 
usually required and is the best option. 
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Strategies in Negotiation 
Using the method of the inductive case study, Odell gives a useful starting point for 
understanding multilateral trade negotiations, even though his theory is derived from 
case studies of two-party negotiations. Unlike the game-theorist perspective, he 
departs from the notion of unbounded rationality. Taking the conception of bounded 
rationality as a basic starting point permits the premise that the international 
negotiator will lack theoretically complete information about the situation in general 
and the negotiation in particular. In addition, effective preferences can be influenced 
by such things as the way issues are framed, which also can change as a result of the 
process of negotiation. Furthermore, he also provides a useful account of what 
strategies work and under what circumstances and why. 
 
However, the categorisation of bargaining strategies/tactics above is rather a 
definition for classifying and describing bargaining behaviour. In reality, trade 
negotiators see bargaining strategies in a more practical light. Examined below are the 
most popular bargaining strategies used in international trade negotiations, namely 
agenda-setting and coalition-building.   
 
Agenda-setting 
In general, the term agenda-setting used in negotiation literature only indicates the 
agenda of a negotiation at the beginning of any negotiation – in the diagnostic phase 
setting stage of negotiations. Contrary to a commonplace misunderstanding, agenda-
setting takes place throughout a negotiation. According to Singh, agenda-setting is ‘a 
process variable to inclusion or exclusion of issues being negotiated’ which is not 
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restricted to when a negotiation begins.109  However, Singh’s focus on agenda-setting 
does give a more accurate reflection of the agenda-setting process in any given 
negotiation. To Singh, agenda-setting refers to big issues included in any trade round 
in the macro sense; whereas agenda-setting in the micro sense refers to issues 
included or excluded during meetings as the round progresses and as negotiating 
parties work toward formulas and frameworks.110 Agenda-setting takes place also 
during the formula[tion] phase defining zones, within which an agreement may be 
reached, as well as the detail stage in which concessions are made and traded because 
each negotiation meeting’s agenda may define their shape and scope, even when a 
formula is already in place and concessions are being traded. 
 
Negotiation process or phases of negotiation may be identified for analytical 
purposes. For example, Zartman has classified negotiation into three phases: (1) the 
diagnostic phase setting the stage of negotiations, (2) the formula phase defining zone 
within which an agreement may be reached, and (3) the details phase in which 
concessions are traded. However, as mentioned previously, this study has roughly 
classified negotiating phases into four stages: (1) catalyst, (2) pre-negotiation, (3) 
negotiation, and (4) post-negotiation/ implementation.111  
 
Agenda-setting includes sets of practices deployed to include, exclude or keep the 
focus on issues. Particularly, three practices – use of popular or attractive frames, 
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degrees of technical and institutional capacity/expertise, frequency of participation in 
meetings – were valuable for developing countries to influence agenda-setting during 
the Uruguay Round.112 
 
Unilateral Threats VS the Role of Coalitions 
Unilateral threats refers to the ability to use domestic policy means to constrain the 
other party’s choices of action during a given negotiation.113 In general, unilateral 
sanctions or measures are designed to induce pressures to coerce responses from the 
other parties. However, this bargaining instrument is normally confined to major trade 
players. The United States’ section 301 and refusal to renew privileges such as the 
Generalised System of Preference for developing countries are especially a case in 
point.  
 
Coalition is a set of governments that defend a common position in a negotiation by 
explicit coordination. This category does not include a set of states that happen to act 
in parallel without explicit coordination, or a set of delegations that exchange 
information and meet to seek compromises, but do not defend a common position. A 
trade coalition may be defined according to a common product interest or a common 
ideology. Some trade coalitions are relatively informal and short-lived, while others 
last longer with a title and a regular meeting schedule. A coalition operating at a given 
stage is a product of the negotiation process from an earlier stage, rather than a 
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structure exogenous to this process. Thus, for a given state, a sophisticated negotiation 
strategy will often include tactics for building coalitions, for splitting rival coalitions, 
and for defending against efforts by outsiders to break one’s own.114 
 
Coalitions that include important players such as major developing or developed 
countries are likely to gain more for developing countries than those that do not.115 
A distinguishing feature of multilateral negotiations is the frequent formation of blocs, 
groups, or coalitions among the various participants, which later may become 
permanent or institutionalised. Before and during negotiations, groups sometimes 
form spontaneously to deal with particular problems or in response to a crisis. 
Many of these blocs are deliberate creations of their members on the basis of shared 
characteristics or common interests. There are regional alliances, whose organising 
principle is geography.116 
 
They exchange information on all or part of the agenda, either in advance or during 
the negotiations. At times, they develop common general positions on key agenda 
items, developing unified positions on an agenda; however, coalitions are a mixed 
blessing. They can make the negotiating environment less complex and enhance the 
efficient conduct of negotiations, but there is always the possibility of a breakdown of 
talks as blocs may become rigid and inflexible, turning into stumbling blocks for 
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success.117 A problem of equivalent importance, which was certainly evident in the 
Cairns Group, is internal divisions which may prevent the group from formulating an 
effective common position that offers a basis for participation in the negotiation. 
 
Coalitions may be classified into two types: bloc-type coalition and issue-based 
alliances. The two may be seen as representing the opposite ends of a spectrum. There 
are two key differences between the bloc-type coalitions and issue-based alliances. 
118 Firstly, the former come together against a backdrop of ideational and identity-
related factors, whereas the latter are formed for instrumental bargaining reasons. 
Secondly, the bloc-type coalitions combine like-minded countries and try to adopt 
collective positions across issue areas. In contrast, issue-based coalitions are directed 
towards specific threats and dissipate after the particular issue has been addressed.  
 
The Doha Round and Cancun ministerial have seen recent prominent bloc-type 
coalitions. Rather than attempt to restrict themselves to a single issue, these blocs 
evolve common positions in different issue areas. They differ significantly from the 
old bloc-type, as they tend to have detailed positive proposals as opposed to simply an 
agenda of resistance and blocking.119 Akin to the issue-based alliances, they stress 
the importance of research in facilitating negotiations in the area under discussion. 
These so-called “smart” coalitions thus combine elements of both issue-based 
alliances and bloc-type coalitions. Similar to their issue-based predecessors, they may 
focus on one central issue, even while addressing broader issues. By incorporating 
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elements of the old bloc-style diplomacy, they are able to acquire more longevity than 
the short-term issue-based alliance. These coalitions have also adopted some of the 
research-oriented strategies of the issue-based coalitions.  
 
Strategies choice (determinant factors) 
The ultimate aim of negotiation analysis is to predict, explain, or find ways of 
influencing the outcome. Then, the understanding of what determines the negotiating 
strategy becomes crucial. 
 
The factors that shape bargaining or negotiating positions can be categorised at three 
basic levels. At the global level are those structural features of the international 
system such as the extent of trade interdependence. At the state level are internal or 
domestic influences such as the type of government or the opinion of its citizens. At 
the individual level are the characteristics of the negotiator – his or her personal 
beliefs, values, and personality. All three levels of influence simultaneously affect 
decisions, but their relative weight usually depends on the issues and circumstances at 
the time of decision.120  
 
This section examines the conditions and factors that encourage negotiators to adopt 
one or another of the negotiation strategies earlier discussed. These factors explain the 
rationale behind the choice of strategies chosen and are placed in the context of 
negotiation and the negotiators’ beliefs. 
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Context   
Negotiation is a process by which contending parties come to an agreement, but that 
process neither occurs nor can be analysed merely on its own terms. No international 
negotiation is ever context-free. International negotiation is subject to many 
influences. The term ‘context’ denotes the broad structural context within which 
negotiation occurs. This refers to matters that range from the role and function of 
constituencies to norms of diplomacy. In the domain of international relations, it can 
be argued that in order to understand the factors that contribute to effective 
negotiation, one must take into account both the actor and the context. 
  
The contexts of any negotiation are diverse and can range from the history of the 
conflict and parties, the particular issues that form the basis for the current or 
anticipated round of negotiations, to the decision-making processes at work. The 
negotiators have never been isolated from the environmental context of negotiations. 
Political and military events, labour-management disputes, and contract disputes are 
just some examples of the context of negotiations. The situational factors that are 
specific to the particular negotiation in question encompass everything from the 
nature of the negotiation problem to the relationship between two or more negotiators. 
 
For example, the context of the negotiation involves the surrounding conditions that 
monetary and trade diplomats normally inherit and cannot influence much in the short 
run – cultures, international security conditions, international institutions, or domestic 
political institutions.121 
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Although the notion of a state remains a realistic simplifying assumption and a useful 
unit of analysis in international politics, it would be a mistake to view the parties in 
international negotiations as if they were unitary decision-makers. Domestic politics, 
bureaucratic idiosyncrasies and personal motivations all influence their objectives and 
negotiating tactics. It is important to point out that only a number of staff members are 
appointed as the negotiators and delegations; and thus this group of individuals may 
have more influence on the objectives and negotiating tactics than any other 
bureaucrats. Yet, it is also important to note that governments are complex 
organisations, staffed by officials who compete and disagree and who must in fact 
negotiate among themselves to formulate the national interest in any conflict with 
external opponents.122 
 
Domestic Theories of International Bargaining 
There exists a well-developed body of writing on the domestic context and 
international bargaining. Within this body of literature, it is believed that international 
negotiations are often not effectively consummated because of poorly conceived sets 
of internal negotiations and a lack of coordination between internal and external 
negotiations. A classic case is trade negotiations. The international trade negotiations 
are depicted as a two-level game, where domestic bargaining affects the positions that 
states adopt internationally. The reverse is also true, that is the international level has 
often been put to effective use to curtail the pressure of domestic lobbies at home.123 
Domestic forces may desire to influence international negotiations for either of two 
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reasons: a concern about foreign policy, or private interests. Domestic groups that are 
concerned about foreign policy hold their own views regarding the national welfare or 
regarding international issues and have their own convictions as to how principles like 
freedom and justice ought to be pursued in practice. Then, there are the private-
interest groups whose members are concerned with the effects of an agreement on 
their personal welfare, as distinct from holding a certain view of the national interest. 
Tariff negotiations and commercial agreements make characteristic battlegrounds for 
such private interests.124 For instance, liberalising trade between two countries may 
benefit each, but within each country there may be a few large losers (for example, 
farmers, industrial workers) and a multitude of small winners. The trick internally is 
to get the winners to compensate the losers so that the losers no longer become a 
blocking coalition.125 That said, governments often feel handicapped in the pursuit of 
national objectives if domestic interest groups become involved in their negotiations. 
This is evident in the case of the United States, where governments are faced with 
many motivated lobby groups. Citizens in favour of a “hard position” will criticise 
any concessions to the opponent; those who want an agreement will criticise the 
government’s “inflexibility.”126  
 
There is a plethora of writing on domestic politics and international bargaining. 
Another economic model, proposed by Ronal Rogowski, uses the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model to offer a compelling account of how trade affects political cleavages within 
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countries.127 According to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, countries export 
manufactures which make use of the abundant factor, and import goods that are 
intensive in the scarce factor. Rogowski then extends the Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
to reason that increasing exposure to trade will increase the political power of locally 
abundant factors, whereas decreasing exposure to trade will harm these factors. With 
trade, international economic forces can exert a profound effect on the political 
coalitions and the politics surrounding trade policy in domestic politics. Coalitions 
will then form along sectors. For example, owners of abundant factors will favour a 
free trade agenda, while owners of scarce resource will develop a common stand of 
protectionism.128 Obviously, this bears some relevance to coalition formation among 
states in the global political economy, since coalitions among states are still the result 
of resource endowment. Countries that share similar interests as commodity exporters 
are more likely to form a negotiating coalition, for instance, the Cairns Group in the 
Uruguay Round, which is examined in greater detail in chapter 5. 
  
To sum up, international negotiators also are embedded in complex two-level political 
games; and three levels in the case of the EU. While they are doing business with 
each other on one level, constituents and other officials at home are trying to 
influence their conduct. Thus, negotiators’ perception of their alternatives in any 
given negotiation is also affected by domestic politics. 
 
Although it is true that domestic theories of international bargaining can explain the 
coalition formation of developed countries where lobbies have traditionally played a 
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much greater role, it is less compelling in explaining the developing countries’ 
situation where lobby groups and partisan pressures are much smaller. Naturally, 
domestic constituencies can tie the hands of negotiators while also building credibility 
for a country’s proposals. However, domestic lobbies are not the only factor 
contributing to the choice of negotiating strategy. Negotiation alternatives for any 
country are also related to the particular alignment of other international actors and 
their interests. Other countries’ objectives and negotiating strategies help shape one’s 
choice of bargaining alternatives. Hence, a sole reliance on domestic politics would 
have difficulty explaining one country’s choice of bargaining strategy and their 
reaction at the international level. In fact, international bargaining and domestic 
politics are so interconnected that they should rather be simultaneously analysed as a 
whole.129  
 
The other context for negotiation, which also determines the choice of bargaining 
strategy, is the issue being negotiated. At the GATT/WTO, the presence of multiple 
issues and actors offers more alternatives to international trade negotiators. Also, 
several issues in a negotiation allow more opportunities for coalition-building and 
agenda-setting than if the talks are bilateral and focused around one issue.130 
Moreover, multiple actors allow for more alternatives to form coalitions. 
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Negotiator beliefs (about feasibility of strategies)/ ideology/ 
experience 
Many negotiation theories have a common game-theoretical heritage. Game theorists, 
however, regard communication as neither central nor problematic. However, 
bargaining and negotiation are subclasses of social communication, and if bargaining 
strategies are significant and they vary across negotiations, a useful theory ought to 
help explain this variation, and if possible help to anticipate future strategy choices by 
others. However, game-theoretical concepts fail to explain why one strategy works in 
one situation, and not in another. One useful thing to know, taken from labour-
management relations, will be that the negotiator’s belief about how the other side 
will react has some impact on the choice of strategy and the effectiveness of strategies 
employed.  
 
The cognitive perspective focuses on the belief systems of the bargaining actors. It 
redirects attention from the actors’ external behaviour to their internal (mental) 
processes. The cognitive theory believes that each actor comes to the bargaining 
process with a set of beliefs and expectations about himself or herself, the adversary 
and the bargaining issues, based on previous experiences. As soon as the exchange 
begins, each actor is in a position to test and either validate or adjust his or her initial 
beliefs and expectations. In order to understand the ensuing negotiation process, there 
is a need to explore the belief systems of the actors.131 In comparison with the game-
theoretical conceptions, the cognitive perspective emphasises the obstacles to change 
and resistance to change in bargaining. Incompatible beliefs frequently complicate 
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and aggravate international bargaining. Change is seen to occur when the bargaining 
actors modify ‘peripheral’ beliefs. ‘Central’ beliefs are normally considered stable 
and unaffected by persuasion attempts. As this brief outline indicates, the cognitive 
perspectives offer alternative explanations of change in international bargaining – 
modified belief systems from the cognitive perspective.132 A cognitive approach 
entails a different view of the negotiation process from the focus of most rational-
choice approaches. In brief, cognitive theory may contribute to a better understanding 
of the conflicting elements of international negotiations by explaining why negative 
images of the adversary and perceptions of conflict persist. Therefore, it is 
indispensable to acknowledge the fact that, like any human beings, officials who play 
a role in negotiations have their emotions, personal weaknesses, and personal beliefs. 
For example, in terms of international economic development, levels of national 
economic development alone do not determine monetary or finance policies. Instead, 
trade negotiators’ perceptions of the opportunities and constraints that their states’ 
economic resources provide may more powerfully influence their bargaining strategy 
choices.133 
 
Another possibility to explain negotiating behaviour is culture or nationality.  To 
attribute negotiating behaviour to the actor without regard for the cultural and 
situational context in which that actor functions is no more sensible than explaining 
everything in situational terms without regard for the individual players. While there 
are certainly differences in negotiating style that are attributable to culture, much can 
probably be traced more accurately to an amalgam of culture, situation, personality, 
                                                 
132
 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
133
 Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Witkopf, Eugene R., World Politics: Trend and Transformation. 
London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2001, p. 61. 
Chapter 2: Literature review: bargaining, negotiations and strategies  77 
and interaction. However, it should also be clear that the matter of evaluating the 
negotiating behaviour of actors across the divide of culture and nationality is far from 
a simple matter. Nonetheless, the international arena is replete with illustrations of 
negotiation across traditional boundaries of culture and nationality. Thus, one 
potential way in which a negotiator behaves can be explained in terms of the 
negotiator’s culture. Most generally, the term culture refers to the negotiator’s 
ideology, socialised experience, and shared values with others from a similar 
background.134 
 
Conclusion 
To help explain what strategies are more likely to be successful, this chapter 
examined the IPE literature including works by Odell and Narlikar which deal with 
bargaining and negotiation. In fact, the game theoretic perspectives also offer valuable 
insights by using models to explain how developing countries can recognise 
bargaining problems and how many available strategies are possible, as well as how 
they identify the best alternative that offer the best chance of achieving the desired 
goal(s). However, in practice, bounded rationality is more typical. The rational 
decision-maker, assumed by game theoretic perspectives, is often more an idealised 
standard than an accurate description of real-world behaviour. Yet, it does allow one 
to make useful simplifying assumptions; and the game theoretic perspective also 
offers some explanatory and possibly predictive values. Also, there is increasing work 
that constructs a game which assumes limited or constrained information. After all, 
that is one of the bases of a prisoner’s dilemma. Moreover, there is increasing work 
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on repeated games which are more relevant to negotiations, as actions taken in Game 
1 can affect the stakes for Game 2. 
 
Odell depicts economic bargaining as neither purely distributive struggle nor win-win 
accommodation. He develops a theory premised on bounded rationality, setting it 
apart from the most common form of rational choice, as well as from views that reject 
rationality. Furthermore, available information is often incomplete and insufficient to 
make a precise decision. By taking these assumptions as the starting points, Odell also 
points to another crucial problem for policy-makers, which is their susceptibility to 
cognitive dissonance.  
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Chapter 3: Historical background to the case study 
 
The historical background to the Uruguay trade talks is important in understanding the 
bargaining strategies used by negotiators and trade diplomats at the Uruguay Round 
because, as mentioned earlier, the context of the negotiation is one of the factors 
determining bargaining choice. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a 
brief review of the development of the GATT and the separate treatment of 
agriculture under the GATT rules. It begins with a brief background on the Uruguay 
Round and goes on to assess the Uruguay Round negotiations on Agriculture.  
 
It is crucial to note that the effectiveness of any strategic bargaining move depends, to 
a large extent, on the strategies pursued by other countries, including those in 
alliances and opponents. It is therefore almost imperative to assess the interests and 
the bargaining strategies employed by other major countries in agricultural 
negotiations before assessing the effectiveness of the strategies pursued by Thailand. 
Hence, the chapter later evaluates the roles and interests of the key actors in the 
negotiations, including developing countries in general.  
Historical Background to the Uruguay Round (context for 
negotiations) 
 
The Uruguay Round, launched at Punta del Este in 1986, was the eighth Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations (MTNs) convened under the auspices of the GATT 
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). It has been the most ambitious and most 
complex of all GATT Rounds. Designed in part to bring two of the sectors which had 
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been out of the mainstream into greater conformity with the GATT, namely textiles 
and agriculture, the agenda for the Uruguay Round reflected a mix of the old and the 
new in trade concerns.135 To these two elements of ‘old business’ were added three 
new negotiating areas. These new issues included trade in services, Trade Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and Trade Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMs). In fact, there were several contributing factors that led to the inclusion of 
these new issues. Trade in services, in which the US was the leading exporter, had 
been growing fast, but lay entirely outside the rules of the GATT. Also, the perceived 
need by industrial countries to see developing countries implement patent and 
copyright protection led to the inclusion of the protection of intellectual property 
rights. 136 Finally, Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) such as export 
performance and domestic purchase conditions attached to foreign direct investment 
activities was included because these investment policies of developing countries 
often place constraints on the activities of American corporations abroad.
 137
 
 
 
The Uruguay Round was initiated because many countries in the world economy 
recognised that the early 1980s were a turning point for the global economy and that 
fundamental changes were occurring that would challenge the traditional GATT 
structure.138 The context from which the Uruguay Round emerged was one of rapid 
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change in the pattern of world trade, together with ferment within the policy structures 
dealing with trade. As noted earlier, the emphasis on context is crucial, as the 
rationale for honing in on a specific case is to be able to identify, uncover and unpick 
specific contextual factors in which the event, person or policy being analysed is 
embedded.139 These changing economic circumstances, such as the slowing of the 
world economy as well as developments in sectors like agriculture and services, 
eventually led countries to negotiate the Round. Moreover, apart from a general 
concern over the world economy, the evidence of increasing trade independence 
between national economies in the world economy encouraged officials in the United 
States, as well as in other countries, to pursue the option of a new trade 
negotiation.140 With rising trade dependence, national economies would become 
increasingly externalised and this, in turn, would make them more vulnerable to the 
actions of other governments. Thus, for most trade officials, negotiating new 
international trade rules was an effective means to achieve market access and 
economic security in the external economy.  
 
From the beginning, the Uruguay Round negotiations were expected to be tough 
because so much was at stake and there was so much work to be done. In addition, the 
range of issues covered was much more extensive than previous Rounds. This was 
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partly a consequence of there being a certain amount of unfinished business carried 
over from the Tokyo Round.141 
 
Before the Uruguay Round negotiations could begin, countries had to agree on the 
objectives for the negotiations and decide the way in which the negotiations were to 
be organised.142 As it happened, the pre-negotiation process, the so-called catalyst 
stage, took over a year before the formal negotiations began in September 1986 with 
the launch of the Round at Punta del Este, Uruguay.  
 
The schedule for the Uruguay Round was as follows: a mid-term review in December 
1988; the drafting of framework agreements, followed by further negotiations on the 
final form of the agreement in autumn 1990. The formal signing of agreements would 
then take place in Brussels in early December 1990. As it happened, things did not go 
according to plan. The mid term review turned into a somewhat contentious affair. 
The ‘mid-term’ meeting in Montreal culminated in the suspension of the negotiations, 
with the Cairns Group threatening to walk out of the negotiations unless there was 
substantial progress in agriculture. The negotiations were resumed in April 1989, 
when countries agreed to compromise on a wording of the objective of the 
agricultural talks. Nevertheless, the Brussels meeting collapsed amidst recriminations 
about where responsibility for failure lay, despite all the attempts to gain 
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consensus.143 It is generally accepted that the ‘final’ negotiations in Brussels in 
December 1990 collapsed, largely as a result of the impasse on agriculture.144  
 
Timeline of the Uruguay Round Negotiations 
 
Sep 86 Punta del 
Este: 
Launch of the Round 
Dec 88 Montreal: ministerial mid-term review 
Apr 89 Geneva: mid-term review completed 
Dec 90 Brussels: “closing” ministerial meeting ends in deadlock 
Dec 91 Geneva: first draft of Final Act completed 
Nov 92 Washington: US and EC achieve “Blair House” breakthrough on 
agriculture 
Jul 93 Tokyo: Quad achieve market access breakthrough at G7 summit 
Dec 93 Geneva: most negotiations end (some market access talks remain) 
Apr 94 Marrakesh: agreements signed 
Jan 95 Geneva: WTO created, agreements take effect 
   
Figure3. 1: Timeline of the Uruguay Round Negotiations. 
Source: the WTO. 
 
There are a number of factors which contributed to the failure to reach agreement. 
Firstly, the fact that so many, both old and new, issues were addressed in the Round 
made the negotiations extremely complex and complicated.145 The scale of the 
undertaking was quite vast and, with hindsight, it was bound to create difficulties. 
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Secondly, there were strong inter-sectoral linkages among many of the issues. In fact, 
when the Round was launched, it was believed that inter-sectoral linkages would 
provide the key to a successful Round with deals being cut across groups.146 
However, as it turned out, these inter-sectors linkages actually complicated the 
negotiations even further. Offers of concessions in one area were held up by any lack 
of progress on other linked issues. In particular, the notion that agriculture was unique 
made it virtually impossible to make cross-sectoral linkages or tradeoffs. Also, some 
of the new issues, e.g. TRIMs and the protection of intellectual property, created 
unexpected difficulties. These new issues were problematic because there was no real 
track record of negotiating on them, and because some of them raised constitutional 
problems e.g. in the matter of intellectual property rights. Another crucial factor that 
made agreement increasingly difficult to attain was the complexity of cross coalition 
activity. For example in agriculture, coalitions faced each other on both a North-North 
basis and a North-South basis.147 To sum up, all the factors stated made it more 
difficult to reach a final agreement.  
 
The Agricultural Negotiations 
As stated earlier, the Uruguay Round dealt with several highly contested and 
important issues, including the so-called new issues of TRIPs, TRIMs and services, 
and agriculture was not the only important issue. Nevertheless, this section places a 
greater emphasis on the issue of agriculture negotiations. Of all the other equally 
important issues, agriculture negotiation was chosen as the focus because it is in these 
                                                 
146
 Ibid., pp. 21-23. 
147
 Ibid., p. 22. 
Chapter 3: Historical background to the case study  85 
negotiations that Thailand’s mixed bargaining strategy is most obvious at all three 
levels – international, regional, and domestic. 
   
Although the greatest emphasis is placed on agriculture negotiations, it is crucial that 
agriculture is considered within the wider context of the Uruguay Round negotiations.  
The post-1950 period saw substantial growth in agricultural protection and insulation 
in the advanced industrial economies and its spread to newly industrialising 
economies. After the Second World War, farmers and agricultural ministries in 
OECD countries exempted agriculture from key GATT disciplines and recurrent 
MTNs. The US led the way with its request for a waiver in 1955. With the official 
creation of the EEC and its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), European countries 
also insisted on special treatment for this sector.148 That tendency accelerated in the 
1980s to the point where some protectionist countries went beyond self-sufficiency to 
generate surpluses, which could only be disposed of by dumping them onto the world 
market, with the help of export subsidies.149 During much of the 1980s, agricultural 
trade had been affected by the accumulation of surplus stocks (especially in the 
United States and the EC). In an effort to clear stocks, governments resorted to export 
subsidies, which depressed agricultural prices further.150 
 
Previous rounds in the GATT had fostered a process of trade liberalisation in 
industrial products, but had been unable to reduce agricultural trade barriers and 
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distortions. Indeed, very little progress was made on agriculture in the Kennedy and 
Tokyo Rounds. In both Rounds, the European Economic Community proposed that 
international commodity agreements be negotiated for products such as cereals, rice, 
sugar, and dairy. However, the US, in contrast, emphasised the need to expand 
agricultural trade and to finally end the special status of agriculture in the GATT.151 
In spite of its own effort, the attempt to liberalise trade in agriculture in the Kennedy 
and Tokyo Rounds failed mainly because of an unwillingness to modify the protection 
of agriculture both in the US and the European Economic Community’s CAP.152 
 
The significance of the UR agriculture negotiations was that it permitted discussion in 
a more internationally oriented context of issues, which were generally locked in by 
entrenched domestic alignments. Prior to the Uruguay Round, the multilateral trading 
rules for agriculture were largely ineffective, with a plethora of non-tariff barriers 
providing high and variable rates of protection, both in industrial and in developing 
countries.153 Export subsidies were a particular source of discord. In particular, 
competitive export subsidies by the European Union and the United States depressed 
and destabilised world prices. In the previous rounds of MTNs prior to the Uruguay 
Round, agricultural discussions between the two major players, the US and the EU, 
were based on two totally different conceptions. The EU favoured the development of 
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a system to manage world trade so as to facilitate the functioning of the CAP.154 The 
basic premise of the EU was that the CAP was nonnegotiable, and that the focus of 
discussions should therefore be on stabilising world agricultural markets instead. The 
US, in contrast, emphasised the need to expand agricultural trade and to end the 
special status of agriculture in the GATT. Countries such as Australia and New 
Zealand supported the idea of significant liberalisation proposed by the US and the 
idea was much welcomed by most agriculture exporting developing countries, 
including Thailand, since the loss of developing country export revenue resulting 
from agricultural protectionism in the US, the EU and Japan had been significant.  
Therefore, it was clear to everyone that a significant reform of agricultural trade rules 
and practices was needed for the conduct of agricultural trade negotiations. It also led 
traditional agricultural-exporting countries to insist that Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations focus on reducing agricultural protection.155  
 
The agricultural negotiations largely determined the pace and progress of the Round. 
The first phase (September 1986 to December 1988) established the objectives of the 
negotiations and defined their structure. Agricultural negotiations were to be an 
integral part of the negotiation on goods trade, but conducted in an agricultural 
committee.156 For the first time, domestic agricultural policies were to be the subject 
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of international negotiations, though at that time it was unclear as to whether their 
level and instrumentality, as well as their trade effects, were on the table.157 
 
The UR agriculture negotiations were influenced by a number of crucial factors, 
including a crisis in the global agricultural system. This massive crisis in world 
agriculture originated from the over production of agricultural products, as a result of 
the commodity price boom of the early 1970s. Consequently, the 1980s experienced a 
price slump for agricultural products and international prices for agricultural 
commodities collapsed. Undoubtedly, this led to substantial increases in farm support, 
particularly in the US. Export competition, propelled by subsidies, between the EU 
and the US in world markets was also another consequence of this change in 
economic conditions. These factors – growing trade disputes between the US and the 
EU, a recognition within the EU that its interventionist agricultural policy needed to 
be reformed to control an increasingly unsustainable agricultural budget, and a 
realisation that the success of the UR depended partly on the EU making agricultural 
concessions in order to accommodate the needs of its trade partners - led to the 
realisation among contracting parties that agriculture negotiations were necessary 
under the GATT auspice.158 
 
Actually, agricultural issues, above all, were responsible for much of the Round 
ending seven and a half years later. While all participants displayed a willingness to 
bring about substantive agricultural and trade policy reform, disagreements over the 
extent and speed of reduction in trade-distorting domestic and export subsidies and 
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border protection almost led to the breakdown of the Round.
159 
Although producing a 
multilateral agreement on new trade rules and disciplines had always been difficult, 
the inability of the EU and the US to reach agreement on the treatment of agricultural 
trade was the most obvious cause.  
 
The timeline of the Uruguay Round negotiations on agriculture can be divided into 
three phases.160 The first phase was an exchange of ideas, including the approach to 
be taken to improve agricultural trade and the way in which negotiations should 
proceed. This began right after the launch of the round at Punta Del Este. In July 
1987, the United States tabled its dramatic proposal for eliminating all trade-distorting 
farm programmes over a ten-year period, followed by a proposal from the newly 
formed Cairns Group. The Cairns Group, fourteen small and medium-sized 
agricultural exporters, proposed an immediate freeze on price support, followed by a 
phased reduction, until a new set of rules could be introduced to regulate agricultural 
trade. However, the EC did not agree. The EC tabled a counter proposal to negotiate 
reductions in support levels only when some action would be adopted in the short run 
to shore up world prices.  
 
Generally speaking, the first phase produced more disagreement than agreement, 
which later culminated in the collapse of the negotiations at a midterm review in 
Montreal in December 1988, coupled with the fact that the Cairns Group insisted on 
progress in agriculture before the talks could proceed. Moreover, the EC and the 
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United States could not reach an agreement on the scope and objective of the 
negotiations, nor on the modalities. In April 1989, the talks resumed only when 
countries finally agreed to a “midterm” package of measures which specified a freeze 
in support prices and laid down the timetable for the rest of the negotiations.  
 
The second phase of the negotiations saw a detailed proposal from each major 
participant, with the intention to arrive at a common document on which all parties 
could base further negotiations. Significantly, the form of the final agreement began 
to take shape in this second stage. In contrast to its original paper in 1987, the United 
States proposed an approach that would focus on rules to guide both domestic policies 
and trade in agricultural products. The US proposed that non-tariff import barriers 
should be converted into tariffs; the ban of export subsidies should be implemented 
and domestic support policies should be categorised into three main groups: 
prohibited, actionable and non-actionable subsidies. The Cairns Group broadly 
supported this approach. However, the EC argued for an across-the-board cut in 
support levels by a similar instrument proposed by the United States in 1987. In June 
1990, the chairman of the Negotiating Group on Agriculture, Aart de Zeeuw, 
attempted to put all the ideas together into one single negotiating paper called the 
Chairman’s Draft. In it, he presented a blueprint for a substantial and comprehensive 
draft agreement. Yet, it did not receive enough support to be a basis for negotiations. 
The EC argued that the position in the Chairman’s Draft followed too closely those 
proposed by the US/Cairns Group and rejected it. The final negotiations in Brussels in 
December 1990 later collapsed largely due to the impasse on agriculture. The Cairns 
Group indicated its unwillingness to settle for a weak compromise on agriculture once 
again. An agreement on the structure of an agricultural package was not realised until 
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February 1991. It could only happen after the EC had proposed substantial 
modifications in its own internal common agricultural policy, allowing a deal to be 
struck.  
 
Finally, the third phase of the negotiations saw detailed development of an agreement 
that would apply to all of the participating countries. The details were included in the 
“Draft Final Act” of December 1991, submitted by Arthur Dunkel, the Director 
General of the GATT, which has often been called the Dunkel Draft.  The Dunkel 
Draft introduced the timetable for the liberalisation of support and protection. The 
Dunkel Draft was later modified by the Blair House Accord. The Blair House Accord 
was reached in November 1992, between the United States and the EC, with some 
difficulty within the EC. Member states within the EC were split between positions. 
For France, the Blair House agreement, with its provision for subsidy cuts, was 
problematic. Hence, France wanted to formally renegotiate the accord. Nonetheless, 
the United Kingdom and Germany would be displeased if a breakdown in 
negotiations occurred; whereas France and some smaller countries like Portugal and 
Ireland supported Commission President Jaques Delors, who claimed that 
Agricultural Commissioner Ray MacSharry had exceeded his mandate while 
negotiating with the US.161 Initially, Germany was concerned about how a collapse 
of the Round would hit its export based manufacturing industries and, hence, opposed 
France on the renegotiating of the accord. However, Germany later changed its 
position and supported France in reopening the talks with the US about the accord 
because it also saw potential benefit for its farmers. With both Germany’s support on 
the renegotiation of the accord and German pressure on France’s acquiescence in a 
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GATT treaty, France later changed position, for fear of becoming isolated.162 This, 
later, led to fresh negotiations with the US Clinton administration and, hence, the 
conclusion of Blair House 2, which represented a ‘clarification’ of the initial 
agreement.  
 
With the Blair House Accord reached, the agricultural talks in the Uruguay Round 
resumed. The main elements of the Dunkel Draft were the groundwork for the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. The Agreement on Agriculture that 
emerged from the Uruguay Round covers four main parts, dealing with market access, 
domestic support, export competition, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. 
 
Key actors/parties/interests/strategies 
The Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations, like most important historical events 
and phenomena, had factors underlying or leading up to it which are of vital 
importance to understanding and analysis. Often, in international affairs, the 
objectives sought by nations become enmeshed and are identified with the techniques 
for attaining those objectives. Thus, it is critical to understand the interests, the 
objectives, and bargaining strategies of the key players prior to assessing the 
strategies used by Thailand during the Round. 
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Leading exporters and importers of agricultural products, 2006                                               
(Billion dollars and percentage)                                                                                                                                                            
  
Value  
Share in world 
exports/imports  Annual percentage change    
                        
  2006  1980 1990 2000 2006    2000-06  2004 2005 2006 
            
Exporters                                                                           
European Union (25)                                405.25  - - 41.5 42.9   10 14 7 9 
            extra-EU (25) exports                       95.31  - - 10.1 10.1   9 11 8 13 
United States                                            92.66  17.0 14.3 12.9 9.8   4 4 4 12 
Canada                                                      44.23  5.0 5.4 6.3 4.7   4 19 3 7 
Brazil                                                        39.53  3.4 2.4 2.8 4.2   17 27 14 13 
China                                                        32.54  1.5 2.4 3.0 3.4   12 9 19 13 
Australia                                                   22.18  3.3 2.9 3.0 2.3   5 35 -4 5 
Thailand                                                   21.58  1.2 1.9 2.2 2.3   10 13 4 21 
Argentina                                                  21.33  1.9 1.8 2.2 2.3   10 13 12 11 
Indonesia                                                  18.32  1.6 1.0 1.4 1.9   15 27 16 30 
Russian Federation  a                               17.06  - - 1.4 1.8   14 13 20 16 
Malaysia                                                   15.57  2.0 1.8 1.5 1.6   12 14 2 16 
Mexico                                                     14.69  0.8 0.8 1.6 1.6   8 13 13 17 
India  a,  b                                                 14.41  1.0 0.8 1.2 1.5   14 8 26 34 
New Zealand                                            13.24  1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4   10 24 7 2 
Chile                                                         11.49  0.4 0.7 1.2 1.2   10 22 11 14 
Above 15                                                      784.09  - - 83.5 83.0   - - - - 
Importers                                                                          
European Union (25)                                433.66  - - 42.3 43.3   9 14 6 8 
            extra-EU (25) imports                      123.72  - - 13.3 12.4   8 13 5 9 
United States                                            103.65  8.7 9.0 11.6 10.3   7 14 9 8 
Japan                                                         65.62  9.6 11.5 10.4 6.6   1 12 1 0 
China                                                        51.65  2.1 1.8 3.3 5.2   18 39 7 14 
Canada  d                                                  23.95  1.8 2.0 2.6 2.4   8 8 11 12 
Russian Federation  a,  d                          23.38  - - 1.6 2.3   17 13 23 22 
Korea, Republic of                                   18.58  1.5 2.2 2.2 1.9   6 11 5 11 
Mexico  d                                                 18.46  1.2 1.2 1.8 1.8   9 11 7 12 
Hong Kong, China                                   11.90  1.2 1.9 2.0 1.2   0 3 -1 7 
            retained imports                               7.79  1.0 1.0 1.1 0.8   3 9 3 7 
Taipei, Chinese                                         9.67  1.1 1.4 1.3 1.0   3 13 5 2 
Switzerland                                               8.85  1.2 1.3 1.0 0.9   8 9 4 7 
United Arab Emirates  a,  c                      8.81  0.3 0.4 0.6 0.9   ... 31 17 ... 
Saudi Arabia  a                                         8.56  1.5 0.8 0.9 0.9   7 12 31 -6 
Malaysia                                                   8.50  0.5 0.5 0.8 0.8   11 37 3 17 
India  a,  b                                                 7.84  0.5 0.4 0.7 0.8   12 7 7 7 
Above 15                                                      798.99  - - 82.1 79.8   - - - - 
                        
a      Includes Secretariat estimates.                                                                                                                                                      
b      Figures refer to fiscal year.                                                                                                                                                           
c      2005 instead of 2006                                                                                                                                             
d      Imports are valued f.o.b.                                                                                                                                        
Table  3.1: Leading exporters and importers of agricultural products, 2007. 
Table 3.1: Leading exporters and importers of agricultural products, 2007. 
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics 2007. 
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Major trading nations interests/objectives/positions/strategies 
The level of economic and industrial development a state enjoys affects the foreign 
policy goals and bargaining strategies it can pursue or utilise. Generally speaking, the 
more economically developed a state is, the more likely it is to play an activist role in 
the negotiations. Major trading nations have interests that extend far beyond their 
borders and typically possess the means to pursue them. Interestingly, states that 
enjoy industrial and commercial capabilities and extensive involvement in 
international trade also tend to be somewhat militarily powerful (with the exception of 
Switzerland). This may in part be because military might is seen as the result of a 
function of economic capabilities.163 
 
US  
It is undeniable that the United States has been and remains the single most important 
actor in the international trade arena, and indeed the central actor in the world 
political economy. To varying degrees, the US has dominated, along with other 
powerful trading states, rules setting and a control over the major institutions of 
economic and political management; although, at present, it is less influential than it 
was.  Yet, one cannot deny the vital role that the United States plays in the politics of 
international trade. Hence, any analysis of the GATT rounds of trade negotiations 
must at least seek to understand the role and the interests of the US. In fact, the US 
plays such an extremely central role in international trade negotiations that most of 
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the Rounds had been led and initiated by it. As a matter of fact, the International 
Trade Organisation (ITO) never came into being partly because of the incompatibility 
of the ITO Charter with US agricultural policy at the time.164 The irony is that the 
ITO was, in fact, a joint initiative by the US in agreement with the United Kingdom.  
 
The principal instigator of the Uruguay Round was the US. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the agenda of the Round largely reflected largely American priorities, 
including the liberalisation of trade in services, high technology goods, and the 
protection of intellectual property rights.165 
 
An intriguing point to make here is that the free trade doctrine has often had special 
appeal in the United States and has usually dominated its foreign economic policy.166 
The central role of the liberal theory in the evolution of US trade policy is apparent in 
the economic policy options the US pursues. In accordance with the mentioned liberal 
principles, the United States has sought to expand global trade along two parallel 
tracks. To some extent, it has liberalised its own trade policies, despite its extensive 
use of anti-dumping procedures. At the same time, it has worked to move other 
nations toward free trade ideology by creating a global economic system that 
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facilitates that choice.167 Apart from its unilateral and multilateral trade initiatives, 
the United States was also a leading force in shaping the Bretton Woods institutions 
after World War II.  Two of the three organisations, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the Bank for Reconstruction and Development (or the World Bank), came 
into being. The exception was the third – the International Trade Organisation (ITO). 
Efforts to establish the ITO were abandoned only when the US Truman administration 
announced in December 1948 that it would not submit the ITO Charter to Congress 
for ratification.168 In addition, it played the greatest role in extending the 
liberalisation process through the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to create and enhance a liberalised trade regime. In recent 
years, however, the United States has adhered to unilateral and bilateral actions more 
frequently in order to achieve a liberal trading system to protect its own interests 
which have shifted as imports into the US have increased. In order to pry open a 
market perceived to be unfairly closed, unilateral measures such as trade sanctions 
have been threatened.169 In contradiction to the overall liberal view, this US 
unilateral approach ignores the balance of concessions and advantages struck in 
previous GATT rounds. The justification for its action is that the balance of advantage 
struck in the WTO is not being respected and is often exploited by its other trading 
partners. Consequently, the threat of sanctions has led to a series of bilateral 
agreements.170 This sort of bilateral agreement has also been fairly heavily criticised 
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by free trade experts. Again, the United States claims that the bilateral agreements are 
only bilateral in terms of negotiation, as the results would be multi-lateralised. It 
should be noted that, while in many cases there have been positive effects of bilateral 
trade talks, there have also been negative effects for other trading partners as well, 
since the agreements usually benefited narrowly focused US interests. Clearly, the 
unilateral path will still remain an important tool in US eyes.171 
 
On agriculture, however, the top US priority was to regain its market share of world 
trade in cereals and other agricultural products. The US position shifted from 
favouring protectionist farming policies to a more liberalised one when trade was in 
decline during the early 1980s.172 This shift in the farm policies of the US was the 
direct result of a change in the balance of power within the agricultural policy 
community.173 Traditionally, agriculture has been regarded as a sector of economic 
activity that deserves special treatment and, hence, US agricultural policy tended to 
protect vulnerable small groups of ‘family farmers’ although it cannot be denied that 
big farm agri-businesses actually received most of the financial advantages.174 The 
US implemented both domestic support and import protection to shield these 
vulnerable farmers from outside competition.175 This attitude manifested itself during 
the post-war negotiations on the ITO as part of US insistence that the ITO not affect 
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its agricultural policies and, since the Second World War, GATT rules on agriculture 
were in part written to fit existing US agricultural policies, in order to protect its farm 
trade.176  However, while other farm interests still favoured it, this protectionist 
attitude changed in the 1980s when the export oriented agri-business lobby in the US, 
whose aim was to promote exports on the basis of price competition, turned against 
protection.  Due to advances in technology and management skills, these agriculture 
businesses were pro free trade as they would profit from a level playing field resulting 
from a reduction in subsidies, especially in the EU. By negotiating through the GATT 
in the UR, the US therefore aimed to abolish all forms of agricultural support and 
protection.177 The US position was strongly supported by other major exporters of 
temperate agricultural products such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and 
Argentina. 
 
During the Uruguay Round the US tabled four major proposals which addressed the 
agenda and negotiations in agriculture. The first was the 1987 US proposal. In 
summary, the goals of the proposals that the US wanted to achieve were: (1) to 
establish discipline over the use of export subsidies by seeking to freeze existing 
subsidies, with an agreed timetable to phase them out over a period of years (the so-
called ‘standstill’ and ‘rollback’ provisions); (2) to enhance market access and to 
reduce all trade barriers, including quantitative restrictions; (3) to strengthen the 
dispute settlement and enforcement processes; and (4) to phase out all trade-distorting 
                                                 
176
 Hoekman, B., and M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System: from GATT 
to WTO, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p.212. 
177
 Ingersent, K.A., Rayner A.J., and Hine R.C., ‘The EC Perspective,’ in K. A. Ingersent, A.J. Rayner 
and R.C Hine, eds., Agriculture in the Uruguay Round, Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1994, 
p.59. 
Chapter 3: Historical background to the case study  99 
domestic subsidies and import barriers over a 10-year period.178 By advocating a 
sweeping elimination of all trade-distorting agricultural subsidies by the year 2000 or 
over a ten-year period (the so-called zero option which was borrowed from nuclear 
strategy), the main thrust of the US proposal was clearly targeted at a reduction in 
levels of support and protection. 179  
 
The year following the tabling of the initial proposals did not see much advancement 
in the negotiation process. As the scheduled mid-term review approached, views on 
the issues tended to polarise rather than come together. The US continued to insist on 
an advance commitment to the elimination of trade-distorting subsidies by submitting 
the second proposal in November 1988. A Framework Proposal was specifically 
designed to set the agenda for future negotiations and act as a guide for the 
forthcoming Mid-Term Review. A central element of the Framework Proposal was 
the ‘tariffication’ of all non-tariff barriers to agricultural trade.180 The term 
‘tariffication’ means the course of action by which all NTBs should be converted to 
their tariff equivalents and bound.  
 
The Montreal meeting was meant to be the time to bring together the individual 
negotiating positions and to resolve difficulties in any area; however, the reverse 
happened. The intensive negotiations in Montreal failed to find a solution to the 
unbridgeable gap between the United States and the EC in agriculture. The US 
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insisted that a commitment be made to ‘eliminate’ support and protection for 
agriculture; whereas, the EC was willing to concede only that it should be ‘reduced’. 
Undoubtedly, the deadlock in agriculture gave rise to a complete halt to the progress 
of the negotiations. Only when the wording of the objective of the negotiations was 
agreed upon by both the US and the EC were the impasses on agriculture finally 
resolved in April 1989. In place of the aim of eliminating support, the United Sates 
accepted what was characterised as a language change in the April Agreement, which 
called for ‘substantial progressive reductions in agriculture support and protection 
sustained over an agreed period of time’.181 Actually, the acceptance of this form of 
words entailed a basic shift in the US position.182 
 
Another proposal of the US was the ‘Comprehensive Proposal’ of October 1989, 
which laid down a direct challenge to EC. In effect, the proposal challenged the EC to 
dispose of its support system, the CAP. The variable levy would have to be converted 
into a fixed tariff, export subsidies would be eliminated, and domestic subsidies tied 
to domestic production would be phased out. Policies that would be allowed would 
feature only research and extension, domestic food subsidies, food aid, and 
‘decoupled’ income payments to producers.183 It is equally important to note that, in 
the same year, US farm politicians spent a good amount of time in Washington, 
drafting the 1990 Farm Bill. These simultaneous processes and interlocking 
considerations could not be ignored. In fact, some parts of the Farm Bill – especially 
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those of the re-authorisation of the Export Enhancement Programme (EEP) and a 
Market Promotion Programme (MPP) - were viewed as counter-attacking foreign 
agricultural exports subsidies, those of the EC to be more specific.184 
 
Again, the United States led the way by tabling its ‘final’ proposal on 15th October 
1990, by taking the Chairman’s Draft as a basis for a framework. The proposal called 
for a 75 per cent cut in domestic support and tariffs over a 10-year period. Until then 
the United States had pressed for the elimination of import barriers within 10 years; 
the goal was then reduced to a 75 per cent cut over the same period (one facet of 
abandoning the zero option). It also called for a 90 per cent reduction in export 
subsidies over two years. Without doubt, this position contrasted with that of the 
European Community.185Consistent with its overall approach, in this proposal the 
United States advocated the eventual removal of the exceptional treatment of 
agriculture under the GATT, including Article XI.2(c) (i) which allows countries to 
impose quantitative import restrictions as part of supply-management systems.186 
Interestingly enough, the United States showed a willingness to part with its beloved 
Section 22 in order to obtain its general strategic goals of the Uruguay Round - to 
phase out all import barriers on the ground that trading partners reciprocate.187 
 
Although the final US proposal was less aggressive than earlier positions taken, the 
GATT meeting in Brussels, which had originally been intended to conclude the 
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Uruguay Round, still reached a ‘breakdown’ point in December 1990. A deadlock in 
agriculture negotiations, which centred on the so-called Hellstrom proposal which, 
essentially, proposed 30 per cent reductions on internal support, border protection and 
export subsidies over five years, was an obvious cause of the breakdown.188. In the 
aftermath of the Brussels meeting, the US negotiators and their Cairns Group allies 
maintained pressure for reform on the European Community. Indeed, the United 
States and the Cairns Group utilised a variety of economic techniques and political 
tactics to move towards the accomplishment of the objectives already spelt out. 
Nonetheless, at the same time, it could be sensed that the United States was 
positioning itself for some type of compromise.189 This, coupled with other 
significant factors such as the Dunkel Shuttle, the MacSharry Plan190, and the 
extension of Fast-track legislation, led to a successful bilateral negotiation – the Blair 
House Accord, representing the political culmination of the six-year-confrontation 
between the US and the EC. 
 
To conclude, the United States entered the negotiations with a firm bargaining 
position to press for long term agricultural reform and for more liberal agricultural 
trade policies, since agricultural protectionism had been deep-rooted and farm lobbies 
had always been the stumbling block to agricultural policy reform, both in the US and 
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other developed countries. Yet, in the background of the United States negotiating 
position were its own farm policies, and there lurked US farm organisations, farm 
commodity groups and, more importantly, the big agri-businesses, which would be 
constantly on the alert to prevent an erosion of their interests during the 
negotiations.191 Thus, like any other country, the United States objectives and its 
bargaining position during the life of the Uruguay Round were pretty much affected 
by two major forces: the reaction of other countries, especially the European 
Community, to its proposals and the politics of agriculture at home.  
 
EU 
Another major player in agricultural trade in the Uruguay Round was the European 
Union (EU), known at the time as the European Community (EC). Overall, the EC 
moved from being an importer of most agricultural products in the early 1970s to 
being a net exporter of most in the mid-1980s. This transition, due to the CAP and 
rising productivity, had critical implications for global agricultural trade, as well as 
for the EC budget. Thus, at the outset of the Uruguay Round, the EC was under 
pressure to reform its CAP from two directions - from trading partners and from 
internal pressures.192 The EC’s agricultural trading partners pressured to gain 
improved access to the EC market for their imports, as well as to see an end to 
subsidised competition in third country markets. The internal pressure was purely for 
budgetary reasons. 
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Traditionally, the EC held that the CAP was non-negotiable and that the focus of any 
agricultural discussions should therefore be on stabilising the world agricultural 
market. With this notion, very little progress had been in the earlier rounds of trade 
negotiations e.g. the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds. 
 
As stated earlier, agricultural protection and domestic market regulation proliferated 
during the inter-war period. Even though the US led this trend with its request for a 
waiver in the GATT in 1955, the CAP is the pre-eminent example of how farmers 
become insulated from foreign competition. It provided an intervention or support 
price at which the Community guaranteed to purchase the agricultural output for 
farmers and a threshold price (above the internal support price) below which no 
imports were allowed.193 In order to isolate the EU market from international 
competition, a variable levy equal to the margin between the threshold price and the 
lowest representative offer price on world markets was imposed on imports. The 
programme was extremely costly. However, the EU was not alone. Domestic support 
in Japan and the US over the same period was equally high.194  
 
In the run-up to the Uruguay Round, the EC therefore attempted to limit the scope of 
the negotiations to the modification of existing agricultural policies, rather than 
radical reform. However, the United States, supported by the Cairns Group, wanted an 
agreement to achieve a market-oriented, barrier-free agricultural trading system. The 
US-Cairns Group proposal contrasted with that of the European Community, which 
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continued to refuse substantial alteration of its support policies and which preferred 
market sharing arrangements.195 It was strongly suspected within the EC that an 
unstated aim of the US was to destroy the CAP, 196 but it was clear that its wider 
trading interests could be severely damaged by the raising of protectionist barriers to 
EC exports, particularly in the US if the EC refused to negotiate on agriculture. In 
some significant respects, US agricultural trade was affected by the CAP, not least in 
terms of competition in third country markets. 
 
Despite some signs of greater readiness to consider concerted and reciprocal 
reductions in agricultural support levels, the EC’s negotiating position on agriculture 
at the beginning of the Uruguay Round was little changed from the position taken up 
and defended in the Tokyo Round. The EC insisted that radical changes in the CAP 
pricing system, which insulates and protects EC producers from world prices, could 
not be conceded in the GATT negotiations.197 Hence, the EC’s stance on agriculture 
during the Uruguay Round was reactive rather than innovative for most of the time. 
The community chose to react to proposals for reform tabled by others, most notably 
the United States and the Cairns Group of agricultural exporting countries.198  
 
However, when the EC had to table its own proposal, it firmly emphasised that the 
key aim of the EC was to cut domestic subsidies to a level where supply and demand 
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on the global market would be in equilibrium. Although the EU wanted to reduce the 
general level of domestic support, it nevertheless sought to maintain flexibility in the 
implementation of this provision, thereby allowing for domestic subsidies, border 
measures and export subsidies to be altered accordingly. The EC believed that cutting 
domestic support would lead inevitably to a reduction in border restrictions or export 
subsidies. Predictably, the US disagreed with the EC’s view. It also argued, instead, 
for an application of reduction measures to all the policy components.199 
 
Countries were clearly divided on the extent and the pace to which they were prepared 
to go in reducing the support of domestic agriculture. The subsequent tabling of 
proposals on agriculture revealed how far apart the main participants in the Uruguay 
Round negotiations were on this issue. During the mid-term meeting, the United 
States continued to insist on an advance commitment to the elimination of trade-
distorting subsidies. Of course, the EC steadfastly declined to be drawn into such an 
obligation. The EC also labelled the US ‘zero-option’ proposal unrealistic. Although 
the US proposal was indeed unrealistic, the EC, however, did not offer its own view 
of a longer-term objective.200 As a consequence, it was predictable that what was 
intended to be the final meeting of the Uruguay Round, duly held in Brussels early in 
December 1990, would somehow end in fiasco. No agreement could be reached on 
agriculture and failure there brought the entire Round to an abrupt halt. This is 
because the US and the Cairns Group were unable to accept the EC’s refusal to offer 
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specific quantitative commitments, both in lowering border protection and reducing 
export assistance.201 
 
Although there were fundamental disagreements on agriculture between the key 
actors, the EC and the US, significant pressures, as well as concerns about the future 
of the whole trade negotiation architecture, were pushing both sides to finally reach an 
agreement. As for the EC, the main incentive to seek agreement on agriculture was 
the increasing burden of rising budgetary costs of the CAP, which were again causing 
serious concern in the Community, as well as concerns about the impact on 
manufactured goods exporters if no agreement was reached. 
 
The Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations were revived in February 1991 when all 
the contracting parties agreed to the resumption of negotiations. By that time, from 
the EC perspective, the ultimate fate of the Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations 
appeared to be tied up with the fate of the MacSharry Plan, since both were ultimately 
concerned with reducing the incidence and costs of agricultural support, in particular 
trade-distorting ones. However, the EC argued that there was no connection between 
MacSharry and the Uruguay Round and the MacSharry Plan was purely concerned 
with reforming the CAP to realise domestic objectives only.  Yet, not many people 
believed it. Thus, the EC softened its previous hard-line refusal to consider the 
possibility of acceding to the US demand for specific support reduction commitments 
in the three main areas. 
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However, even with some apparent further relaxation of US demands, the agricultural 
negotiations made little further progress in 1991. Therefore, GATT Secretary-General 
Dunkel attempted to force the Uruguay Round to a successful conclusion by 
presenting the negotiators with a comprehensive draft agreement on 20th December 
1991. The draft included all areas of the negotiations, including agriculture. The main 
body of the Dunkel text on agriculture dealt specifically with improving market 
access, reducing domestic support and improving export competition.202 
 
Despite the readiness to accept the Dunkel draft agreement on agriculture as the basis 
for a conclusion of the UR agriculture negotiations between the US and most of the 
Cairns Group countries (excluding Canada), the failure of the EC and a number of 
other countries to adhere to the conditions offered by the Dunkel draft (including 
Canada and Japan) led to the abandonment of the timetable set by the Final Act for 
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations by 15th April 1992.203 
 
Finally, the EC and the US resolved their differences on agriculture in the Uruguay 
Round by striking a bilateral deal. Apparently, this bilateral agreement - the Blair 
House Accord - was the major cause of the removal of the obstacles to the conclusion 
of an overall Uruguay Round agreement. 
 
In summary, from the beginning of the Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations, the 
EC preferred some kind of market sharing agreement amongst the world’s largest 
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producers and exporters of temperate agricultural products.204 While the US entered 
the negotiations with an interest in liberalising agricultural trade, by the same token, 
the EC wished to protect its farm support measures. Nonetheless, the last intriguing 
point to note is that the EC was also faced with contradictory internal demands. 
Differing national positions within the EC, particularly France which later led to Blair 
House 2, greatly complicated the EC’s stand point in the Uruguay Round agricultural 
negotiations. Lastly, this, in effect, complicated even the internal issue, that of trying 
to find a consensus on the MacSharry proposals.205 
 
Developing countries at UR negotiations and agricultural 
negotiations 
Developing countries are increasingly active in multilateral trade negotiations since 
they now make up the majority of the WTO members. They are expected to play an 
increasingly important role in the WTO because of their numbers and because they 
are becoming more important in the global economy. This reflects the fact that 
developing countries in general, but particularly what are sometimes termed 
‘emerging’ countries (sometimes referred to as BRICS = Brazil, Russia, India, China), 
have become more deeply integrated into the international trading system. They now 
realise the unavoidable interconnectedness of the global economy from which they do 
not wish (or, in fact, cannot afford) to be excluded, since their economies have 
become more dependent on international trade. Particularly, they believe that joining 
the WTO, which is a rules-based organisation governed on the ‘one country, one vote’ 
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basis, would yield them a channel through which their voices and interests would be 
heard and favoured more. 
 
Recent economic policy changes in developing countries, emphasising openness and 
market orientation, have given them a much greater stake in the outcome of trade 
talks. An important rationale for small economies to engage in reciprocal, multilateral 
negotiations to liberalise trade in order to gain access to markets abroad is political. It 
allows governments to offset opposition to liberalisation on the part of import-
competing industries by creating political support on the part of export interests that 
obtain greater access to foreign markets.206 Together with the emergence of global 
markets, this has led to the prospect of productive participation in world trade as a 
viable path to development. Nonetheless, it has its own price. It has also increased the 
risks of exposing domestic markets and institutions to competition from abroad, and 
made countries with inadequate infrastructure and inappropriate policies vulnerable to 
marginalisation in the global economy.207 
 
The Uruguay Round was the political consequence of the impact of globalisation and 
the changing participation of developing countries.208 Thus, the agenda for the round 
was a reflection of the need to respond to a changing trading system, as well as being 
influenced by the increased participation of developing countries in the system. 
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Changes in the pattern and volume of trade alter relations between state and society, 
creating new conflicts. Since multinational corporations (MNCs) operate in more than 
one territorial market, they find it simpler to face common regulatory systems, be it 
intellectual property regimes or other standards throughout their operations. As a 
result, the Uruguay Round inevitably had to extend the move into ‘deeper’ or ‘behind 
the border’ integration.209  
 
In addition, globalisation saw a change in the role of developing countries. For the 
first time in the Uruguay Round, developing countries tried to influence the outcome 
directly, particularly as some of them were assuming a much larger role in the 
international trade system by the 1980s than had been the case previously. In the 
seven previous GATT Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, developing countries 
focused most of their attention on obtaining preferential access to industrial country 
markets.210 They, therefore, had been free-riders, using the Most-Favoured Nation 
(MFN) rule to benefit from tariff reductions among developed countries. The new 
engagement included active participation in meetings, where they made numerous 
negotiating proposals, and a willingness to increase the extent of their obligation. One 
of the incentives for their more active roles in the negotiations was potential gain or 
benefit in agriculture, which would hopefully more than offset the short-term costs of 
the new rules on services and intellectual property. 
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For almost 40 years after World War II, most developing countries did not perceive 
the GATT as a friendly or fruitful institution in which to promote their interests. 
Inward-oriented industrialisation and nationalist ideologies of development were 
widely exercised in most developing countries. Nevertheless, the situation was 
reversed at the beginning of the 1990s, and changed more significantly in the 
relatively active role that developing countries played in the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. 
 
At the same time, industrial countries started to see the engagement of developing 
countries in multilateral trade talks through new lenses. Developing countries were 
also increasingly becoming a market for developed countries. The minimal size of 
developing countries’ market had previously been seen as not being worth the effort 
of pressing for greater access.211 However, as competition among the major trading 
players intensified, these circumstances motivated developed countries to seek a new 
negotiation to incorporate developing countries more firmly into GATT rules.212 
Thus, the continued opening and greater access to the developing countries’ market 
became a more important goal in the eyes of industrialised countries.  
 
On the other hand, developing countries had their own reasons to seek a new 
negotiation. The most evident reason would be the recession and debt crisis that 
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devastated the economies of many developing countries.213 Subsequently, 
developing countries abandoned their former defensiveness and embraced a m
more participatory attitude. The question became what would be an appropriate 
strategy of participation, and what commitments to make and on how to micromanage 
a massiv
uch 
e agenda. 
                                                
 
This change of attitude was reflected in the way they advanced, on an individual or 
group basis, a positive agenda of their own. However, this was not obvious because 
developing countries, led by Brazil and India, objected to the inclusion of services in 
the international trade agenda. In their view, rules limiting the investment policies of 
developing countries were seen as unfavourable to their interests, as well as an 
intrusion on their autonomy. Developing countries insisted on liberalisation of the 
regulations of excessive protection in agricultural markets, which would presumably 
give them the benefit of expanded exports. This aim was, in part, a quid pro quo for 
agreeing to accept the TRIPs and GATs agreements. 
 
To be sure, developing countries did not leave the negotiations empty-handed; the 
inclusion of agriculture, the commitment to reduce subsidies and more access to 
markets can be deemed important gains, although not substantial. Nonetheless, it may 
be concluded that what seems to be the highest achievement of developing countries 
from the Round is the fact that it strengthened rules for international trade, thereby 
providing assurances that their trade would not be penalised by unilateral measures of 
trade superpowers, although this might, in part, depend on how well the Dispute 
System Mechanism (DSM) worked.  
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In order to exploit the potential gains, developing countries employed many strategies 
during the course of negotiations in the Uruguay Round. One of the best examples is 
probably the formation of coalitions. For example, G-10 was a coalition that 
epitomised the traditional bloc diplomacy of developing countries.214  The 
negotiating position of the G-10 was that members would block the opening of a new 
trade Round until traditional issues of standstill and rollback were attended to. 
Another good example of coalition, aiming to achieve desirable outcomes in the 
negotiations, was the Cairns Group, as mentioned in the earlier section. However, it is 
important to note that the Cairns Group was also a coalition with some problems and 
was not that effective. The fact remains that developing countries continue to form 
coalitions within multilateral contexts. This is evidence that individual countries are 
still motivated to co-operate with each other. After all, it seems like a rational 
response to the superior bargaining power such as the United States or European 
Union.215   
 
Obviously, developing countries were instrumental in building momentum towards a 
new trade negotiation. In fact, the reality was that a changing world economy made 
developing countries important to the international trade system.216 Evidently, 
throughout the talks the major players  were unwilling to risk, for lack of a serious 
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effort to reduce the levels of protection for agriculture losing potential, ‘sweet deals’ 
in areas such as financial services and intellectual property rights. 217 On the other 
hand, developing countries were willing to essentially soften their calls and demands 
in recognition that the potential loss to them from a major breakdown in negotiations 
outweighed whatever benefits might accrue to them from more direct enhancement to 
system structure.218 According to Whalley, the active cooperation of developing 
countries in the liberalisation process in the end was driven more by the fear that the 
non-discriminatory multilateral trade system would collapse. If the Round failed, it 
would result in them being excluded from any emerging regional trading blocs. As 
was anticipated, the Final Act promised the industrialised nations more access to one 
another’s and to developing countries’ markets. In exchange for the acceptance of the 
new issues, developing countries were to gain access to industrial markets for their 
primary commodities and for an increasing number of their semi-processed and 
finished products. Nevertheless, no matter how critical developing countries were to 
the Round, the agenda still reflected the interests of the major trade players like the 
US and the EU, even when the agenda was a mixture of the old and the new in trade 
concerns.  
 
Developing countries have complex interests in the area of market access. Exporters 
of agricultural products have an incentive to see trade barriers lowered. On the other 
hand, many tropical products already enter duty free into the main industrial markets. 
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In these cases, expanded market access into industrial markets may have to come 
from actions other than tariff reduction such as reducing domestic taxation.219 
 
Conclusion  
The nature of trade in agricultural goods is changing over time, in terms of 
transportation, storage, and communication technologies, resulting in the rapid rise of 
trade in processed foods.220 Undoubtedly, these changes will have a direct effect on 
the political balance of interests in the formulation of trade policy and the interests of 
individual countries in the outcome.221 However, over the past few decades, 
economic development has transformed the structure of the economies of most 
developing countries. Nevertheless, the agricultural sector continues to play a 
fundamentally important role in the economic growth and development prospects of 
the vast majority of developing countries. Therefore, not surprisingly, agriculture also 
continues to play a major role in domestic agricultural production and employment in 
these countries. 
 
The negotiations on agriculture were one of the key parts of the Uruguay Round from 
start to finish. During the negotiations, officials employed a variety of resources to 
achieve their state-conducted diplomacy, according to the internal and external 
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pressures placed on them. At first, the US style consisted primarily of blaming the EC 
and its CAP, along with Japan, for distorting international trade.222 Although the US 
toned down its demands for a dramatic liberalisation of agricultural trade, it remained 
adamant about the full inclusion of agriculture. Some experts view Reagan’s zero-
option proposal as a masterful stroke because, although the United States protected its 
agriculture, it shifted the burden of proof onto the EC and Japan to justify continued 
use of support for agriculture. 223  Other strategies were the use of intimidating 
measures that included threatened loss of American markets, more liberal agreements 
made with other nations, and the loss of markets that would likely result from US 
efforts to promote regional trade agreements with other countries. From time to time, 
the US also used the threat of Congress increasing export subsidies to pressure 
competitors.  Once negotiations got serious, the US sought to isolate the EC by 
emphasising common interests with some members of the Cairns Group and Japan. 
Speaking of which, the strategies the EC employed were to act more defensively 
throughout the talks, mainly because the EC seemed to believe until the later stages of 
the Round that the US would finally settle for something less, which the US 
eventually did.224  
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Chapter 4:  
Overview of the case study 
 
This chapter gives an overview of the political economy of Thailand in general and 
prior to the Uruguay Round in particular. It then explores the 
interests/objectives/positions with which Thailand entered the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, especially those regarding agriculture. Next, it provides an account of 
how the interests/objectives/positions of Thailand were derived and formed and how 
it uniquely differed from many developed trading counterparts.  
 
Overview of Thai political economy and Thailand with 
international trade negotiation 
This overview discusses Thailand’s characteristics and resources and outlines its 
political and economic performance in the global political economy. It also looks 
briefly at the Thai agricultural sector and presents a thumbnail sketch of its role in the 
Thai political economy. It then reviews the history of Thailand and international trade 
negotiations. 
 
Thailand at a glance 
Thailand is an axe-shaped country situated in the heart of the Southeast Asian 
mainland. Siam is the name by which the country was known to the world until 1939 
and again between 1945 and 1949. On May 11th, 1949, an official proclamation 
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changed the name of the country to "Prathet Thai", or "Thailand", by which it has 
since been known. The word "Thai" means "free", and therefore "Thailand" means 
"Land of the Free."  
 
The land covers an area of 513,115 sq km and extends about 1,620 kilometres from 
north to south and 775 kilometres from east to west. Thailand borders the Lao 
People's Democratic Republic and the Union of Myanmar to the north, the Kingdom 
of Cambodia and the Gulf of Thailand to the east, the Union of Myanmar and the 
Indian Ocean to the west, and Malaysia to the south. The population of Thailand is 
approximately 64 million, of which around eight million live in the capital city, 
Bangkok. The national and official language is Thai, while English is widely spoken 
and understood in major cities, particularly in Bangkok and in business circles. The 
Baht is the standard currency unit used in Thailand. 
 
With H.M. Bhumibol Adulyadej as Head of State, Thailand has theoretically been 
governed by a democratically elected government since 1932. However, in reality 
Thailand has been under periods of military rule on numerous occasions. Under the 
constitution, the Parliament comprises 200 Members of the Senate and 500 elected 
Members of the House of Representatives. The Prime Minister is an elected MP and 
is selected from among the members of the House of Representatives. A summary of 
this information can be found in Table 4.1 below.  
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Thailand at a glance 
Geography Maximum Length 
Maximum Width 
Land Area  
1,620 km 
775 km. 
513,115 sq. km.  
  (Equivalent to the size of France, or slightly smaller than Texas) 
 
Climate 
 
Tropical monsoon climate with a high degree of humidity 
 
 
Population 
Annual average temperature  
Rainy season (May to October) 
Cool season (November to February)
Hot season (March to April) 
 
64 million (8 million in Bangkok)  
22.5 ◌Cํ - 32.3 ◌Cํ 
24.1 ◌Cํ - 31.8 ◌Cํ 
20.3 ◌Cํ - 30.8 ◌Cํ 
23.2 ◌Cํ - 34.2 ◌Cํ  
 
Religion 
 
Buddhism 
Islam  
Christianity 
Others  
 
94 % 
4 % 
1 % 
1 %  
 
Literacy 
 
(% of population age 15 and above) 
Male 
Female 
 
 
97.1 % 
93.9 %  
 
Currency 
 
Language 
 
Government 
 
 
Baht (41.50 Baht/US$ - 2003 average rate) 
 
Thai 
 
Constitutional Monarchy 
Head of State              King Bhumibol Adulyadej 
 
   The parliament comprises 200 elected Members of the Senate  
and 500 elected Members of the House of Representatives.  
  
 
Table 4.1: Thailand at a glance. 
Source: Bank of Thailand 
 
Thai Political Economy (agriculture) 
This section provides a brief outline of the political and historical context within 
which Thailand’s economic transition has occurred.  
Thailand’s government is nominally a constitutional monarchy with an elected 
parliament. However, the military plays a significant role in Thai politics in practice 
and heavy military involvement in government affairs has traditionally been tolerated. 
Between 1932 and 1997, Thailand had sixteen constitutions and well over 50 cabinets. 
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The period of absolute monarchy ended after the overthrow of King Prajadhipok, the 
seventh king of the Chakri dynasty (Rama VII) in 1932. 
 
Until the abolition of the absolute monarchy in the coup, the palace was the sole force 
responsible for the definition of policy agendas. Thereafter, the centre of power was 
shifted from the palace to military headquarters.225 After World War II, conservative 
military-controlled governments were prominent. The decade following the war was 
dominated politically by Phibul Songkhram, Prime Minister from 1948 – 1957, later 
forced into exile. After staging a coup in 1957, the eminent military figure, Field 
Marshal Sarit Thanarat, assumed power in 1958. He briefly concentrated power in his 
hands and laid the policy framework for Thailand’s subsequent decades of economic 
growth. 
 
Under Sarit’s rule, Thailand adopted a market-oriented import-substituting 
industrialisation strategy and, hence, began its rapid economic expansion. This was 
also propelled by a World Bank advisory mission in 1957. The report recommended 
that Thailand should at that time concentrate on investment in the public infrastructure 
required for economic development. In addition, the World Bank had called for 
reducing reliance on state enterprises and monopolies in order to create incentives for 
private investment, both foreign and domestic. It is interesting to note that Thai 
officials implemented many of the recommendations, since this development strategy 
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suited Sarit’s own political purposes by undermining his opponents’ political bases, 
which were generally concentrated in the state enterprise sector.226 
 
The US government approved of Sarit’s anti-communism and support for private 
investment. As a consequence, Thailand received a substantial increase in economic 
and military aid from the US.227 The National Economic and Social Development 
Board (NESDB) was also formed as a result of the report of the World Bank. The 
Board began to produce regular five-year development plans to guide public 
investments in infrastructure. 
 
With Sarit’s death in December 1963, power shifted to a new military alliance headed 
by General Thanom Kittikachorn,228 who became the Prime Minister. However, 
there was a growing concern associated with the expanding communist threat. Hence
the Thanom military government was too preoccupied with the security issues at hand
to focus on economic affairs
, 
 
.  
                                                
 
In the early 1970s, Thailand experienced a short period of democracy and civilian 
government. When the Premiership went to Kuk-rit Pramoj, leader of the Social 
Action Party, some interesting policy initiatives were introduced.  However, Kuk-rit’s 
hostility towards the army again led to another military seizure of power in 1976 
through the bloodiest coup in Thai history, which ended three years of civilian 
 
226
 Unger, Danny, Building Social Capital in Thailand. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998, p.61. 
227
 Ibid., p.62. 
228
 Warr, Peter G., ‘The Thai Economy’, in Peter G. Warr, ed., The Thai Economy in Transition. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.12. 
Chapter 4: Overview of the case study   123 
governments; thus, the role of the military in public affairs became increasingly 
contentious in the 1970s and 1980s. The growth of an urban educated middle class 
has led to increasing demands for democratic reform and for a reduced role for the 
military, in economic affairs as well as in political life.  
 
The brief years of civilian government coincided with significant economic changes. 
New interest groups emerged and new policies were initiated and implemented. An 
important new development was the involvement of the big business corporations of 
the capital in politics. This element of business moved towards an alliance with those 
senior technocrats responsible for economic management; they began to influence the 
direction of economic policies. This small group derived its influence from the 
command of money and position.229 This was a radical departure from the previous 
periods, when control over policy was shared only by the military and the 
bureaucracy.230 
 
A new constitution was promulgated in November, 1978. The ensuing general 
election was held in April 1979 under the new constitution, yet, no single party 
obtained a majority and the position of  Prime Minister was later offered to General 
Prem Tinsulanonda, a respected army general, favoured by the military and the main 
political parties. The Prem government’s main feature was an accommodation or a 
sharing of power between the political parties, the military and the bureaucracy.  
Although there were several political crises during the Prem administration, the basic 
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arrangement of power sharing remained undisturbed for eight years.  The Prem era 
was probably the first time since 1973 when parliamentary politics was relatively 
stable. However, the period was appropriately characterised as ‘semi-democratic’ 
because the military continued to play a strong political role within the parliamentary 
framework. Due to the relative stability of domestic policy, economic growth was 
then given high priority. In the end, threats of a vote of no confidence led to Prem’s 
resignation in 1988. 
 
The resulting election in July 1988 led to the selection of Chatichai Choonhavan as 
Prime Minister, the first elected Member of Parliament to become prime minister 
since 1976. Although the Chatichai government presided over the period of the most 
rapid economic growth in Thai history, it soon appeared that the parliament was 
entrenching its power and severely curtailing the military’s political role. In February 
1991, the military leadership staged a sudden coup against Chatichai, installing a 
National Peace Keeping Council to run the country. Only a year later, General 
Suchinda, one of the coup leaders, became Prime Minister, leading to the tragic events 
of ‘Black May’ in which hundreds of civilians were killed or injured. Suchinda was 
forced from office when the King intervened by re-appointing Anand Panyarachen to 
the position of Prime Minister to prepare for subsequent elections. Later, Shuan 
Leekpai was elected as Prime Minister, and he was in the office from October 1992 to 
July 1995. 
 
In summary, the military has dominated Thai politics since the 1930s. Many observers 
argue that regular military coups undermined the entrenchment of democratic political 
process or any political stability. Nonetheless, these frequent military intrusions into 
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politics and the coalitional nature of Thai democratic governments shed some light on 
the fragility of those governments. The above summary of recent Thai political 
history provides an understanding of the political context within which international 
trade negotiators had to work.  
 
As for the development of Thailand in the economic arena, the adoption of the free 
trade policy of Thailand can be traced back to the nineteenth century. The Bowring 
Treaty signed between King Mongkut (King Rama IV) and Great Britain in 1855 
required Thailand to adopt relatively free trade economic policies. Free trade policies 
promoted the expansion of agricultural exports, but did not produce rapid economic 
growth per head of population. In the century following the Bowring Treaty, Thai 
economic growth barely rose. Yet, it is not surprising that agricultural exports were 
the main source of both foreign exchange and government revenue. However, the 
agricultural growth was not driven by improved productivity, but by expansion of the 
cultivated land area and cultivable land remained abundant until the 1960s.231 
 
Thailand has followed a fixed exchange rate policy since the end of World War II, 
with the baht pegged to the US dollar. The capital account is relatively less open when 
compared to the trading system, which is more open.232 Since 1972, Thailand’s 
economy has been transformed from import substitution into an export led economy 
due to the Industrial Promotion Act coming into force. Since this remarkable shift of 
economic policy to export-led growth, Thailand’s trade policy has always been liberal 
and outward-oriented, which is believed to be a crucial means to achieve 
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developmental goals of the government. Since then, the market oriented reform 
programmes have been continuously implemented. Various measures have been 
undertaken to reduce and eliminate trade and investment barriers, and also to integrate 
Thailand more fully into the global economy. Figure 4.1below shows that, from 1986 
–90, Thailand was one of the fastest growing economies in the world with an average 
real GDP growth rate of 11.5%. During 1981-85, average export and import values of 
Thailand registered at 165,561 (US$ 6,622.2 million) and 229,259 (US$ 9170.3 
million) million Baht respectively, resulting in an average negative trade balance of 
63,698 million Baht (US$ 2,547.9 million). The major exporting products were 
mainly agriculture and processed food, accounting for almost 50% of the total average 
export value, while the main import items were minerals, fuel and lubricants and 
machinery, accounting for 26% and 27% of the total average import value 
respectively. 233 
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Real GDP Growth 1980 -
2002  
Figure4. 1: Real GDP Growth 1980-2002 
Source: Bank of Thailand 
 
Role of Agriculture in the Thai Political Economy 
In the early stage of economic development in Thailand, agriculture played an 
important role in the country’s economic growth, with agricultural exports leading the 
way. Similar to most low- and middle-income developing countries, Thailand’s 
product market policies implied taxation on agriculture and subsidisation for industry. 
Rice is by far the most important agricultural commodity and a major export revenue 
earner for Thailand. Therefore, rice exports were taxed by a combination of 
instruments: the rice premium, export duty; and a reserve requirement. In addition, 
taxing agricultural exports, particularly rice, kept the price of staple food low and, 
hence, reduced the domestic terms of trade between agricultural and manufactured 
products. However, these taxes have been slowly phased out.  
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Thailand has experienced a high rate of growth since 1960, and the country has since 
become more industrialised. Agricultural exports throughout the 1960s and 1970s 
contributed to industrialisation, as they were the major source of foreign-exchange 
earnings and provided the manufacturing sector with the capital needed to obtain 
imported machinery. Agriculture was the leading sector in the Thai economy during 
its crucial two decades of growth in the 1960s and the 1970s. Although the role was 
taken over by manufacturing during the 1980s and developments in agriculture now 
appear less significant to the country’s macroeconomy, agriculture still plays a very 
important role in the Thai economy. This is because the agricultural sector still 
employs the majority of the Thai people.234Although the percentage of GDP and the 
percentage of labour force in agriculture have decreased in the past decades, the 
significance of agriculture remains high in the Thai political arena. In 1994, 
agriculture still accounted for approximately 12% of Thailand’s GDP, while 
employing more than 60% of the total workforce in the Thai economy, as shown in 
Table 4.2 below. 
 
The structure of employment, 1960 – 1994 
  
 Percentage share 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 1994 
Agriculture 82.3 79.3 71.9 63.5 60.8 
Industry 4.2 5.8 7.9 14.2 15.8 
Service 13.5 14.9 20.2 22.3 23.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 4.2: The structure of employment, 1960 – 1994. 
Source: National Statistic Office 
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Thailand and trade negotiations 
Since international trade is the key to Thailand’s economic development and growth, 
policies to protect her trade interests are important. Therefore, Thailand, along with 
many other countries, uses negotiation as means to improve the conditions for trade, 
pushing for more disciplined and transparent rules for the conduct of global trade, in 
the hope of increasing market access for exports and measures to protect domestic 
industries from unfair competition resulting from dumping and domestic subsidies 
from other countries. Table 4.3 below shows how exports are significant to the Thai 
economy and, hence, the enhanced commitment of Thailand in international trade 
negotiations. 
 
Export value, import value and trade balance: 1996 – 2005 
Year 
Export Value Import Value Trade Balance 
Billions of 
Baht 
GDP 
As % of 
GDP 
Billions of 
Baht 
GDP 
As % of 
GDP 
Billions of 
Baht 
GDP 
As % of 
GDP 
1996 1411.0 30.6 1,832.8 39.7 -421.8 -9.1 
1997 1,806.7 38.2 1,924.3 40.7 -117.6 -2.5 
1998 2,248.1 48.6 1,774.1 38.3 474.0 10.2 
1999 2,214.2 47.7 1,907.4 41.1 306.9 6.6 
2000 2,768.1 56.2 2,494.1 50.7 273.9 5.6 
2001 2,884.7 56.2 2,752.3 53.6 132.4 2.6 
2002 2,923.9 53.6 2,774.8 50.9 149.1 2.7 
2003 3,325.6 56.1 3,138.8 52.9 186.9 3.2 
2004 3,874.8 59.6 3,801.2 58.4 73.7 1.1 
2005 4,436.7 62.5 4,756.0 67.0 -319.3 -4.5 
Table 4 3: Export value, import value and trade balance: 1996 - 2005 
Source: Office of the Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Commerce 
 
Thailand’s trade relations with other nations date back to as early as the 19th century. 
Nevertheless, it was not until 1923 that the Ministry of Commerce was first appointed 
to be the body responsible for dealing with trade negotiations and agreements. Since 
Chapter 4: Overview of the case study   130 
then, the Ministry of Commerce has played a key role in these matters at all levels – 
bilateral, regional, and multilateral. For instance, at a bilateral level, Thailand signed 
bilateral trade agreements with Japan for the first time in 1957.235 Within the scope 
of bilateral agreements, Joint Trade Committees (JTC) and the Joint Economic 
Cooperation Commission (JC) have been created; yet, bilateral negotiations are 
normally designed only to solve immediate trade disputes. This is, in particular, the 
case with the United States on textiles and intellectual property rights. Thailand has 
had a trade relationship with the USA regarding textiles since 1972. As for intellectual 
property rights, the USA demanded that Thailand have intellectual property rights law 
enforcement in place in order to receive the renewal of the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP), which is deemed significant to Thailand’s competitiveness. 
Parallel to the course of the Uruguay Round negotiations, Thailand’s bilateral trade 
negotiations with the US took place under pressure from the US, under the US301, to 
negotiate on Thai domestic intellectual property rights law. 
 
In the regional framework, Thailand joined ASEAN in 1967. However, trade talks 
under the umbrella of ASEAN did not significantly take off until 1977, when the 
ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement (ASEAN PTA) was reached. Also, 
Thailand has been a member of APEC since 1989. 
 
Thailand primarily took part in multilateral trade negotiations as an observer in the 
Tokyo Round negotiations in 1978. It was at this time that the cabinet approved the 
setting up of a Multilateral Trade Negotiations Committee on 28th August, 1978. Four 
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years before the Uruguay Round negotiations kicked off, Thailand joined the GATT 
and became the 88th Contracting Party on 20 November 1982, after all the other 
ASEAN countries except Brunei.236 However, the negotiators began to realise the 
significance of multi-party trade negotiations prior to the GATT, in earlier MFA 
negotiations. Thai officials started to realise the importance of the international rules 
and dispute settlement processes for the first time when Thailand first received 
complaints from other textile exporting countries that Thailand had set a poor 
example. When the USA called Thailand to discuss the MFA in order to limit its 
quota, Thai negotiators, believing that Thailand did not have bargaining power despite 
the leverage given by US bases in Thailand, gave in to the US request.237 
 
Moreover, Thailand used the GATT as a forum to solve trade problems and disputes 
with powerful trading partners, who pressured Thailand by using their own domestic 
laws e.g. the US301 introduced by the US.238 Developing countries like Thailand 
found themselves in disadvantaged positions. Another circumstance that added to the 
importance of the multilateral trading system was when the US accused Thailand of 
violating MFN traditions by discriminating against foreign cigarettes. Thailand asked 
the US to take this dispute to the dispute settlement process under the supervision of 
the GATT instead of dealing with it bilaterally, in which case the US would have had 
more power to coerce Thailand. The ruling in mid 1990 was that Thailand had to open 
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its market for foreign cigarettes. Yet, Thailand could reserve the right not to change 
the law (the ban on cigarette commercials) since it was regulated equally on both Thai 
and foreign cigarettes. Thai negotiators were very pleased with the result when 
compared with other countries such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Malaysia, 
that did not take the dispute to the GATT and later had to let the US cigarette 
companies advertise in domestic markets.239 Thailand, as a result, used GATT as a 
camouflage to solve problems, for instance, disputes over the import ban on foreign 
cigarettes and disputes over intellectual property rights under the 301. 
 
Thai Interests/Objectives/Position 
This section attempts to identify the interests (or what Thai negotiators perceived to 
be the Thai ‘interests’) and the positions Thailand adopted in the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. The section then elaborates on the objectives Thailand wanted to achieve 
in the agriculture negotiations, as well as in the Uruguay Round negotiations in 
general. It is important to note that the positions Thai negotiators adopted in the 
agriculture negotiations should not be taken out of context with regards to the 
positions Thailand adopted for the Uruguay Round negotiations as a whole.  It then, 
goes on to explore how the interests were formed and how the positions were later 
taken. 
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Positions in the Uruguay Round and in Agriculture negotiations 
It should be apparent from the previous section that the weak and unstable political 
system in Thailand prior to the Uruguay Round contributed to the fact that politicians 
and those in power at that time had to prioritise their domestic share of power over the 
following trade talks that were happening in the international trade negotiations arena, 
despite the importance of trade to economic growth.  
 
The question that then arises is if the Uruguay Round negotiations did not gain a lot of 
attention from the cabinet or the public, then how were Thailand’s strategic positions 
developed? The answer lies in the fact that most of the Thai positions and the 
bargaining strategies in the Uruguay Round negotiations came from merely a handful 
of permanent officers in the Ministry of Commerce.  
 
According to Mr. Kirkkrai Jeerapat, due to the past experience of trade officials with 
the MFA, the US301 and the cigarette cases, the top priority was to progress a 
strengthened system of trade rules, although Thailand was seen to be very active in 
agriculture negotiations.240 In the mind of the Thai trade negotiators; the creation of 
common rules was the key mechanism by which the multilateral system of trade rules 
reduces the importance of market power. As a consequence, the main objective in 
supporting the new Round was to develop trade rules or rule of law that could 
safeguard Thailand from unilateral actions from powerful trade counterparts like the 
US301. However, the strengthened trade rules were the hidden agenda in the eyes of 
Thai negotiators. This prompted Thai officials, with other ASEAN members, to join 
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with Colombia and Switzerland, the leader of the Café Au Lait group, and come up 
with positive proposals for the declaration draft because Thai negotiators saw 
potential linkages in key areas by using new issues like services as a bargaining chip 
and the group presented itself as a wiser choice of ally for Thailand than the hard-
liners such as the G-10. 
 
Although the rules were the most important consideration, Thailand’s visible move 
was in agriculture. The farm war between the US and EU resulted in the new Farm 
Act in 1985, increasing export subsidies to dispose of surplus US agricultural 
products at the world market at a price as low as those from the EU. In fact, it was not 
necessary for the US to subsidise rice exports. Nevertheless, congressmen from wheat 
and cotton states wanted to please congressmen from rice states.241 As a result, the 
new Farm Act 1985 also incorporated an increase in rice export subsidy and supports. 
In 1986, when the new Farm Act was being implemented, there were protests in front 
of the US Embassy in Bangkok. This led Thai officials in Geneva to be very active in 
helping to form the Cairns Group and to put forth a positive agenda that conformed to 
the general liberalising stance of the GATT. According to Miss Chutima 
Bunyaphrapassara, Thailand also played a significant role in getting the Cairns Group 
off the ground by hosting an official trade meeting for trade officials from fourteen 
food exporting countries in Pattaya in July, 1986, the first meeting of the group, one 
month before the official formation of the group in Cairns. 
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In terms of Thai interests and positions in agriculture negotiations, the main focus was 
market access and a more liberalised market for Thai agricultural commodities, 
especially rice. Table 4.5 shows below the percentage composition of export earning 
of Thailand during the period of pre the Uruguay Round. As shown in Table 4.6, 
Thailand is the number one exporter for rice in the world market.  The main focus for 
Thailand was the US subsidy for rice exports and the closure of rice markets in Japan 
and South Korea. With the main objective being to prevent the US from using a 
subsidy, Thailand chose to join the Cairns Group to help negotiate on this point. Table 
4.7 indicates the main destinations for Thai exports. The EU is the main destination 
for exports of Thai poultry. In the case of fresh chicken, Thailand wanted market 
access to the EU market because chicken exports from Thailand had been restricted 
by the EU quantitative restriction on imports. It is interesting to note that Thailand did 
not only ally with the Cairns Group or the ASEAN, but also allied with the US, the 
main target for Thailand’s criticism over a subsidy for rice. Thai negotiators stressed 
the fact that, if Thailand was seen as a ‘good boy’ by the US over the new issues, they 
could go to the US to ask for help when faced with an issue on which Thailand and 
the US had common interests, namely agricultural protectionism in the EU.242    
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Export earnings: percentage composition 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Agriculture    38.0 34.0 27.8 26.4 23.0 18.0 15.1 15.0 12.2 11.4 
Fishing 77.1 75.1 68.3 5.5 6.4 6.1 5.2 5.5 5.3 6.0 5.9 5.7 6.0 
Forestry    0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 - - 
Mining 0.1 0.1 2.1 5.2 2.7 1.6 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.2 0.8 0.5 0.6 
Total primary 77.2 75.1 70.4 48.9 42.4 35.8 33.7 30.2 24.9 22.4 21.8 18.4 18.0 
              
Manufacturing 15.4 15.4 26.8 49.5 55.4 62.7 65.4 68.6 73.8 76.2 76.9 80.0 81.1 
Others 3.2 2.2 1.5 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 0.7 
Re-exports 3.6 1.9 1.3 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 
              
Total exports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 4 4: Export earnings: percentage composition 
Source: Dixon, Chris, The Thai Economy: Uneven development and 
internationalisation, 1999, p.5. 
 
 
Export value and world market share of Thai agricultural products 
Products 
World Market 
Shares (% of 
world exports) 
Year World ranking 
Rice 1995 28.2 1 
Sugar 1994 7 3-4 
Pineapple, canned 1994 48.3 1 
Cassava 1994 93 1 
Seafood, canned 1994 32.3 1 
Fresh prawn, frozen 1994 14.1 1 
Fresh seafood, frozen 
(fish and calamari) 
1994 5.7 5-7 
Chicken meat, fresh 1994 8.5 4 
Rubber  1994 31.3 1 
Vegetable and Fruit 1994 3.2 
Information 
not available 
Table 4 5: Export value and world market share of Thai agricultural products 
Source: adapted from นิพนธ์ พัวพงศกรผลกระทบของการเจรจารอบอุรุกวยั ต่อสินค้าเกษตรในตลาดโลก และภาค
เกษตรของไทย. สถาบันวิจัยเพ่ือการพัฒนาประเทศไทย. ตลุาคม 2539. หน้า 69. [Puapongsakorn, Nipon, The 
Impact of the Uruguay Round Negotiations on World Agricultural Products and the 
Agriculture Sector of Thailand. Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute 
Foundation, October, 1996, p. 69.] 
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Geographical pattern of exports (by value) 
 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1992 1994 
USA 13.9 7.0 13.0 11.0 12.6 19.7 26.2 22.4 21.0 
EC 14.6 13.0 17.0 14.0 22.2 17.9 21.5 19.2 9.3 
Japan 17.8 18.0 26.0 28.0 15.1 13.4 17.2 17.5 17.1 
Asian NIEs 20.9 13.6 18.0 18.0 14.9 15.3 15.1 16.8 33.7 
ASEAN-5 21.2 17.6 8.0 7.9 8.6 6.5 4.3 3.7 3.1 
Asian Socialist 0.2 4.0 8.8 3.4 3.3 2.4 1.8 2.2 4.4 
Other 11.4 27.8 9.2 17.7 23.3 24.8 13.9 18.2 11.4 
Pacific Asia 60.1 53.2 60.8 55.3 41.9 37.6 38.4 40.2 58.3 
Table 4 6: Geographical pattern of exports (by value) 
Source: Bank of Thailand 
 
 
To show that Thailand was committing to agricultural liberalisation, Thai negotiators 
offered to reduce the import tariff rates by an average reduction rate of 24%, and to 
bind 997 tariff lines for agricultural products. Moreover, Thailand committed to open 
market access for 23 agricultural products through tariffication and to reduce 
domestic subsidies by 13.3% over ten years.243 However, Thailand stated that it had 
no export subsidising policy in place.244 
 
In the realm of agriculture in particular, the agricultural policies at home are 
conflicting in character. Although Thailand had a vital role in the Cairns Group in 
supporting liberalisation of agricultural trade, it can be said that not all internal 
bureaucrats fully supported the liberalisation of agricultural trade. If one examines 
Thailand’s offer to the GATT in 1994 closely enough, it is evident that Thailand did 
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not fully support agricultural liberalisation either since Thailand also used ‘dirty 
tariffication’.245 To maintain high levels of protection, Thailand used dirty 
tariffication for 23 products by converting non-tariff barriers to very high tariff rates 
by using the high base period. Also, the tariff quota was a very important tool for 
politicians to use in electoral campaigns with farmers  and the system was another 
factor contributing to rent seeking. Even though Thailand supports agricultural 
liberalisation, domestic politics still tend to give rise to agricultural protection. In 
some cases, politicians proposed that Thailand raised export subsidies for some 
agricultural products, for example rice, and price insurance for agricultural products, 
which goes against the Uruguay Round agreements.  
 
It is also important to note that, during the time of the launching of the new Round, 
there occurred another significant trade related event in Thailand, namely a renewal of 
the GSP and the MFA with the US. The US set conditions for the renewal of the 
second generation of GSP, which should have been unconditional, for Thailand in 
1985-1986. The conditions were: (1) market access for US products, (2) adoption of 
international labour protection standards; and (3) sufficient and effective intellectual 
property rights protection.  At that time, every party realised that GSP was vital to 
Thai exports to the US. As a result, the cabinet consented to amend the copyright and 
patent law on September 10th, 1986.246 In regard to the MFA, the US announced an 
embargo on Thai textiles export in 1985. As a result, Thailand, driven mainly by 
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business factors, negotiated with the US to eliminate the quota for clothing products. 
Thailand claimed that the foundation of the US quota was unjust and discriminatory, 
since the US gave a greater tariff quota to the Philippines, Singapore, and Indonesia. 
247  
 
To sum up, there were three main objectives and interests Thailand wished to achieve 
in the Uruguay Round. Firstly, even though it was a hidden agenda, Thailand wanted 
rules of trade law and the dispute settlement mechanism to be strengthened in order to 
help developing countries with less market power to cope with pressure from 
unilateral threats from the trade superpowers. Secondly, Thailand wished to see a halt 
in the farm war and agriculture more in-line with the GATT rules. Finally, Thailand 
agreed to negotiate on services, intellectual property rights, and investment, in 
exchange for the elimination of the textiles quota. As for the objectives and interests 
of Thailand in agricultural negotiations, Thailand wished to see the termination of the 
US subsidy on rice, as well as market access for major Thai agricultural commodities 
such as rice, sugar, and cassava. In terms of chicken exports in particular, Thailand 
wanted more market access to the EU and Japanese markets.  
 
Thai ‘interests’: how? 
Saying that one country enters a trade negotiation to defend her interests is easy. 
However, it is more difficult to identify what those interests are. Although Thailand is 
considered as a unit in international trade negotiations, unity is not obvious before 
Thai interests can be identified. Even within a country, it is difficult to find a common 
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position between, say, trade and agriculture ministries, or strong importing sectors and 
weak suppliers of the domestic market.  
 
Other countries perceived Thailand to be relatively enthusiastic in the Uruguay 
Round, negotiating from the agenda setting stage. Thai negotiators participated 
creatively and actively. However, the truth was that the Uruguay Round negotiations 
did not receive that much attention from domestic constituencies. Thai positions only 
came from a handful of interested academics and officials. Only a small number of 
public consultations were held to inform the populace of Thailand’s positions.   
 
Due to Thailand’s inexperience in multilateral-level trade negotiations, there were a 
very small number of knowledgeable officials and experts available. At the beginning 
of the Round, there were merely 18 officials in the department of trade policy and 
there only 7-8 people were responsible for all the GATT work.248 Meanwhile, in 
other government organisations, there were no officials to coordinate positions with 
officials from the Ministry of Commerce. 
 
With the exception of organised commerce and industries like the cotton and textile 
group who also had to follow the MFA, very little consultation did take place between 
the government and key domestic non-state actors in determining Thailand’s offer in 
the UR. Surprisingly, the way strategies are formed is not as systematic as would be 
expected. There are no organisations to oversee the whole process of identifying 
national interests, studying the options and all the alternatives, and choosing the 
strategies or tactics. During the Uruguay Round, these processes were studied only by 
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those involved in the negotiations directly; and the strategies chosen only reflected the 
beliefs of trade negotiators from the Ministry of Commerce. 
 
Also, the negotiating skill and initiative of the Thai delegation has traditionally been 
Geneva-based rather than closely connected with the capital, although it is worth 
noting that the delegation members were drawn mainly from the Ministry of 
Commerce. The picture is very similar to that quoted in the work of Narlikar: 
 
In the absence of a workable or particularly useful negotiating mandate, the 
ambassadors were able to evolve strategies on the spot by drawing upon their 
sense of the situation, their experience, and the advice of their negotiating 
colleagues, many of whom were in the same position.249 
 
In the Uruguay Round, Thailand made a lot of effort to participate fully and was very 
active in all negotiations from the pre-negotiation or consultation stage. In addition, 
Thailand’s positioning had been quite firm and unwavering. Surprisingly, this might 
be due to the fact that the decision-making process in Thailand had not been faced 
with pressures from sources such as domestic businesses, politicians, or even NGOs, 
giving greater autonomy to the delegation in Geneva. In contrast, the negotiating 
position of developed countries, as well as some developing countries like India and 
South Korea, was greatly influenced by domestic commercial and bureaucratic 
lobbies and interests. 
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However, it might also be assumed that Thailand’s positioning in the Uruguay Round 
was a consequence of bilateral pressure, especially in intellectual property issues. 
Thailand, like many developing countries, had weak or almost non-existent 
intellectual property rights laws. Initially, Thailand preferred that intellectual property 
issues would remain out of the GATT discipline and would stay under the WIPO 
framework. Certainly, many other developing countries shared the same view. 
Nonetheless, the US and other developed countries were insistent, during the Uruguay 
Round, that developing countries should adopt appropriate protection for intellectual 
property rights. The US called for measures that would both bring and integrate 
intellectual property rights into the GATT system. Moreover, the US also demanded 
the development of what should be a standard for intellectual property protection e.g. 
compulsory licensing. 
 
Faced with the bewildering scope and complexity of the UR agenda, Thailand had to 
try very hard to influence the outcome on many issues. Thailand’s miniscule trade 
delegations in Geneva – consisting of less than five trade officials – were 
overwhelmed by the daunting negotiating agenda, and struggled to keep up with 
developments in the numerous important areas of parallel negotiations. To note, at the 
time of the Uruguay Round, there was no permanent ambassador at the WTO, there 
was only the Office of Commercial Affairs which was under the Department of Trade 
promotion. However, there was communication with the capital. From the interview, 
trade negotiators had to send a telex every night to get the positions confirmed and to 
update on the negotiating processes. Thai positions had to come from the capital. The 
evidence confirms that negotiating positions and trade policies were still largely top-
down. 
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In general, it might be expected that persons who have authority over major trade 
negotiations like the Uruguay Round must be very active and work collectively as a 
team. Yet, looking into Thai politics during that time might prove to be a 
disappointment. The following observations can be made on Thai politics during the 
course of the Uruguay Round Negotiations. 
 
Firstly, most ministers in the cabinet, or even the Prime Minister, during that time 
were not aware of the significance of the GATT or the Uruguay Round negotiations at 
all. And most Ministers of Commerce were not interested and did not pay sufficient 
attention to the negotiations.250 The only minister who was concerned to any extent 
with the Uruguay Round was Mr. Amaret Sila-on.251 This reflects that there was a 
fundamental lack of concern at the domestic level in Thai domestic politics. 
Additionally, the positioning given to negotiators in Geneva was relatively vague. 
Nevertheless, this was an advantage for negotiators in Geneva, since it gave them 
more scope and some autonomy to devise their own position necessary for the 
negotiations at that time.252 
 
However, this did not always appear to be the case; Mr. Prajuab Chaiyasarn, Deputy 
Minister of Commerce expressed an interest in the issue. However, some analysts 
criticised that he had become interested only because it would boost his popularity 
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back home. Another analysis was that he was assigned to be in charge of Department 
of Business economics only because trade was seen to be of secondary importance to 
other issues in the government. 
 
Secondly, as already discussed, it is obvious that the positioning and the role of 
Thailand in the negotiations during the Uruguay Round were significantly free from 
internal political procedures and pressures from private sectors. The sole private 
sector that was continuously involved in the negotiations was textiles and clothing, 
which had to follow the quota system of the MFA in any case. 
 
Moreover, it is found in this study that farmers had very small roles in helping to form 
Thai interests. It was revealed by interviews with farmers, both chicken and prawn, 
that they have never heard of the GATT, despite being in farming more than 20 years.  
Although they now know the name ‘WTO’, they do not know what business is being 
conducted at the WTO and how it might affect their produce for trade internationally. 
All of the farmer-interviewees said that the only officials they knew or, in other 
words, had seen, were the people from the Department of Livestock and Fishery. 
When asked if they had heard of the Uruguay Round and the Department of Trade 
negotiations, the answer was as expected. They did not know what the terms were 
about, let alone how they affected them.  
 
Apparently, this seems to confirm that Thai negotiators based their negotiating tactics 
on their personal beliefs and judgement on which strategy best served the interests of 
the Thai economy as a whole. Although Thai negotiators were not faced with direct 
lobbies and political demands, it does not mean that they could operate without 
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constraint. Trade policies and strategies should have been in line with the framework 
that had been predetermined by the cabinet. Therefore, the positioning of Thai 
delegations was the result of the calculation of domestic political pressures by trade 
negotiators based in Geneva. The environment that contributes to the framework of 
policy formulation was very complex. One possible answer to the question why Thai 
negotiators chose the particular strategies is that they came from an ideational 
framework. Most of the negotiators were educated abroad and, thus, it is probable that 
their preference of liberal economic ideas derives from their education. 
 
Lastly, there was no effective communication between ministries, let alone the public. 
There were feelings among officials that trade negotiations were largely distant from 
their responsibilities and the agreements would not be relevant to their day-to-day 
duties. As this was the case, it is undoubtedly understandable that negotiating 
positions and trade policies in agriculture also came from the Department of Trade 
negotiations at that time. For instance, the trade negotiators negotiated on fishery 
products, especially fresh prawns, assuming that prawns were caught in the sea 
without realising that the prawns which Thailand exported were farmed. Also, despite 
communication with the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, it was not 
sufficiently effective in the formulation of Thai interest and position. This reflects 
more general deficiencies in the department.   
 
For example, in the case of rice, during the negotiations, Thai negotiators overlooked 
the fact that the US rarely used direct export subsidies, so called for an Export 
Enhancement Program or EEP, for rice export. Instead, the US channelled export 
subsidies through marketing loan programmes. Although subsidies that went through 
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the marketing loan programme were not considered to fall into the export subsidy 
category because this programme also affected the US internal market as well, the 
impact of this marketing loan programme was that the price of rice exports from the 
US was affected, since rice produced in the US was mostly not for domestic 
consumption but for export. As a consequence, Thailand did not ask the Cairns Group 
to negotiate with the US to reduce domestic subsidies, particularly under the 
marketing loan programme. This miscalculation on the part of Thai negotiators, 
regarding the US proposal to reduce export subsidies under the EEP within five years 
and domestic support under the marketing loan within 10 years, resulted in a 
prolonged realisation of the gain Thailand entered into negotiations with.  
 
The aim of Thai negotiators regarding rice exports from the US was the elimination of 
subsidies. However, the price of rice on the world market was affected more by the 
marketing loan than direct export subsidies under the EEP. The issue that received the 
interest of the Cairns Group most was the US export subsidy under the EEP because it 
was in the direct interests of Australia, Canada, and Argentina.253 
 
Overall, Thailand’s participation in the UR proceeded virtually without domestic 
public attention and debate until at least the final stages of the negotiation round. In 
fact, most businesses became involved only after the implementation period because 
they were not happy with the results of the agreements. Only then, did businesses start 
to follow the negotiations and have more interactions with trade officials and 
negotiators. Later, the Joint WTO Committee was formed by the Board of Trade of 
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Thailand, the Federation of Thai Industries, and the Thai Bankers Association to work 
with the Department of Trade Negotiations, Ministry of Commerce. This was in part a 
reflection of a learning process. It was also a demonstration of a growing awareness 
of the interconnection between global politics and global economics by domestic 
businesses, which formerly were unaware of how trade agreements could affect the 
way they do business. 
 
Conclusion 
The chapter has examined the political economy of Thailand. By looking at the 
political nature of Thai domestic politics, the kind of domestic political context in 
which international negotiators operate can be seen. Also, the chapter looked at the 
role of agriculture in the Thai political economy, as an indicator of extra interests in 
agricultural negotiations at the Uruguay Round. The chapter then showed the complex 
process of how the national interests/positions/objectives of Thailand were derived. 
Clearly, national interests cannot be taken as given. The process of the formation of 
national interest is very problematic and complicated. Yet, the notion of national 
interest is still the main starting point for the choice of bargaining strategy. It is still 
useful because it also reflects the process of negotiation tactics such as agenda-setting, 
coalition building and/or unilateral threats. 
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Chapter 5:  
The Case of Thailand: Coalition Building 
 
The preceding chapter examined the extent of the bargaining power Thailand 
experienced during the negotiations, the level of interest in the negotiations, and the 
formulation process of the position/objectives. This chapter shows the strategies that 
Thai negotiators deployed to increase the bargaining leeway of Thailand during the 
Uruguay Round negotiations. It then goes on to study the plausible strategies and 
negotiation tactics Thai negotiators used during all phases of negotiation. Finally, the 
chapter turns its attention to an analysis of Thai strategies, as well as factors which 
inform the choice of strategies. 
 
The Strategies  
The aim of this section is to review and evaluate the trade bargaining strategies of 
Thailand during the trade negotiations in the Uruguay Round. Clearly, any 
government involved in negotiations is taking part in a strategic interaction. As a 
result, any negotiation outcome will depend on how other parties play their cards as 
well as how one plays one’s own. Intended to increase bargaining power, bargaining 
strategies must be used at all levels, whether by individual officers, collectively with 
other negotiators, or even with other institutions. As a matter of fact, strategies 
deployed at the individual level could be classified as tactics, whereas a mixture of 
tactics could be used in an overall bargaining strategy. 
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It was a common belief among Thai negotiators that GATT was formed from the 
objectives of the powerful trading countries. Most of the time, these powerful 
countries would choose to use the GATT system only when it best served their 
interests, not for the common interests of all countries as they claimed. As perceived 
by the Thai negotiators, this may have been an explanation why agriculture and 
textiles were excluded from the GATT for such a long period of time. 
 
As discussed in the previous section, Thailand’s bargaining power in multilateral 
trade negotiations in the GATT is rather limited compared to other major trading 
countries. Notwithstanding this fact, Thailand, as one of the smaller emerging powers, 
tried to overcome bargaining-power shortcomings by deploying a number of 
strategies and negotiating tactics. As a consequence, the strategies employed were to 
achieve the objectives (the national interests or the positions in negotiations), as set 
out in the earlier section. The aims of the strategies were as follows: (1) to increase 
bargaining power or to make the voice of Thailand louder; (2) to get agriculture onto 
the table; (3) to pursue the hidden agenda – trade rules being strengthened; and (4) not 
to be coerced to enter bilateral negotiations to negotiate new issues which were not 
yet in the interests of Thailand. 
 
Hence, small countries like Thailand had three existing options. The first option was 
not to cooperate with the GATT system because of not wanting to give in to the 
powerful countries. However, most people saw this first option as not being viable, 
since it would bring more damage than gains. The second option was to be 
unresponsive and indifferent to the system because the effort was believed to be 
fruitless and unrewarding, no matter how much effort being put in. With regard to this 
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option, it was not surprising to discover that a few people, including some officials in 
the Minister of Commerce, found it favourable. The final option was to try to use as 
much negotiating power to influence the agendas as much as possible rather than 
doing nothing. This option received a lot of interest from high-rank officials who were 
responsible for the negotiation. This was because they saw that Thailand had at least 
some bargaining power, though not enough to easily and effortlessly influence the 
direction of negotiations.254 The Thai negotiators believed that the reason why 
Thailand could at least enjoy some bargaining leeway was based on the fact that 
developed countries wanted to open the Thai market for banking, telecommunication, 
and investment. This, therefore, created some additional leverage in bargaining. 
 
Before looking into the strategies of Thailand, it might be of importance to address 
and discuss Thailand’s accession process and negotiating behaviour between the 
failed ministerial of 1982 and the launch of the Uruguay Round in 1986. This is 
important because doing so would be useful in establishing a necessary assessment of 
the terms on which Thailand began its life in the GATT. Also, it is important not least 
because many of the coalitions of Thailand in the Uruguay Round, such as the Cairns 
Group and ASEAN-based coalition, began to take shape in the pre-negotiation phase 
of the Uruguay Round. 
 
Although the government of Thailand had considered and explored the question of 
accession to the GATT roughly for two decades, it was not until the Tokyo Round 
that Thailand found that it was time to make decision concerning the matter. This is 
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not only because Thailand saw that major trading partners, and other ASEAN member 
states, were GATT contracting parties from whom Thailand could benefit more in 
trading as one of the GATT members, but also because Thailand’s trade regime was 
seen as relatively liberal and broadly in accordance with GATT principles by the Thai 
government.  
 
Thailand decided to apply for membership of GATT as a provisional member on June 
6, 1978, then as a full member on December 22, 1981. At the Council meeting on 22 
February 1982, a working party was set up to examine the application of the 
Government of Thailand to accede to GATT. After application for accession to 
GATT, Thailand submitted a memorandum on foreign trade regime to GATT 
contracting parties for consideration. The Draft Decision and the Draft Protocol for 
the Accession of Thailand was submitted to and approved by the Council which met 
on 21 July 1982. In the accession process, Thailand conducted tariff negotiations with 
7  contracting parties which requested tariff concessions from Thailand, namely, 
Canada, EEC, Norway, Sweden, Finland, New Zealand and Switzerland.255 Later, 
Thailand bound tariff concessions on 92 items, which were listed in the schedule of 
tariff concessions (Schedule LXXIX) annexed to the Protocol for the Accession of 
Thailand to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. On 21 October 1982, the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES adopted a Decision that the Government of Thailand 
may accede to the GATT and the protocol was signed by Thailand on 21 October 
1982 and entered into force 30 days later. Thailand became the 88th contracting party 
to the GATT on 20 November 1982. 
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Between the date of becoming a full member and the launch of the Uruguay Round in 
1986, Thai negotiators actively participated in meetings. During the pre-negotiation 
phase, most negotiations or consultations usually took place in the forms of informal 
gatherings and dinners. Despite the limited number of staffs, Thai negotiators 
attended most meetings, particularly those under the leadership of Switzerland and 
Columbia as well as those of ASEAN. This is important because coalitions, which are 
the key negotiating strategy for Thailand, were formed during this period. From 
outsiders’ perspective, Thailand began its life in the GATT in a very active way. 
Yet, it is surprising to learn that there was not a seemingly organised system of the 
formation of bargaining strategies for Thai negotiators during the progression of the 
round.  
 
While the objectives and the positions of Thailand were ostensibly studied and 
analysed, the effectiveness and the effect of the strategies used in negotiations were 
not thoroughly examined. Basically, trade delegates were not made aware of the 
different strategies or tactics that were available. So, the strategies utilised by Thai 
delegates stemmed from their belief that, in order to have any chance of Thailand’s 
interests being included in the agreement, they first had to be appear on the agenda 
being negotiated. Additionally, as already discussed, Thai delegates believed that 
Thailand, similar to other less developed countries, was at a disadvantage when 
negotiating with more powerful counterparts. Hence, to increase its bargaining 
leverage, Thailand had to join coalitions. 
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Agenda setting 
According to Singh, agenda-setting is ‘a process variable to inclusion or exclusion of 
issues being negotiated’ which is not restricted to the beginning of a negotiation.256  
Contrary to a common misperception, agenda-setting takes place throughout a 
negotiation. Generally, the term agenda-setting used in negotiation literature only 
indicates the agenda of a negotiation at the beginning– in the diagnostic phase setting 
stage of negotiations. However, Singh’s focus on agenda-setting does give a more 
accurate reflection of the agenda-setting process in any given negotiation.  
 
To Singh, agenda-setting refers to big issues included in any trade Round in the macro 
sense; whereas agenda-setting in the micro sense refers to issues included or excluded 
during meetings as the Round progresses and as negotiating parties work towards 
formulas and frameworks.257 Agenda-setting takes place also during the formula 
phase, defining a zone within which an agreement may be reached, as well as the 
detail stage at which concessions are made and traded because each negotiation 
meeting’s agenda may define their shape and scope, even when a formula is already 
in place and concessions are being traded.258 
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Agenda-setting includes sets of practices deployed to include, exclude or keep the 
focus on issues. Particularly, three practices – use of popular or attractive frames, 
degrees of technical and institutional capacity/expertise, frequency of participation in 
meetings – were valuable for developing countries to influence agenda-setting during 
the Uruguay Round.259 
 
Empirically, negotiation is an on-going process. There is no such thing as a ‘genuine 
start’ or a ‘real ending’ to international trade negotiations, which means that 
negotiations at a technical level resume even after the Round is concluded. By the 
same token, before the Uruguay Round negotiations officially began, it had taken 
countries more than four years to agree on the objectives for the negotiations and 
decide the way in which the negotiations should be organised.260 Thai delegates 
actively participated in this process, believing that waiting until later development in 
the Round would be too late to have any influence on the agendas. As it happened, 
small informal meetings and consultations had been conducted for at least two and a 
half years and the pre-negotiation process took over a year before the formal 
negotiations began in September 1986 with the launch of the Round at Punta del Este, 
Uruguay. Only a month after the Marrakesh declaration, negotiations resumed 
because there were too many details left to discuss; and negotiations are still the prime 
activities at the GATT/WTO.  
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The fact that Thailand was very active and frequently participated in meetings, both 
formal and informal like dinners and other social gatherings from the pre-negotiation 
phase of the Uruguay Round, resulted in the increase of Thailand’s influence on 
agenda setting in the negotiations, as well as more of the positions or interests of 
Thailand being included in the Final Act. However, it is acknowledged that the 
burden of attending all these meetings overloaded the capacity of the three staff 
members based in Geneva at that time. Although this was changed after the Uruguay 
Round and the number of permanent officers based in Geneva has increased, some 
negotiators admit that the increase in the number of officers does not translate to an 
increase in bargaining power. This is due to the confusing bureaucratic systems and 
procedures at the capital, which requires the number of officers to jump from three to 
twelve because it would be very difficult to gain approval from the cabinet to increase 
the number of officers later on. Moreover, it is sadly accepted among negotiators that 
most officers who are granted permanent posts at the WTO do not see the big picture 
or understand fully how negotiations are being conducted at the WTO until they are 
posted there. There has not been proper training provision or tutorials for trade 
representatives or legal officials involved in the GATT/WTO. This illustrates that 
Thailand lacks specialists in all relevant issues being negotiated. Concerned with 
language barriers and the less opinionated norms of Thai culture, one negotiator even 
disappointingly admitted that ‘all of 12 Thai negotiators cannot be compared to and 
cannot work as efficiently as those 5 negotiators from Singapore.’261 She expressed 
concerns that most Thai negotiators lack self-confidence regarding English language 
speaking ability, as well as that Thais, in general, lack assertiveness in expressing 
opinions. This becomes even more obvious when one is required to express an 
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opinion, especially in English. Hence, it is felt that language barriers and the less 
opinionated norms of Thai culture affect the efficiency of Thai negotiators in 
international negotiations. 
 
As already discussed, most contentious issues in the negotiations of the GATT 
required small meetings to solve disputes and disagreements, known as the Green 
Room. Although the Green Room process has been extensively criticised for its 
exclusivity by the developing countries, Thai negotiators worked very hard to gain an 
invitation to participate in the small meeting rooms. This can be seen as another 
attempt to take part in the agenda-setting process, rather than being a bystander and 
becoming agenda-takers. In fact, the chance to be invited to join these small meetings 
depends entirely whether the chairman of that particular meeting ‘sees’ that country or 
not. The activity of Thai negotiators, as well as the fact they were a representative of 
ASEAN in the Cairns Group, gave rise to Thailand being called to participate in 
agriculture negotiations in the ‘Green room.’262 It is crucial to note that Thailand 
became a representative of ASEAN in the Cairns Group because the other ASEAN 
members of the group – Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines – were not so eager 
and favoured liberalisation in agriculture like Thailand and their main focus was more 
on tropical products, since plant oil was categorised as a tropical product in the UR. 
As stated earlier, these countries chose to join the Cairns Group because the ASEAN 
members wanted to convey group solidarity to the international community; and also 
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these countries wanted to please Thailand as good neighbours.263 Nevertheless, with 
this significant role in the Cairns Group, Thailand succeeded in receiving invitations 
to join small, important meetings. However, in cases where Australia participated in 
smaller agricultural meetings as a representative of the Cairns Group, Thai negotiators 
were unlikely to join the meetings. Nonetheless, Thai negotiators felt assured that at 
least the interests of Thailand would be defended in the most contentious issue, 
namely agriculture, although they did realise that Australia could not completely 
represent the interests of the whole group’s members  
 
Although agenda-setting is a necessary strategy, it is not a sufficient condition for 
ensuring concessions to oneself in negotiations. Once an issue is on the agenda, other 
negotiation tactics or strategies must be simultaneously used. Coalition-building with 
important players or around particular issue-areas can effect concessions.  
 
Coalition Building VS Unilateral Threats 
Unilateral threats or unilateral trade measures can be used as bargaining strategies, 
both to get the agenda on the negotiating table and to keep the agenda on the table. 
Yet, smaller market size makes it ineffective for developing countries to use threats of 
retaliation. On the contrary, retaliation measures taken by larger economies can easily 
cause severe damage to a smaller economy. 
 
By the same token, decisions are made by consensus in the GATT. The term 
consensus implies equity in the decision making process. Nevertheless, a consensus is 
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actually defined to mean that every member either assents or remains silent. 
Theoretically, even a weak state has the authority to block a consensus, which could 
be seen as a tactic to shift the outcome in its favour. In actual fact, however, the idea 
that a small developing country alone could block a consensus is simply an illusion 
since its credibility will be low. A threat by one small trader alone is less likely to be 
believed in general. Also, if a developing country blocks a consensus on one issue, it 
is likely that others will be inflexible on other issues; and this will result in a 
deadlock, which will cause the entire weight of the whole organisation to bear down 
on that country. Besides, less developed countries are also less able to afford to make 
side payments in case of no agreements. In contrast, the powerful countries generally 
have far better alternatives to an agreement. Due to the virtue of their market size, 
technological advancement, global corporations and domestic political stability, this 
leaves developing countries vulnerable to discriminatory trade policies adopted by 
their major trade partners.264 
 
All developing countries are aware of their vulnerability to pressure inside and outside 
the organisation and their need for agreement on other issues. Forming a coalition is, 
therefore, a tactic or a strategy designed to increase their credibility. Yet, coalitions 
often require compromises. Delegates must think strategically about the country’s 
interests and link them with those of the others. 
 
The presence of multiple issues and actors at the global level offers more alternatives 
to negotiators than if the talks are bilateral and concentrated around one issue. 
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Evidently, small countries were not able to use bilateral negotiation as another way to 
gain leverage in bargaining power in the GATT. Their trade was highly reliant on 
exports to industrialised countries’ markets, and the US and the EU market in 
particular. Several issues in a negotiation allow for more opportunities for coalition-
building and agenda-setting. Moreover, multiple actors allow for more options to arise 
from the coalitions than might originally be suspected.265 
 
Throughout the Uruguay Round negotiations, small countries repeatedly reiterated the 
virtues of non-discrimination because of the insurance it ought to provide against 
selective treatment by big countries. Nevertheless, the reality looked somewhat 
different. Repeatedly, developing countries were pressured to make concessions 
bilaterally to larger powers on matters such as intellectual property protection and to 
agree to Voluntary Export Restrictions (VERs).266 The US was employing a two-track 
approach as trade strategies. US 301 was used in parallel with GATT negotiations for 
trade liberalisation in trading partner countries, especially developing countries, while 
maintaining its own protection at home; it was the weapon the US used outside the 
GATT umbrella. Actually, the final stage of the Uruguay Round demonstrated the 
developing countries’ lack of leverage as it became a US-EU bilateral negotiation 
with the results unveiled to the others only days before the deadline. 
 
In the case of Thailand, tension increased when the US bilaterally threatened to use 
measure 301 and cut down the relative merits of GSP if Thailand did not adopt and 
implement intellectual property rights protection. Likewise, in the absence of 
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bargaining power, Thailand could not use unilateral measures such as the US 301 – 
disguised trade-distorting measures - like the major trading countries. Although 
Thailand is a major agricultural exporting country, Thailand’s exports are highly 
dependent on the markets of industrialised countries, namely the EU, the US, and 
Japan. Most of the time, unilateral actions, for instance, US 301, super 301, special 
301, and VER were being used against Thailand. For this reason, Thailand could not 
use unilateral measures as a weapon in trade negotiations outside the GATT, since 
they would bear no consequence and be too insignificant and too costly. To draw on 
strategic realism, in order to use economic threats effectively, one nation must possess 
adequate economic power and domination.  
 
Hence, coalitions became important for developing countries, not only because they 
facilitate a sharing of resources like markets, but also because of other kinds of 
resources such as representatives, research, and lobbying skills.267 It is true that the 
limitations of bargaining power of developing countries are mostly rooted in domestic 
factors, but coalitions present an external strategy of at least alleviating some of the 
effects of these domestic deficiencies.268 From the Thai negotiator’s point of view, it 
was wiser to present demands through coalitions because they would enjoy greater 
legitimacy and attention than those presented by lone countries. Coalitions allow a 
pooling of organisational resources, and enable countries with ill-defined interests to 
avail themselves of the research efforts of allies and a possible country-wise division 
of research and labour across issue areas.269 Therefore, the delegates attempted to 
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strengthen the bargaining positions by forming coalitions with like minded countries. 
Additionally, as illustrated previously, the Thai negotiators aimed to increase their 
bargaining power, out of frustration, by joining coalitions as a first priority, especially 
in trade negotiations; they felt that they had no other viable option. 
 
Moreover, coalition strategy seems to serve another purpose altogether. In the effort 
to avoid bilateral pressure and to avoid upsetting the superpower trading counterparts, 
coalitions somehow yielded Thailand a cushion against the superpowers. It is vital to 
view multilateral negotiations in the structure of global trade politics, since 
multilateral trade negotiations are not stand-alone occurrences. Hence, it came as no 
surprise when one of the trade negotiators revealed that Thailand did not want to be 
seen as a bad boy or a hard liner in the GATT by blocking negotiations like Brazil or 
India.270 Compared to India or Brazil, Thailand’s bargaining power was relatively 
small. In addition, Thai negotiators believed that it would not be wise for Thailand not 
to consider that there were also negotiations at the bilateral level at the same time, 
notably with the US. If Thailand had been seen as a bad boy at the GATT, they would 
easily have become a target for future retaliation or target for GSP withdrawal. 
Predictably, Thai negotiators sought to increase Thailand’s bargaining power by 
joining coalitions.  
 
By joining coalitions, Thailand was able to influence the agenda of the negotiations 
from the start of the Round through more channels and they were very active in 
joining all the pre-round negotiations. This stemmed from the hard lesson that 
Thailand, as well as other developing countries, learned from the Tokyo Round. After 
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the Tokyo Round, there was criticism that developing countries did not participate 
fully in the negotiations. Developing countries were not happy with the Tokyo 
Agreements, since they felt that they merely took on the rules without helping to 
shape them.  
 
In the Tokyo Round, Winham concluded that the contracting parties finally reached 
agreements, even though its coverage was quite sophisticated due to the pyramidal 
quality of the negotiations.271 Winham compares the negotiations in the Tokyo 
Round with a pyramid because powerful countries, namely US, the EU, and Japan, 
first met and agreed with each other. Then, they slowly brought in other countries, 
middle power and developing countries respectively, in order to make the negotiations 
multilateral. 
 
Coalitions that Thailand joined during the Uruguay Round were the Café au Lait 
during the pre-negotiation phase, the ASEAN and the Cairns Group. Thailand chose 
to attach priority to the Café au Lait group, under the joint leadership of Colombia and 
Switzerland, during the pre-negotiation period because it saw potential linkages could 
open up in key areas if new issues like services were used as a bargaining chip.272 
With its openness to negotiation and the research oriented nature of the group, the 
Café au Lait was an issue-based coalition which brought together both developed and 
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developing countries with common interests.273 The achievement of the group was 
that its draft provided the blueprint for the Punta del Este declaration. Once the issues 
of services and new issues in the pre-negotiating phase were dealt with and the 
relevance of the group was somehow diminished, Thai negotiators still actively 
participated in the group. This is evident in the fact that they subsequently joined the 
Hotel de la Paix group. The name of the group was derived from the name of the hotel 
in Geneva where the monthly meeting was held. As a consequence, the Café au Lait 
was seen as an agenda-moving coalition, whereas the ASEAN and the Cairns Group 
were seen as proposal-making and negotiating ones. 
 
While the role of the Café au Lait was diminished, the Thai delegations placed 
priority on the ASEAN and the Cairns Groups. The Thai government concurrently 
chose to work with ASEAN because they had been in close contact for a rather long 
period of time. In contrast, the reason why the Thai negotiators joined the Cairns 
Group, however, derives from the agricultural focus of Thailand. Thailand chose to 
advance its position in agricultural liberalisation through the Cairns Group because 
rice, the most important good of Thailand, was categorised as a temperate product in 
the Uruguay Round. Hence, it was sensible to channel its vigour in agricultural 
liberalisation through the Cairns Group, since the focus of the group was more on 
agriculture in general, while ASEAN focused more on tropical products. The reason 
why ASEAN put priority on tropical products was because, apart from Singapore who 
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did not have an interest in agricultural issues, most of the members’ main goods were 
oilseeds plants, particularly those of Malaysia and the Philippines.274 
 
ASEAN  
At the end of World War II, European states and colonies in Asia tried to end their 
separation from one another and tried to develop contacts with the neighbouring 
countries. Despite being forced into treaties by Britain, Thailand, as the only un-
colonised nation in Southeast Asia, tried to forge new relationships in the region. Thai 
diplomats and statesmen advocated independence for every nation and the formation 
of regional cooperation. However, the time in the years soon after the war was not 
perfectly ripe for regional formation. On 8th August 1967, the Bangkok Declaration 
announced the establishment of the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), comprising the original ASEAN five, namely Singapore, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. In 1984, Brunei Darussalam became 
independent and joined ASEAN. After being invited as an observing guest in the 
ASEAN Ministerial Meetings (AMM), Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar later 
became members of ASEAN. 
 
The history of ASEAN is long and the role of ASEAN in the international security 
sphere has been interesting. However, the role of ASEAN in international trade 
negotiations only started when the ASEAN Geneva Committee (AGC) was formed in 
1973 to coordinate the position of members in the GATT. 
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Even though ASEAN was regarded as a disappointment as a regional integration 
scheme, it is, however, deemed very successful as a trade coalition in the 
GATT/WTO, particularly since its active participation in the pre-launch phase of the 
Uruguay Round. Members divided up assignments for coordinating WTO issues 
among themselves. Thailand was responsible for dealing with agriculture. Indonesia 
was assigned to deal with textiles issues. Meanwhile, Malaysia and the Philippines 
was coordinating work on tropical products. Singapore took responsibility for trade 
rules275 (Brunei had not become a GATT Contracting Party at that time). Despite the 
fact that, since the pre-launch phase of the Uruguay Round, the ASEAN had in some 
respects come to resemble the EU in the WTO, in the sense that one negotiator speaks 
on behalf of its individual members, at the time of the Uruguay Round the ASEAN 
Geneva Committee (AGC)276 operated more as a joint platform for its members to 
exchange information rather than acting as a joint bargaining platform to come up 
with a unified stance.277 Nevertheless, there have been times when members have 
presented coordinated proposals under the name of the ASEAN. 
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Furthermore, the group has been an avid supporter of multilateralism. As such, the 
ASEAN coalition has resembled the Cairns Group in putting forth a positive agenda 
that conforms to the general liberalising stance of the GATT. In the eyes of outsiders, 
the ASEAN has enjoyed a very good image as a trade coalition and a regional 
institution which can utilise its bargaining power to commonly pursue similar 
interests.278 
 
As for coalitions, ASEAN is seen as a priority in the mind of Thai trade negotiators. 
This is because of the geographical proximity and the similar level of economic and 
social development. Also, ASEAN can provide Thailand with raw material, labour, 
and a market for export goods. More importantly, the closer economic integration of 
ASEAN will bestow Thailand with additional bargaining power.279 
 
The Cairns Group 
Since both the EC and the United States had been persistent in either blocking or 
ignoring the GATT dispute settlement on agricultural issues, the result was the 
collapse of food prices in the 1980s. As a result, other agricultural exporting countries 
faced substantial and continuing deterioration in their terms of trade with no effective 
opportunity for redress. The ensuing trade war between the EC and the United States 
provided the stimulus which brought many countries together to form a coalition of 
comparatively efficient agricultural exporting countries. One good example of such a 
coalition, overcoming the developing country solidarity barrier for the first time, was 
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a group of fourteen traditional agricultural exporters that sought significant 
liberalisation. This coalition, aiming to achieve desirable outcomes in agriculture 
negotiations, was called the Cairns Group. The key point is that it was the first time 
that agricultural exporting developing countries allied with a number of industrial and 
centrally planned economies to advance a common aim, namely to keep agriculture 
on the agenda for the Uruguay Round. The Cairns Group’s objective was to gradually 
attain free trade in agricultural commodities, eliminate production distortions, and 
ensure that binding undertakings were made to this effect. This aim was more directed 
towards industrial countries because they generally distorted their economies in ways 
which offer substantial net assistance to agriculture. In contrast, the policies of Cairns 
Group countries tended to offer comparatively little support to their agricultures. Yet, 
it is essential to note one exception to this generalisation. This important exception 
was Canada, which offered high rates of assistance to its dairy and livestock sectors. 
 
The Cairns Group was formed out of frustration among comparatively efficient 
agricultural exporting countries over a series of changes in the conduct of world 
agricultural trade over which they, as individual countries, could have no influence. 
The Group initially comprised fourteen countries from five continents: North 
America, South America, Europe, Asia, and Australia, and three of which were 
members of the OECD, namely Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Four members 
from the ASEAN were Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Five 
developing countries from South America were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, 
and Uruguay; while Hungary was the former centrally controlled economy from 
Eastern Europe and Fiji was from the Pacific Islands. Currently, however, the Cairns 
Group consists of the following eighteen members: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, 
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Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay.280 
 
The initial concern of the group was to keep agriculture on the agenda for the 
Uruguay Round. As for Thailand, the main focus was on the new US Farm Act 1985 
or the Food Security Act that came into effect in April 1986, which increased the 
subsidies for rice, threatening Thailand’s exports. However, the overall concern of the 
Cairns Group revolved around the issues of export subsidies and all forms of trade 
barriers to agricultural products. For instance, the products that received special 
attention from the group members were beef (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
and Uruguay), lamb (New Zealand, Australia, and Argentina), wheat and grain 
(Argentina, Australia, and New Zealand), sugar (the Philippines, Thailand, Fiji, 
Brazil, and Argentina), rice (Thailand and Australia), flowers (Chile and Columbia), 
and vegetable oil and oilseeds (Malaysia and Brazil).281  
 
In its original declaration, adopted in Cairns in 1986, the Group committed itself to 
working collectively to ensure the inclusion of agriculture in the Round. Also, the 
group committed itself to liaising with other affected developing country groups and 
interests.282  
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The strength of the Cairns Group was sustained during the Round by the continuing 
trade war between the EC and the United States which further impaired their terms of 
trade.283 The Group tried to have a significant influence on the conduct of the Round 
by denying the EC and the United States the opportunity to come to terms bilaterally 
in a way which could harm the interests of other exporters. Moreover, the new 
importance of developing countries in other aspects of the Round, especially in the 
negotiations on services trade and on intellectual property rights, also helped the 
group in sustaining their strength and significant role. However, despite their 
collective power, in many agricultural markets they also recognised that their interest 
lay in a more complete subjection of agricultural trade to the GATT disciplines to the 
outcomes of a successful Round.  
 
More often than not, a conciliatory approach was sought by the Cairns Group during 
the course of the Round. Nonetheless, frustration over the continuing trade war 
accumulated as the Round proceeded. Actually, the apparent intransigence of the EC 
led the position of the Cairns Group away from the middle ground and towards that of 
the United States.284 Thus, it is not surprising to see that the final proposals of the 
Cairns Group resembled those of the United States, seeking extensive tariffication and 
a 75 per cent reduction in support rates. Both proposals by the US and the Cairns 
Group persisted with separate consideration of export subsidies and guaranteed access 
limits for exporters in markets such as that of the EC. Again, the EC offered a 
comparatively modest commitment to reduce support, without specifying the ultimate 
rate to be achieved. In addition, a compromise offered at the meeting by the US and 
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the Group was rejected by the EC, leading to the Cairns Group withdrawing from 
negotiations in all areas. Given the importance of the developing countries in the 
Cairns Group to the negotiations on services trade and intellectual property rights 
protection, this effectively prevented the conclusion of the entire Round.285 Once 
again, the Cairns Group indicated its unwillingness to settle for a weak compromise 
on agriculture. Without an agricultural component, all other parts of the negotiations 
were put on hold. 
 
In the final stages, no matter what role the Cairns Group had played during the 
Round, agreement on agriculture remained dependent on a success in bi-lateral 
negotiations between the United States and the EC. Those negotiations, concluded in 
Washington in November 1992, fell far short of the Cairns Group’s proposals during 
the Round. Apparently, the effects of the negotiations would mainly rest on the 
unilateral reforms of the CAP. 
 
The Group had been aided by the new importance of developing countries in other 
aspects of the Round, namely negotiations on services and intellectual property rights. 
The developing countries in the Cairns Group were able to make progress in these 
areas, conditional on progress in agriculture. In the final stages of the Round, 
however, agreement on agriculture depended on success in bilateral negotiations 
between the United States and the EU. Nevertheless, the Cairns Group established 
itself as a serious player in the game, acting as both a proposal maker and a blocking 
coalition. However, at times the position of the Cairns Group of agricultural exporting 
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countries was criticised as being too close to that of the US, although less extreme, to 
play a mediating role.286 
 
As stated earlier, the outward move of Thai negotiators was in agriculture and it could 
be anticipated that Thailand would be very active in one of the key agriculture 
coalitions in the Uruguay Round, namely the Cairns Group. Evidently, the fact that 
Thailand hosted the 14th official trade meeting  in Pattaya in July 1986, in order to 
form the Cairns Group clearly shows Thailand’s vigorous effort to influence the 
outcome by utilising bargaining strategy – via a coalition - to achieve it. 
 
To strive for agricultural liberalisation through the group, Thai negotiators chose to 
work closely with Australia to counter the effort by the EU for agriculture to be left 
out of the negotiations. Thai negotiators also acted as the coordinator for the ASEAN 
members in the Cairns Group and participated in negotiations concerning agriculture 
ranging from small to decision-making negotiations.287  Thailand exploited the 
Cairns Group to achieve the objectives of agricultural liberalisation by participating 
actively in the agenda-setting process within the group. 
 
In addition to being very active in the Cairns Group, Thailand also helped to create 
more bargaining weight for the group by persuading another three ASEAN countries, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, to join the group. Actually, the three 
countries were not so keen on joining the Cairns Group because Malaysia was more 
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interested in oilseed, tropical products and market access while Indonesia and the 
Philippines in fact wanted to protect their agricultural sector. Nevertheless, they later 
joined the group because there was an informal accord between Thailand and these 
countries that if they backed up Thailand on this issue, Thailand would reciprocate on 
the other issues that these countries favoured.  By the same token, the fact that these 
countries joined the Cairns group can be seen as an effort to maintain unity within the 
ASEAN.288 The logic that underlay this strategy of Thai negotiators is that if 
Thailand could persuade other countries to join the Cairns Group, it would illustrate 
its very active leadership role within the group. It was believed by Thai negotiators 
that this affected Thai clout within the group by leading with a louder voice and 
Thailand’s proposals having more weight. At the same time, this illustrates the active 
role of Thailand not only in the Cairns Group but also in the ASEAN as well.  
 
Conclusion 
It is true that the meaning of strategy often shifts according to the goal sought.  
Yet, it is equally crucial to recognise the negotiation behaviours of state actors in 
trade negotiations in order to understand the negotiation processes and, hence, 
outcomes in order to be able to improve or gain the desired outcomes. The above 
illustration demonstrates the dynamic of the formulation of the bargaining strategy of 
Thailand, which is undeniably a very complex process.  
 
The underlying principle in negotiation is an attempt to do better than the status quo.  
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All parties enter negotiations with the same rationale. Thus, an easy option in 
bargaining is to be defensive. No party likes to accept a deal that worsens the status 
quo. To maintain the status quo, an easy option would be that ‘no deal is better than a 
bad deal’. Hence, finding a compromise that will benefit or be acceptable to all 
member countries is much more difficult. This is because it is very difficult to even 
start with the first step which is to identify one’s own interests. To move forward by 
identifying what others can accept as well as take, in other words to reach a 
consensus, proves to be much more time consuming and complex than might first be 
expected. 
 
This chapter examined the strategies Thai negotiators used during the course of the 
negotiations. The limited awareness of the importance of the GATT by the public led 
to the formulation of bargaining strategy being heavily contingent on a small group of 
officials from the Ministry of Commerce. Guided by their experiences and personal 
beliefs, the strategy aimed to achieve the liberalisation of agricultural trade, as well as 
strengthened trade rules in the global community. The important role of agriculture in 
the Thai economy, as well as in Thai exports, significantly contributed to the issue 
being one of the priorities Thailand wished to pursue in the negotiations. 
 
As a result of a small-sized market, Thailand enjoyed less bargaining power in 
economic negotiations when compared to counterparts with a larger market like the 
US and the EU. Negotiation tactics and strategies such as agenda-setting and 
coalition-building allow Thailand and other developing countries alike to affect gains 
and outcomes by altering interests and making available agreeable alternatives to 
negotiators. Unilateral actions by Thailand would not pose much threat to other strong 
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trading partners, since they carried little weight and credibility. Therefore, agenda-
setting and coalition-building seemed to be the most viable option for Thailand; and 
Thai negotiators exercised this strategy extensively during the Uruguay Round period 
because they believed that to monitor and to participate carefully in agenda setting 
would increase Thailand’s gains. With regards to coalition, Thai delegates worked 
closely with the ASEAN and the Cairns Group. They chose to work closely with the 
ASEAN because of the regional context to the negotiations. The Cairns Group offered 
more bargaining leeway for Thailand in agriculture, an issue that was at the top of the 
list of priority due to the significance of agriculture to the Thai economy as a whole. 
 
Finally, the chapter analysed the strategies Thailand deployed by using the framework 
of John S. Odell. By giving objective descriptions of negotiating strategies as 
behaviours that can be observed, Odell classifies strategies into two main ideal types: 
distributive or value-claiming and integrative or value-creating. He argues that to 
reduce the risks of each pure type, a given party can blend tactical elements from each 
pure type to create a mixed strategy, which in most conditions would benefit more 
and lose less. 
 
Based on the assumption of bounded rationality, Thai negotiators lacked not only 
complete information, but also the ability to perform computations on the best 
strategies, which were needed to optimise the outcome. As a consequence, the 
analysis of Thai strategy seemed to convey that Thai negotiators did not see all 
actions taken at all levels of international trade negotiations as a set of strategy. 
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Influenced by the context of negotiations, particularly the bilateral pressure from the 
US, negotiators’ beliefs, as well as the structure of domestic politics, the bargaining 
strategies selected by Thailand utilised tactical elements from both ends of the 
spectrum of the ideal types. At the bilateral level when negotiating with stronger 
partners, Thailand had to resort to some defensive distributive tactics like delays and 
more integrative tactics. However, Thailand yielded concessions more than applying 
other tactics. At the multilateral level, Thailand seemed to use a more balanced mix 
than at the bilateral level. Framing issues in line with the GATT and proposing a 
formula for cutting all tariffs, including those of Thailand’s, thus embodying such an 
exchange of concessions, demonstrates the use of integrative tactics. Joining 
coalitions was a strategy that can be seen as belonging to both camps.   
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Chapter 6:  
Outcome of the Uruguay Round 
 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of a given strategy used in a trade negotiation by 
one party, the outcome or agreement of that trade negotiation must be examined to see 
if it yields a gain or a loss relative to the status quo of that party before the negotiation 
begins. The previous chapter explored the objectives Thailand wished to achieve from 
the Uruguay Round negotiations. Also, the strategies Thailand and Thai negotiators 
employed to attain the mentioned objectives have been discussed. It is very crucial to 
note that looking at the outcome or the agreement of the negotiations is to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the bargaining strategy, not to assess whether the objectives are 
actually achieved. Bargaining strategies can merely directly or indirectly impact the 
final agreements or the rules written, not how the rules are implemented or whether 
the result of the implementation is favourable or not. Firstly, the chapter looks at the 
outcome of the Uruguay Round negotiations in general. Then, it examines the 
outcome of the agriculture negotiations in particular, namely, the Agreement on 
Agriculture. 
 
The outcome of the Uruguay Round negotiations – the Final 
Act 
The outcome of the time-consuming process of trade negotiations in the Uruguay 
Round was a final document comprising more than 26,000 pages, weighing more than 
170 kilograms including final text, tariff schedules and other details. The terms of the 
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Uruguay Round agreement are contained in a document entitled the Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 
This section summarises some of the key decisions agreed upon at the final 
ministerial meeting in Marrakesh in April 1994, which came into effect on January 
1st, 1995. 
 
In the Tokyo Round, developing countries focused on asking for special and 
differential treatment. For instance, they wanted to be exempt from import taxes 
imposed by developed countries. All the evidence suggests that developing countries 
had a very small role in helping form the main agreement of the Tokyo Round. 
However, the world has seen the transformation of the role played by developing 
countries in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. There were two 
main factors contributing to this. Firstly, some newly industrialised countries in East 
and Southeast Asia led through the example of relying more on policy reform, 
exports, and monetary and financial disciplines to avoid inflation and debt than trade 
intervention. Equally importantly, developing countries realised that insisting on 
special treatment and preferences was no longer working effectively because the grant 
of preferences heavily relied on the willingness of industrialised countries to make 
concessions. Since developing countries had too little bargaining power, decisions on 
which developing countries would be granted preferences were mostly dealt with 
bilaterally, not multilaterally. As a consequence, developing countries’ exporters had 
less bargaining power when compared with the industrial countries’ importers. The 
only bargaining tool that developing countries had was to refuse to sign the 
agreements. While small countries repeatedly reiterated the virtues of non-
discrimination because of the insurance it should have provided against selective 
treatment by powerful countries, the reality looked somewhat different. Throughout 
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the 1980s, many developing countries were repeatedly pressured to make concessions 
bilaterally to developed countries on such matters as intellectual property protection 
and VERs. Hence, small and medium sized countries, including Thailand, started to 
feel that their tool – of not signing the agreements - would not be so effective and that 
the trading system was in desperate need of rules that could protect them from 
arbitrary bullying by the powerful countries.289  
 
Developing countries left the Tokyo Round, and indeed all Rounds preceding it, 
feeling that the final agreements reflected the agenda of the industrialised countries. 
As a result, in the pre-negotiation phase of the Uruguay Round (1982-1986), 
developing countries were divided into two sides. The first group was led by India 
and Brazil. Its negotiation position was clearly simple: members would block the 
opening of a new trade Round until traditional issues of standstill and roll back were 
attended to, plus resisting the inclusion of new issues. However, the ASEAN and 
some Latin American countries agreed to the new Round because they wanted to 
express the voice of smaller developing countries in setting the negotiation agenda. 
During the course of the negotiations, the hard liners like Brazil and India shifted their 
positions. The final outcome of the Uruguay Round was that it was the first time all 
the signatories agreed on the final text. The completion of the Uruguay Round was the 
first to squarely address agricultural trade. Also, the outcome of the negotiations was 
the Final Act that agreed to set up the WTO in 1995. Although the outcome was 
achieved later than expected, it was still hailed as a success. ‘The Final Act which 
brought together the various agreements reached in the Uruguay Round and provided 
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the charter for the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is highly 
significant in reinforcing the architecture of the world trading system and extending 
its coverage.’290 
 
As noted earlier, the process of multilateral trade negotiations is an on-going one. It is 
therefore unsurprising that technical-level negotiations resumed in Geneva only a 
month after the closure of the Uruguay Round in Marrakesh. This posed a challenge 
for the resource and personnel capacity of many countries, particularly smaller ones. 
The picture of the on-going process of trade negotiations is stressed here in order to 
emphasise that the Uruguay Round agreements were not the final and complete 
outcome of the negotiations in themselves. It was the outcome of attempts from most 
parties, if not all, to improve the status quo. 
 
Mainly, the Uruguay Round produced agreements and decisions reached in four main 
areas:291 
• Improved market access through tariff reductions, including agriculture and 
textiles, as well as Tariffication of non-tariff border measures; 
• Institutional arrangements covering the dispute settlement mechanism and the 
creation of the WTO; 
• Trade rules governing domestic support, subsidies, countervailing duties, 
safeguards, and antidumping; 
• New issues - services, investment, and intellectual property. 
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The World Trade Organisation  
The agreement establishing the WTO called for a single institutional framework 
encompassing the GATT. The WTO was created to provide a firmer legal foundation 
for the management of world trade. As described earlier, it entered into force on 1st 
January 1995. The WTO would encompass all agreements and arrangements under 
the GATT, as modified by the Uruguay Round (1994a), as well as all arrangements 
concluded under its auspices and the complete results of the Uruguay Round 
including agriculture, textiles, intellectual property, and services, which would be 
binding on all members. It also covered the four plurilateral trade agreements – on 
civil aircraft, government procurement, dairy products, and bovine meat – which 
would be binding only on their signatories. The WTO structure is headed by a 
Ministerial Conference meeting at least once every two years and a General Council 
oversees the operation of the agreement and ministerial decisions on a regular basis. 
The agreement also stipulated that the WTO framework should ensure a ‘single 
undertaking approach’ to the results and outcomes of the Uruguay Round. Hence, 
membership in the WTO would have to participate in all of the negotiated agreements 
as part of a ‘single undertaking’, without exception. 
 
This section aims to give a summary of some of the outcomes of eight-year efforts by 
trade negotiators in the Round. It comes as no surprise that the Round took eight years 
to complete because there was such a wide coverage of both old divisive issues, like 
agriculture and textiles, and new contentious issues, like services and intellectual 
property rights. Nevertheless, it is clear that the negotiations in the Uruguay Round 
were very complex and required a lot of time and resources from all parties alike. Yet, 
unlike their developed countries counterparts, it is more likely that the burden of 
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attending negotiations would have fallen more on the shoulders of trade negotiators 
from developing countries where resources and personnel were constrained. 
 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture: Overview 
The earlier section summarises some aspects of the outcome of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. In this section, the results of the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA) are discussed. To be able to analyse if Thai negotiators 
successfully employed bargaining strategies to improve the status quo in the realm of 
agriculture, one of the main interests of Thailand in the Uruguay Round, it is 
necessary to look at the specific evidence, namely the AoA, to assess the effectiveness 
of bargaining strategies used.  
 
The decline in price of agricultural goods was a central concern for those countries 
that sought a new round of trade negotiations. It became widely accepted early in the 
process of the negotiations that the national agricultural price support policies pursued 
by the major trading countries were at the root of the problems in agricultural trade. 
According to Fitchett, rationales for intervention can be summed up in five points: (1) 
to stabilise and increase farm incomes; (2) to guarantee food security; (3) to improve 
the balance of payments; (4) to support the development of other sectors of the 
economy; and (5) to increase agricultural output.292 Obviously, these reasons are in 
part non-economic and mostly driven by special political interest. Therefore, the 
policies to support and intervene in agricultural trade, both indirect, e.g. price support 
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policy, and direct, e.g. tariffs, in particular those of the major industrialised countries, 
needed to be modified before the trade situation could be noticeably improved.293 
 
Traditionally, disciplines for agriculture differed in two major respects from those on 
trade in manufacture. Firstly, quotas were allowed for agricultural commodities if 
domestic measures were taken to restrict domestic production or used to remove a 
temporary domestic surplus at the same time. Secondly, export subsidies on primary 
products were permitted only if these subsidies did not lead to more than an equitable 
share of world trade for the subsidising country.294 Evidently, more flexibility in the 
use of Quota Restrictions (QRs) and other Non Tariff Barriers (NTBs) in the 
agricultural sector was increasingly introduced through special waivers, starting with 
the US in 1955. Furthermore, these NTBs proliferated through protocols of accession 
and through limited tariff bindings on agricultural imports, which opened the way for 
the use of variable levies under the CAP by the EU. By all these means, a 
proliferation of various ‘grey area measures’ such as VERs and orderly marketing 
arrangements (OMAs) was the final product.295 
 
Thus, it is generally recognised that the GATT rules relating to trade treat agriculture 
differently from other industries. From the outset, agriculture has been a problem area 
for the GATT system for liberalising world trade.296 While agriculture was in 
principle covered by the 1947 GATT Agreement, in practice it was outside GATT 
                                                 
293
 Josling, Timothy E., Tangermann, Stefan, and Warley, T. K., Agriculture in the GATT, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996, p. 163. 
294
 Hoekman, B., and M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System: from GATT 
to WTO, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p.213. 
295
 Ibid., p.213. 
296
 Swinbank, Alan, and Tanner, Carolyn, Farm Policy and Trade Conflict: the Uruguay Round and 
CAP Reform, Michigan: The University of Michigan, 1996, p.7. 
Chapter 6: Outcome of the Uruguay Round 183 
disciplines until the Uruguay Round.297 The rules applying to agricultural trade under 
GATT 1947 were weaker than those for manufactured goods; this is because many 
nations traditionally regarded agriculture as a sector of economic activity that 
deserved special treatment.298The Uruguay Round was, therefore, designed in part to 
bring agriculture into greater conformity with the GATT.  
 
The agriculture agreement comprised the Agreement on Agriculture; Concessions and 
Commitments made on market access, domestic support, and export subsidies; the 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures; and the Decision Concerning 
Least-Developed and Net Food Importing Developing Countries. The terms of the 
Agreement on Agriculture are contained in Annex 1A, the Agreement on Trade in 
Goods. Important detail covering implementation of the Agreement on agriculture is 
contained in the commitments schedules, submitted by each individual country. 
Overall, the Agreement on Agriculture brings agricultural trade more in line with the 
disciplines of the GATT and it also provides a framework for the long-term reform of 
agricultural trade and domestic policies. 
 
The Agreement also, within it, contained “peace” provisions, also known as the 
“peace clause”. It acts as an incentive for countries to accept the new disciplines and 
commitments on domestic support and export subsidies.299 It was agreed that policies 
that conform to the new rules would be sheltered from international challenge under 
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the GATT. The Due Restraint provisions, valid during the nine-year implementation 
period, stipulated that “green box” policies are non-actionable for purposes of 
countervailing duties and other GATT challenges. All domestic support that 
conformed to commitments, including payments under production-limiting 
programmes, was to be exempt from the imposition of countervailing duties as long as 
no injury was caused, and was to be exempt from other GATT challenges if support 
did not exceed that paid in the base period. 
 
Market Access 
Before the Uruguay Round, the use of non-tariff measures was widespread in 
agricultural trade. Moreover, in many countries, the particular type of NTM used had 
strategic importance for the functioning of their domestic market regimes.  
 
Against this backdrop, the biggest advance made in the Agreement of Agriculture in 
respect of market access for agricultural products was to prohibit the use of 
quantitative restrictions on imports and measures such as variable levies, minimum 
import prices, voluntary export restraints and similar border measures other than 
ordinary customs duties. The agreement stipulated that all these measures should be 
converted into tariffs and subjected to binding and reduction.  
 
It was also agreed that WTO members were required to reduce custom duties on all 
products over six years (ten years for developing countries) and that industrial 
countries should reduce these tariffs, including those resulting from tariffication, by 
an average of 36 per cent from a 1986-88 base (24 per cent for developing countries), 
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with a minimum rate of reduction of 15 per cent on each tariff line (10 per cent for 
developing countries). Where there were no significant imports, members were 
required to establish minimum access opportunities, set at a level of 3 percent of the 
corresponding domestic consumption in the first year, rising to 5 percent by the end of 
the implementation period.300 Current access opportunities in excess of the stipulated 
minimum were to be maintained. Both minimum access and current access 
commitments come in the form of tariff-rate quotas (TRQ), under which a certain 
volume of imports (the quota) enters at a lower tariff, and out-of-quota imports are 
subject to a much higher tariff.  
 
Members that had tariffed non-tariff measures were given access to the Special 
Safeguard Provision of the Agreement. This exception from the ‘bound tariffs only’ 
principle is the possibility of imposing additional duties on a product in any year 
when either the volume of imports exceeds or the price of imports falls below the 
designated trigger levels. This agreement took agricultural trade a step closer towards 
the same treatment as manufacturing within the GATT. 
 
Export competition 
It is commonly agreed that, as a consequence of agricultural intervention, countries 
with no comparative advantage in agriculture not only became major producers but 
also net exporters. Production support policies had to be complemented by export 
subsidies to allow surpluses to be sold aboard. These, in turn, led to numerous trade 
conflicts. 
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Hence, it is not at all surprising that curbing export subsidies in agriculture was the 
crucial aim of the countries that had pushed for progress on agriculture in the Uruguay 
Round. It took the exporting countries, especially the US and the Cairns Group, a long 
time in the negotiations to convince the major user of export subsidies, the EC, that 
there would not be a conclusion to the Round without an explicit discipline on this 
category of measures.301 Eventually, the EC gave in, and the agreement on export 
subsidies was finally reached. 
 
While the Agreement did not prohibit the use of export subsidies, it made a major 
advance by requiring members to undertake reduction commitments, although it 
might be questioned how much practical effect these commitments had. Such 
subsidies are deemed to be payments in kind; subsidised stock exports; producer-
financed export subsidies; export marketing cost subsidies; export-specific 
transportation subsidies; and subsidies on goods incorporated into exports. In other 
words, the AoA prohibits export subsidies on agricultural products unless the 
subsidies are specified in a member’s lists of commitments. Members were to enter 
base levels of subsidy exports and of expenditures on export subsidies into their 
schedules, agreeing that the figures contained in the schedules were accurately 
representing their export subsidisation in the past.  Where the export subsidies are 
listed, the agreement requires WTO members to cut both the amount of money they 
spend on export subsidies and the quantities of exports that receive subsidies. 
Members were required to reduce their budgetary outlays on these subsidies by 36 per 
cent of the base period of 1986-1990 and the quantities of subsidised exports by 21 
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per cent over a period of six years. In the case of developing countries, they were 
required to reduce their value of export subsidies by 24 per cent and the subsidised 
quantities by 14 per cent over a period of 10 years. Least-developed countries do not 
need to make any cuts. Commitments for each year of the implementation period have 
been incorporated in the WTO schedules of the members. During the six-year 
implementation period, developing countries are allowed under certain conditions to 
use subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing and transporting exports. Most 
importantly, countries individually accept legally binding commitments regarding 
maximum export subsidisation in the future, based on past levels of export 
subsidisation detailed in their schedules. To ensure stability for developing countries’ 
importers, genuine food aid is exempt from reductions. Nevertheless, it is important to 
note that this might not be the real motive behind the exemption. Arguably, food aid 
was widely seen as a means of developed countries, especially the US, to provide 
hidden farm subsidies. 
 
In contrast to the area of market access, the Agreement did not place direct constraints 
on the types and the levels of policies that countries can use; it constrains the effects 
of policies rather than policy instruments. How a country achieves the reduction of its 
export subsidies entirely depends upon domestic policy decisions.302 As long as the 
country manages to meet its commitments under the Agreement, no controversy will 
be raised in this regard.  
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Domestic Support 
Another major element of the Uruguay Round agreement was a provision to discipline 
and reduce domestic support.  These domestic support provisions are probably the 
most innovative feature of the Agreement. Effectively, they took the close link 
between domestic agricultural policies and international trade explicitly into 
account.303  
 
The main conceptual consideration is that there are basically two categories of 
domestic support – support with no, or minimal at most, distorting effect on trade on 
the one hand (often referred to as “Green Box” measures) and trade-distorting support 
on the other hand (Often known as “Amber Box” measures). The “Green Box” 
policies included, for example, those for the purposes of research, marketing and 
promotion, infrastructure, food security stocks, domestic food aid, disaster payments, 
structural adjustment programmes, environmental programmes, and “decoupled” 
income support. The measures categorised in the Amber Box were subject to 
reduction commitments. The starting point of all Agreement provisions required 
Governments first to compute the base level of aggregate measurement of support 
(AMS) for each country and product. The use of an aggregate measurement of support 
promised to resolve the dilemma facing all agricultural trade negotiations. It was 
agreed that domestic production support to agriculture as measured by an Aggregate 
Measure of Support was to decline by 20 per cent over a period of 6 years (relative to 
a 1986-9 base period, which was a very favourable base period for subsidising 
countries, like the EU). In the case of developing countries, the AMS support had to 
be reduced by 13.33 per cent over 10 years. WTO members were required to calculate 
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and enter their base period AMS in their schedules, as well as the ‘final bound 
commitment level’ for the AMS.304 The reduction commitments, thus, were reflected 
in the schedules of each WTO member. The AMS includes expenditures on domestic 
subsidies, as well as market price support policies such as administered prices, and 
therefore captures both border and non-border policies.  
 
However, the Agreement exempted from reduction commitments another group of 
measures. These are, namely, direct payments made conditional on limitation of 
production, as these are considered less distorting than open-ended price support.305 
These direct payments under production limiting programmes are often referred to as 
“Blue Box” measures. Currently, there are no limits on spending on Blue Box 
subsidies. In the current negotiations, there are disagreements over the existence of 
the Blue Box measures; some countries want to keep the Blue Box as it is because 
they see it as a crucial means of moving away from distorting Amber Box subsidies 
without causing too much hardship. Others want to set limits or reduce commitments, 
some advocating moving these supports into the Amber Box. 
 
Also, under the de minimis provisions of the Agreement, there is no requirement to 
reduce such trade-distorting domestic support in any year in which the aggregate 
value of the product-specific support came to less than 5 per cent of the total value of 
production of the agricultural product in question. Moreover, when non-product 
specific support does not exceed 5 per cent of the value of total agricultural 
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production, it is also exempt from reduction (this threshold is 10 per cent in the case 
of developing countries). 
 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
It is understandable the countries maintain measures to ensure that food is safe for 
consumers and to prevent the spread of pests or diseases among animals and plants. 
These sanitary (human and animal health) and phytosanitary (plant health) measures 
can take many forms. For example, they include requirements for products to come 
from disease-free areas, inspection of imported products, specific treatment or 
processing of products, and the setting of maximum allowable levels of pesticide 
residues or permitted use of only certain additives in food. 
 
Since 1948, national food safety, animal and plant health measures which affect trade 
have been subject to GATT rules under Article XX:(b) of the GATT. As it was 
predicted that barriers to agricultural trade would be reduced as a result of the 
Uruguay Round, governments became more concerned that sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures might increasingly be used for protectionist purposes. Hence, as expressed 
in the Punta del Este declaration adopted in 1986, member countries planned to 
discuss sanitary and phytosanitary measures with the aim of minimising the negative 
effects of such measures on agricultural trade. 
 
The Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures covers food safety and 
animal, plant, and health regulations and is separate from the Agreement on 
Agriculture. The aim of the Agreement is to improve operation of GATT Article 
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XX:(b) by making it easier to distinguish between genuine health and safety issues 
and disguised protection.  
 
The agreement recognises that governments have the right to use sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures and that they should be applied only to the extent necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health and should not arbitrarily or unjustifiably 
discriminate between members where identical or similar conditions prevail, 
constituting a disguised trade restriction. As far as possible, measures shall be based 
on international standards and guidelines or recommendations where they exist. 
Higher standards or stricter measures may only be introduced or used when there is 
sufficient scientific justification that the international standard does not achieve its 
appropriate level of protection. In these circumstances, the established risk assessment 
techniques should be employed and the level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection 
which is deemed appropriate should be decided, taking into account the objective of 
minimising negative trade effects. The right of countries to set their own safety and 
health standards is reaffirmed, but with the proviso that such standards should be 
based on “scientific justification” and that use should be made of international 
standards where possible. Implementation relies heavily on the principle of 
equivalence laid down in the SPS Agreement. Where harmonisation is achieved – 
where national SPS are based on standards agreed in the relevant international 
institutions – policies are presumed to be consistent with the Agreement and the 
GATT, and disputes should not arise. Nevertheless, harmonisation at the international 
level may not always be appropriate. The Agreement therefore allows the alternative 
of equivalence, whereby the importing country accepts that the SPS in the exporting 
country can achieve an appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, even 
though they differ from the measures used in the importing country, if the exporting 
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Member objectively demonstrates to the importing Member that its measures achieve 
the appropriate level of protection.. As special attention was given to developing 
countries throughout the Uruguay Round negotiations, in order to take account of 
their special needs, longer time-frames for compliance to new SPS measures were 
permitted to encourage developing countries to participate in the relevant international 
organisations.’306 
 
The character of the SPS Agreement is rather different from the Agreement on 
Agriculture. In particular, the SPS Agreement does not attempt to regulate any 
specific policies. Hence, individual countries are not committed to make adjustments 
in their policies. The SPS Agreement instead establishes general guidelines for 
government behaviour in the areas concerned.  
 
 
Conclusion 
International negotiations proceed more on the basis of fear than opportunity and, 
more often than not, a sense of apprehension or threat is the catalyst that initiates the 
process.307 Hence it was predictable that most developing countries did not support 
the launch of a new Round of negotiations in GATT. Most developing countries did 
not support the launching of the Uruguay Round mainly because of their fears on 
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three counts.308 Firstly, they feared that they would be the main targets for extracting 
concessions in any new round. Secondly, new subjects of interest to developed 
countries in which the developing countries themselves had no particular interest 
would be taken up in the negotiations. Finally, they felt that the subjects which had 
been of interest to them for a long time would be ignored, as the focus on GATT 
would shift to the new issues initiated in the Round. Yet, there were also a number of 
developing countries, including Thailand, who sought the new Round in order to 
create an opportunity for themselves.  
 
Although the Uruguay Round ended in a compromise after a protracted standoff, 
industrial countries succeeded in adding of all the new issues they wanted to the 
agenda, though subject to certain limiting provisions attached to them by developing 
countries. It is intriguing to note that the achievement in integrating the new issues, 
particularly services, in the negotiation was considered to be a startling outcome, 
especially when initially there was a tense confrontation between developed and 
developing countries. Nevertheless, this can be partially explained through the fact 
that the United States was the most enthusiastic supporter of new rules on services, 
trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) and trade-related investment 
measures (TRIMS). For the part of developing countries, they succeeded in placing 
both agriculture and textiles on the agenda and in gaining a commitment from 
industrial countries that there would be a decrease in protectionism and that the 
special and differential treatment of developing countries would be an integral part of 
any agreement. This was especially the case when the MFA was terminated by the 
Agreement on Textiles and clothing. Hence, the system of import quotas that had 
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dominated the trade since the early 1960s was to be phased out. The quid pro quo they 
obtained included the abolition of VERs (as part of the Agreement on Safeguards) and 
the progressive elimination of the MFA. Also, agriculture was brought back under the 
GATT, although very little actual liberalisation was achieved. 
 
Although developing countries, including Thailand, learned in the Uruguay Round 
that greater participation did not translate automatically into leverage, they strove to 
decisively influence the process of agenda setting and to shape the final outcome of 
negotiations with the exercise of bargaining strategies such as agenda-setting and 
coalition-building to enhance their meagre bargaining power. In the mind of Thai 
trade negotiators; the outcome of the Uruguay Round was adequately pleasing, 
despite the shortfall of the final agreements.   
 
This chapter summarised some of the key aspects of the final outcomes of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations. The chapter then turned its attention to the results of the 
outcomes of the Uruguay Round negotiations on agriculture. The key aspects of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, namely market access, export subsidies, 
domestic support, and sanitary and phytosanitary, have been presented.  
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Chapter 7:  
Analysis of the case study and evaluation of 
Thailand’s bargaining strategies  
 
As indicated earlier, the focus of this thesis is on negotiating processes and bargaining 
strategies with regard to developing countries. The thesis is intended to address these 
questions:  
 
• Among a number of available strategies that developing countries can employ 
to enhance their participatory abilities in the GATT, and consequently, the 
WTO, what is the most effective?  
 
By using the case study of the Thai participation in the Uruguay Round negotiations, 
this chapter attempts to shed some light on the answers to the above questions. With 
that in mind, this chapter aims to assess if the strategies, used to improve the 
bargaining power of Thai negotiators, were successful and effective. Firstly, the 
chapter analyses the bargaining strategy of Thailand and assesses the achievement of 
Thailand in the Uruguay Round. Next, the chapter turns its attention to an evaluation 
of Thailand’s bargaining strategies. It then attempts to assess both the overall 
achievement of Thailand in the Uruguay Round negotiations and the specific 
achievement in the Agreements of Agriculture, as a result of the bargaining strategies 
used. 
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An Analysis of Thai Strategy 
When entering negotiations, bargaining is a method by which outcomes are sought 
that, though not ideal for either party, are better than some other alternatives or better 
than the status quo. Needless to say, when an agreement is reached, it signifies that 
both or all parties find a joint and mutually acceptable solution either to end a dispute 
or create a beneficial deal. Nevertheless, no one can deny that there is a gross power 
disparity in the world trading system and, more often than not, this inequality binds 
the distribution of gains from bargaining in trade negotiations. 
 
Characteristically, all parties enter negotiations aiming to gain more, or in other 
words, to do better than the status quo. Thus, parties enter negotiations utilising 
strategies to increase their own gains from the bargaining. According to Odell, 
‘strategy’ in trade negotiations is ‘a set of behaviours or tactics that are observable in 
principle and associated with a plan to achieve some objective through 
negotiation.’309 
ng 
on 
                                                
 
As discussed in chapter two, Odell argues that bargaining strategy options vary alo
a conceptual continuum between two polar ideal types, which are distributive and 
integrative. Pure distributive strategy has been defined as a set of tactics that functi
merely to claim value from the other parties in negotiations and, at the same time, 
function as a defence against such claims from the other parties. This distributive 
strategy is normally employed when the relevant parties’ goals are either entirely or 
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partially in conflict. The tactics at the distributive end of strategy continuum are, for 
example, an opening bid with high demands, rejecting any concessions, not revea
true priorities and overstressing needs, taking the other parties’ issues of interest 
hostage, threatening to use undesirable measures and imposing penalties. At the oth
end of the continuum stands a purely integrative strategy, which comprises tactics
aiming to attain goals that are not fundamentally in conflict and can be mutually 
integrated for all the parties. Sharing information openly to explore common p
in order to come up with mutually acceptable solutions, as well as proposing 
reciprocatory exchanges of concessions including those of the proposing party, is
well-known example of tactics in the integrative strategy camp. However, Odell 
argues that experienced trade negotiators usually attempt to overcome the downsides 
of each pure type by mixing tactics into a so-called mixed strategy; and he argues that
if a developing country or a coalition follows a mixed strategy, it will gain more and
ling 
er 
 
roblems 
 a 
 
 
se less under most conditions than if it follows a pure strategy from both ends.310 
ual level 
e 
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All these negotiating behaviours can be observed at all levels - at the individ
when negotiators enter the negotiating room, or at the level where a state is 
considered to be a unit. At the individual level, personality or character traits of 
negotiators do have an impact on the process of negotiations, especially when one 
represents a country with less bargaining voice. One of the negotiators interviewed 
verified this assumption. For example, when the US trade representative speaks in th
negotiating room, everyone will listen attentively; whereas, a representative from a 
small African country will receive little notice. Hence, if a negotiator speaks loudly, 
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clearly and at the same time speaks with interestingly framed content, he or she will 
receive more attention. The same result can be achieved by making friends and allie
with many negotiators involved in a given negotiation. One of the negotiators once 
said that negotiation or bargaining is an art. It cannot be taught. It is important for
negotiator to learn when to be assertive or when to compromise.
s 
 a 
ies, it 
en and 
e the agenda to be mutually beneficial for all parties in given 
egotiations. 
d 
ll 
f this 
 
e that it would be only a partial depiction of negotiation processes at the 
ATT. 
ture of 
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WTO does now provide formal training for negotiators from developing countr
was admittedly not available at the time of the Uruguay Round for developing 
countries to learn when to push forward or to use distributive strategy or wh
how to refram
n
 
 It is very difficult for negotiation behaviours at the individual level to be documente
fully, since it would involve an observation of the actual negotiations. Also, a focus 
on the behaviours of negotiators at the individual level would make this research fa
into the category of negotiation analysis. This is because the main impetus o
thesis is the hope of a change in the historical structure of multilateral trade 
negotiation processes and the uneven distribution of outcomes. Thus, this section
concentrates on the strategies at the level of Thailand as a unit, although it does 
recognis
G
 
As noted earlier, it is vital to consider multilateral negotiations in the context of the 
wider structures of the global political economy. Therefore, multilateral negotiations 
are not a stand-alone event. To see Thailand as a unit working in the bigger pic
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trade negotiations, it is important to take bargaining strategies and negotiation 
processes into account at all levels. Hence, it is crucial to look at Thailand’s strategy
choice and the actions it undertook to offset biases and bolster the credibility of its 
position in GATT in the bigger picture where the strateg
 
y choice and the actions it 
ndertook at bilateral and regional levels also feed in.  
as faced 
ok 
 
that did not have 
e same level as the US standard of intellectual property protection. 
se 
 
ng GSP to Thailand 
nconditionally to granting GSP with conditions and rules. 
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Undoubtedly, during the time of the Uruguay Round negotiations, Thailand w
with offensive actions to claim value from the US bilaterally. In the bilateral 
negotiations with the US regarding intellectual property protections, the US 
demanded that Thailand make changes to Thailand’s domestic law. The US then to
steps to worsen Thailand’s alternative to agreement by threatening to remove the 
GSP, a damaging action to Thailand’s exports, if Thailand did not yield the desired 
concessions – ratifying the intellectual property protection. The reaction of Thailand
was that intellectual property should remain under the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO), not under the supervision of the GATT. The reaction of other 
developing countries was very similar to Thailand’s position, unlike the US and other 
developed countries who wish to use the GATT to penalise countries 
th
 
This political pressure from the US to adopt intellectual property protection started in 
1985 when a revision on GSP for Thailand took place.312 The US gave the first pha
of GSP to Thailand for a 9-year period starting from January 1976 and renewed in
1985. However, the main principle was changed from granti
u
 
312
  Interview, Mr. Kirkkrai Jeerapat, Bangkok, September 2005. 
Chapter 7: Analysis of the case study and evaluation of Thailand’s bargaining 
strategies    200 
 
Realising the significance of GSP for its exports, Thailand used the tactics of 
compromise and delay in order to keep the GSP. However, Thailand later had to
a lot of concessions by making amendments in intellectual property rights law. 
Believing that GSP was too important to lose and believing that to fight in the GA
would be a worthless attempt, Thailand consequently simply yielded concessi
under pressure by amending the law without getting compensation in return. 
However, some negotiators held the belief that Thailand could not do anything to 
offset the bias of the negotiations with the US. In mid 1993, Mr. Uthai Pimjaichon, 
the Minister of the Ministry of Commerce, agreed to yield to the US by instructing
seizure of pirate movies. The US was pleased with the result. However, this later 
caused severe conflicts with Mr. Pachara Isarasena, the permanent secretary of the 
Ministry of Commerce at that time, who believed that by simply yielding concessio
Thailand would benefit less and lose more.
 make 
TT 
ons 
 the 
ns 
d 
tellectual 
s 
on 
rategy formation processes is a contest of ideas among those officials involved.  
 
                                                
313 Besides, delaying tactics had prove
useful and efficient. Also, Dr. Supachai Panichapak, the Deputy Prime Minister, 
became irritated since Thailand, by herself, consented to modify domestic in
property rights law which required more protections than the Trade-related 
Intellectual Property Rights (or the TRIPs) in the Uruguay Round. This picture seem
to confirm that policy makers’ beliefs do have an effect on foreign policy decision 
making. In particular, it proves that a key part of trade policy making and negotiati
st
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concerning the GSP and intellectual property law, he was later suspended from office. Mr. Kirkkrai 
Jeerapat, then the director-general of the Department of Business Economics, replaced Mr. Pachara in 
practice. 
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As discussed in chapter two, there are many factors which contribute to the adoption 
of bargaining strategies by the delegations; these factors, which explain the rationale 
behind the choice of strategies chosen, are in the context of negotiation, negotiator 
beliefs, and internal domestic politics. The depiction of bilateral pressure from the US 
presented above can then be seen in the context of the multilateral trade negotiations 
the Thai delegates had to work within, as well as that which influenced the choice of 
strategies at multilateral levels. 
 
Although Odell’s typology of bargaining strategies is an attempt to identify and to 
make generalisations about negotiation processes and bargaining strategies at the 
behavioural level, it is useful in the sense that it helps to describe the observed 
negotiating behaviours. At the bilateral level, it can be observed that Thailand used a 
defensive distributive strategy by using delaying tactics. However, at the same time, 
Thai negotiators chose to compromise and yield concessions, when deemed 
necessary. This also reflects the thinking of trade negotiators: to lose one’s arm is 
better than losing one’s life. This is because the Thais are culturally supposed to be 
more conciliatory. Therefore, this factor can at least give some explanation as to why 
Thai negotiators tended to simply yield concessions as a solution to the negotiations. 
Although Odell does not consider yielding as a bargaining strategy, yielding or simply 
giving concessions is actually observable negotiating behaviour.   
 
At the multilateral level, it can be assumed that Thailand used a mixed strategy, with 
more elements of an integrative strategy, in the GATT during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. The mixed strategy Thailand employed allowed other delegates to claim 
some gains to show their constituents and then moved the deal above the other’s 
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reservation values. Firstly, by joining the GATT and subsequently the WTO, Thailand 
gained access to a major new distributive tactic for worsening another state’s 
alternative to negotiating a satisfactory dispute settlement: filing a legal complaint 
under the GATT and the WTO. Thailand has used this to its advantage; for example, 
in the case of foreign cigarettes.  
 
In addition, it can be seen that Thailand utilised a defensive distributive strategy in the 
Uruguay Round, which consists of analogous behaviours to offset other parties’ 
distributive tactics and protect as much as possible against losing value, by joining 
regional agreements/regional-based coalitions such as the ASEAN and like-minded 
coalitions such as the Cairns Group in agriculture. By the same token, utilising 
coalitions as a springboard for bargaining can be seen as an integrative strategy by 
encouraging the opportunities for mutual gains among the group members. When 
Thailand pushed for an inclusion of issues in the agenda-setting process, it could 
again be said that Thailand attempted a distributive strategy because of asking others 
for benefits. Thai negotiators also employed distributive tactics such as delay and 
refusal to make concessions which are generally used by most trade delegations.  
 
It is also interesting to note that Thai delegates had to also strategically calculate the 
way they employed strategies at the multilateral level, since these actions would have 
some impact on strategies available to them at the bilateral level also. Apparently, 
there were a lot of movements and interests internally to maintain the GSP from the 
US. As discussed earlier, one former Uruguay Round negotiator noted that the reason 
why Thailand did not support India and Brazil or the G10 stance at the beginning of 
the Round was because both Brazil and India were bigger countries, while Thailand 
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was relatively small and it would not benefit Thailand to be seen as a bad boy of the 
world economy, particularly when Thailand had to take bilateral negotiations with the 
US into consideration.314 
 
Since Odell’s typology of bargaining strategies only describes behaviours of a given 
party, he realises that in practice a negotiator or delegation might not choose their 
strategies all at one point and in the systematic manner of self-interest driven 
calculation.315 He then elaborates that some negotiators or trade delegations may even 
make bargaining decisions one step at a time and accumulate a set of trade policies 
and actions without viewing them as belonging to the same set of strategies. This is 
conceivably so in the case of Thai negotiators in the Uruguay Round. Based on their 
personal perceptions and experiences, some may have even acted without thinking 
carefully about their objectives.  
 
The main export markets for Thai exports are made up of more than 20 countries; yet, 
they are concentrated in only three main markets: the US, Japan, and the EU, which 
account for more than 70% of total exports. Moreover, agricultural products and 
processed food accounted for more than 50% of total exports at the time of the 
Uruguay Round. Hence, Thai negotiators were more active and thus tended to employ 
more distributive strategies. In the realm of agriculture negotiations, Thailand 
employed more of a distributive strategy by joining coalitions like the Cairns Group. 
Although Thailand might use an integrative strategy while within the coalition or the 
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 Interview, Ms. Chutima Bunyapapasara, Bangkok, August 2005. 
315
 Odell, John S., Negotiating Trade: Developing countries in the WTO and NAFTA. Cambridge: 
University Press, 2006, p. 17. 
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group, it might use a mixed-distributive strategy elsewhere; joining the coalition in 
itself can be classified as a distributive strategy. 
 
It is obvious that Thai negotiators had tried to use a mixed strategy in the Uruguay 
Round. Although being active in agriculture negotiations and not revealing the 
genuine objectives and priorities (that of the strengthened rules), it can be seen that 
Thai negotiators used actions that fell into value-claiming strategy. However, there 
were fewer elements of distributive strategy and more of integrative tactics due to the 
context in which trade officials had to operate and the negotiators’ beliefs that 
Thailand could not use more distributive tactics because it had less bargaining power. 
Here, realism or power thinking certainly contributes something valuable to the study 
of bargaining and negotiation. According to Odell, however, bargaining power is 
more of a label than an explanation. Odell argues that the notion of bargaining power 
should be replaced with the notion of BATNA (best alternative to negotiated 
agreement) because it introduces a variable that gives a better explanation of the heart 
of strategies and outcomes.316 Although there are examples of the so-called ‘power of 
the weak’, in reality the notion of bargaining power is still significant to the decision 
to enter into any given negotiation. Apparently, the notions of national interest and 
bargaining power in reality are considerably more problematic. Firstly, national 
interest is difficult to define and vaguely derived. Secondly, bargaining power cannot 
be tangibly measured. However, these notions offer negotiators a mental framework 
within which they try to work logically to get the best solution. It still helps as an 
explanation, since all negotiators are rational actors in a sense that they try to identify 
their problems and interests; observe all the possible solutions; and take the action 
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that best serves their interests. In actual fact, most developing countries, including 
Thailand, enter into negotiations with the assumption that they have limited 
bargaining power, and less when compared to their developed countries counterparts. 
Particularly, this perception is especially dominant in the view of almost all Thai 
negotiators. Thus, the fact that Thailand has a small measure of bargaining power is 
taken as a starting point to explore the range of available strategies. 
 
In effect, the view that Thailand had relatively small bargaining power when weighed 
against that of developed countries affected the choice of bargaining strategies Thai 
negotiators employed in the Uruguay Round. In fact, this vision has continued to 
influence the strategy choice of Thai negotiators until the present day. 
 
To sum up, this section concentrated on the strategies Thai negotiators used during the 
course of the Uruguay Round and the effects of their strategies. Influenced by the 
context, negotiators’ beliefs, and less by domestic pressure in the Thai case, it can be 
observed that they used a mixed strategy with a minority of distributive elements 
through the processes of agenda-building and coalition-building. 
 
The achievements of Thailand 
To evaluate the achievements of Thailand in the Uruguay Round, it must be 
established if the outcome of the negotiations improved the status quo of Thailand 
before the negotiations begin. As discussed in the preceding chapter, Thai negotiators 
realised that Thailand had a relatively small amount of bargaining power, since 
Thailand was a developing country with a small market size, when compared to the 
developed countries counterparts.  
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It is intriguing to note that, although external observers regard Thailand as a medium-
sized country, ranked 22nd in terms of population and with a GDP only just below the 
world average per capita, the Thai negotiators currently maintain the perception that 
Thailand lacks bargaining power like any other developing country due to the small 
size of the internal commercial market. Tables 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 below show Thailand’s 
ranks in world exports and imports, as well as its rank in population and GDP per 
capita. With regards to the data shown in the tables below, it is surprising that, from 
an external perspective, Thailand is a significant medium-ranged country and is a 
significant player in international trade negotiations, since evidence points in the other 
direction of Thailand being a small country. Moreover, Thailand is seen to be more 
active in Geneva and better resourced than many other developing countries. 
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Rank order – Top 30 world exporters and world importers 
Rank Country Value of Exports  
Date of 
Information Rank Country Value of Imports  
Date of 
Information 
1 World  $ 13,720,000,000,000  2006 est.  1 World  $ 13,640,000,000,000  2006 est.  
2 Germany  $ 1,361,000,000,000  2007 est.  2 United States  $ 1,987,000,000,000  2007 est.  
3 European Union  $ 1,330,000,000,000  2005  3 European Union  $ 1,466,000,000,000  2005  
4 China  $ 1,221,000,000,000  2007 est.  4 Germany  $ 1,121,000,000,000  2007 est.  
5 United States  $ 1,140,000,000,000  2007 est.  5 China  $ 917,400,000,000  2007 est.  
6 Japan  $ 665,700,000,000  2007 est.  6 France  $ 601,400,000,000  2007 est.  
7 France  $ 558,900,000,000  2007 est.  7 United Kingdom  $ 595,600,000,000  2007 est.  
8 Italy  $ 474,800,000,000  2007 est.  8 Japan  $ 571,100,000,000  2007 est.  
9 Netherlands  $ 465,300,000,000  2007 est.  9 Italy  $ 483,600,000,000  2007 est.  
10 Canada  $ 440,100,000,000  2007 est.  10 Netherlands  $ 402,400,000,000  2007 est.  
11 United Kingdom $ 415,600,000,000  2007 est.  11 Canada  $ 394,400,000,000  2007 est.  
12 Korea, South  $ 386,600,000,000  2007 est.  12 Hong Kong  $ 371,300,000,000  2007 est.  
13 Hong Kong  $ 353,300,000,000  2007 est.  13 Korea, South  $ 359,500,000,000  2007 est.  
14 Russia  $ 348,900,000,000  2007 est.  14 Spain  $ 359,100,000,000  2007 est.  
15 Belgium  $ 328,100,000,000  2007 est.  15 Belgium  $ 320,900,000,000  2007 est.  
16 Singapore  $ 317,600,000,000  2007 est.  16 Mexico  $ 279,300,000,000  2007 est.  
17 Mexico  $ 267,500,000,000  2007 est.  17 Singapore  $ 273,000,000,000  2007 est.  
18 Spain  $ 248,300,000,000  2007 est.  18 Russia  $ 226,500,000,000  2007 est.  
19 Taiwan  $ 235,500,000,000  2007 est.  19 India  $ 224,100,000,000  2007 est.  
20 Saudi Arabia  $ 215,000,000,000  2007 est.  20 Taiwan  $ 214,300,000,000  2007 est.  
21 Switzerland  $ 201,000,000,000  2007 est.  21 Switzerland  $ 189,600,000,000  2007 est.  
22 Sweden  $ 176,500,000,000  2007 est.  22 Austria  $ 157,400,000,000  2007 est.  
23 Malaysia  $ 169,900,000,000  2007 est.  23 Sweden  $ 157,200,000,000  2007 est.  
24 Brazil  $ 159,200,000,000  2007 est.  24 Turkey  $ 156,900,000,000  2007 est.  
25 Austria  $ 158,300,000,000  2007 est.  25 Australia  $ 152,700,000,000  2007 est.  
26 United Arab 
Emirates  
$ 152,100,000,000  2007 est.  26 Poland  $ 150,700,000,000  2007 est.  
27 Thailand  $ 143,100,000,000  2007 est.  27 Malaysia  $ 132,700,000,000  2007 est.  
28 India  $ 140,800,000,000  2007 est.  28 Thailand  $ 121,900,000,000  2007 est.  
29 Australia  $ 139,400,000,000  2007 est.  29 Brazil  $ 115,600,000,000  2007 est.  
30 Poland  $ 137,900,000,000  2007 est.  30 Czech Republic  $ 109,800,000,000  2007 est.  
Table7. 1: Rank order – top 30 world exporters and importers 
Source: adapted from CIA, the World Factbook 
Chapter 7: Analysis of the case study and evaluation of Thailand’s bargaining 
strategies    208 
 
 
Rank order - population 
Rank Country Population  Date of Information 
1 World  6,602,224,175  July 2007 est.  
2 China  1,321,851,888  July 2007 est.  
3 India  1,129,866,154  July 2007 est.  
4 European Union  490,426,060  July 2007 est.  
5 United States  301,139,947  July 2007 est.  
6 Indonesia  234,693,997  July 2007 est.  
7 Brazil  190,010,647  July 2007 est.  
8 Pakistan  164,741,924  July 2007 est.  
9 Bangladesh  150,448,339  July 2007 est.  
10 Russia  141,377,752  July 2007 est.  
11 Nigeria  135,031,164  July 2007 est.  
12 Japan  127,433,494  July 2007 est.  
13 Mexico  108,700,891  July 2007 est.  
14 Philippines  91,077,287  July 2007 est.  
15 Vietnam  85,262,356  July 2007 est.  
16 Germany  82,400,996  July 2007 est.  
17 Egypt  80,335,036  July 2007 est.  
18 Ethiopia  76,511,887  July 2007 est.  
19 Turkey  71,158,647  July 2007 est.  
20 Congo, Democratic Republic of the  65,751,512  July 2007 est.  
21 Iran  65,397,521  July 2007 est.  
22 Thailand  65,068,149  July 2007 est.  
23 France  63,718,187  July 2007 est.  
24 United Kingdom  60,776,238  July 2007 est.  
25 Italy  58,147,733  July 2007 est.  
26 Korea, South  49,044,790  July 2007 est.  
27 Burma  47,373,958  July 2007 est.  
28 Ukraine  46,299,862  July 2007 est.  
29 Colombia  44,379,598  July 2007 est.  
30 South Africa  43,997,828  July 2007 est. 
Table7. 2: Rank order – population 
Source: CIA, the World Factbook 
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Rank Order - GDP - per capita  
Rank Country GDP - per capita (PPP)  Date of Information Rank Country GDP - per capita (PPP)  
Date of 
Information 
1 Luxembourg  $ 80,800  2007 est.  61 Slovakia $ 19,800  2007 est.  
2 Qatar  $ 75,900  2007 est.  62 Barbados $ 19,700  2007 est.  
3 Bermuda  $ 69,900  2004 est.  63 Puerto Rico $ 19,600  2007 est.  
4 Jersey  $ 57,000  2005 est.  64 Hungary $ 19,500  2007 est.  
5 Norway  $ 55,600  2007 est.  65 Oman $ 19,100  2007 est.  
6 Kuwait  $ 55,300  2007 est.  66 Seychelles $ 18,400  2007 est.  
7 United Arab Emirates  $ 55,200  2007 est.  67 Latvia $ 17,700  2007 est.  
8 Singapore  $ 48,900  2007 est.  68 French Polynesia $ 17,500  2003 est.  
9 United States  $ 46,000  2007 est.  69 Lithuania $ 16,700  2007 est.  
10 Ireland  $ 45,600  2007 est.  70 Poland $ 16,200  2007 est.  
11 Guernsey  $ 44,600  2005  71 Netherlands Antilles $ 16,000  2004 est.  
12 Equatorial Guinea  $ 44,100  2007 est.  72 Croatia $ 15,500  2007 est.  
13 Cayman Islands  $ 43,800  2004 est.  73 Guam $ 15,000  2005 est.  
14 Hong Kong  $ 42,000  2007 est.  74 New Caledonia $ 15,000  2003 est.  
15 Switzerland  $ 39,800  2007 est.  75 Botswana $ 14,700  2007 est.  
16 Iceland  $ 39,400  2007 est.  76 Russia $ 14,600  2007 est.  
17 Austria  $ 39,000  2007 est.  77 Virgin Islands $ 14,500  2004 est.  
18 Andorra  $ 38,800  2005  78 Chile $ 14,400  2007 est.  
19 Netherlands  $ 38,600  2007 est.  79 Malaysia $ 14,400  2007 est.  
20 British Virgin Islands  $ 38,500  2004 est.  80 Gabon $ 13,800  2007 est.  
21 Canada  $ 38,200  2007 est.  81 Costa Rica $ 13,500  2007 est.  
22 Gibraltar  $ 38,200  2005 est.  82 Libya $ 13,100  2007 est.  
23 Australia  $ 37,500  2007 est.  83 Argentina $ 13,000  2007 est.  
24 Denmark  $ 37,400  2007 est.  84 Venezuela $ 12,800  2007 est.  
25 Sweden  $ 36,900  2007 est.  85 Northern Mariana Islands  $ 12,500  2000 est.  
26 Belgium  $ 36,500  2007 est.  86 Mexico $ 12,500  2007 est.  
27 Finland  $ 35,500  2007 est.  87 Iran $ 12,300  2007 est.  
28 United Kingdom  $ 35,300  2007 est.  88 Mauritius $ 11,900  2007 est.  
29 Isle of Man  $ 35,000  2005 est.  89 Bulgaria $ 11,800  2007 est.  
30 Bahrain  $ 34,700  2007 est.  90 Turks and Caicos Islands  $ 11,500  2002 est.  
31 Germany  $ 34,400  2007 est.  91 Kazakhstan $ 11,100  2007 est.  
32 San Marino  $ 34,100  2004 est.  92 Romania $ 11,100  2007 est.  
33 France  $ 33,800  2007 est.  93 Antigua and Barbuda $ 10,900  2005 est.  
34 Japan  $ 33,800  2007 est.  94 Uruguay $ 10,700  2007 est.  
35 Spain  $ 33,700  2007 est.  95 South Africa $ 10,600  2007 est.  
36 European Union  $ 32,900  2007 est.  96 Lebanon $ 10,400  2007 est.  
37 Faroe Islands  $ 31,000  2001 est.  97 Belarus $ 10,200  2007 est.  
38 Italy  $ 31,000  2007 est.  98 World $ 10,000  2007 est.  
39 Greece  $ 30,500  2007 est.  99 Brazil $ 9,700  2007 est.  
40 Monaco  $ 30,000  2006 est.  100 Turkey $ 9,400  2007 est.  
41 Taiwan  $ 29,800  2007 est.  101 Dominican Republic $ 9,200  2007 est.  
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42 Israel  $ 28,800  2007 est.  102 Turkmenistan $ 9,200  2007 est.  
43 New Zealand  $ 27,300  2007 est.  103 Cook Islands $ 9,100  2005 est.  
44 Slovenia  $ 27,300  2007 est.  104 Azerbaijan $ 9,000  2007 est.  
45 Cyprus  $ 27,100  2007 est.  105 Panama $ 9,000  2007 est.  
46 Brunei  $ 25,600  2005 est.  106 Anguilla $ 8,800  2004 est.  
47 Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)  $ 25,000  2002 est.  107 Macedonia  $ 8,400  2007 est.  
48 Liechtenstein  $ 25,000  1999 est.  108 Saint Kitts and Nevis $ 8,200  2005 est.  
49 Cyprus  $ 24,600  2007 est.  109 Algeria $ 8,100  2007 est.  
50 Korea, South  $ 24,600  2007 est.  110 Thailand $ 8,000  2007 est.  
51 Czech Republic  $ 24,400  2007 est.  111 Belize $ 7,800  2007 est.  
52 Macau  $ 24,300  2005  112 Suriname $ 7,800  2007 est.  
53 Malta  $ 23,200  2007 est.  113 Serbia $ 7,700  2007 est.  
54 Bahamas, The  $ 22,700  2007 est.  114 Peru $ 7,600  2007 est.  
55 Aruba  $ 21,800  2004 est.  115 Palau $ 7,600  2005 est.  
56 Portugal  $ 21,800  2007 est.  116 Tunisia $ 7,500  2007 est.  
57 Estonia  $ 21,800  2007 est.  117 Colombia $ 7,200  2007 est.  
58 Trinidad and Tobago  $ 21,700  2007 est.  118 Cyprus $ 7,135  2007 est.  
59 Saudi Arabia  $ 20,700  2007 est.  119 Ecuador $ 7,100  2007 est.  
60 Greenland  $ 20,000  2001 est.  120 Cape Verde $ 7,000  2007 est.  
Table7. 3: Rank order – GDP per capita 
Source: CIA, the World Factbook 
 
In addition to the trade negotiators’ perception of Thailand’s position in the global 
political economy, the direct experience of Thai negotiators in multilateral trade 
negotiations was still somewhat immature. As a result, Thai negotiators, though very 
small in number, had to try very hard to influence the outcome of the negotiations by 
employing bargaining strategies and tactics where possible in order not to be 
marginalised in the formation of global rule governing international trade. By 
attempting to address the key question that underpins this research: what is the best 
bargaining strategy for small developing countries like Thailand to use to offset the 
bargaining power disparity in multilateral trade negotiations?, this section presents an 
assessment of Thai bargaining strategies and tactics in terms of the outcome achieved 
in the Uruguay Round.  
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Odell argues that his framework is a mere attempt to describe negotiation behaviours 
and does not amount to a judgement on whether the strategy was good or bad. 
Although this research also does not intend to make a judgement on whether a given 
strategy is good or bad, it aims to identify which bargaining strategy works more 
effectively and increases bargaining power, supported by the empirical evidence in 
the case study of Thailand’s participation in the Uruguay Round. In addition, the 
underlying principle in negotiation, to protect one’s own interests and to increase the 
gain in line with one’s interest, is reflected in an attempt to do better than the status 
quo. Evidently, the notions of interests and power - in term of bargaining power here 
– seem to reinforce the relevance of a mainstream realist perspective in the field of 
international trade politics. Yet, it is important to note that power structures might 
influence negotiations towards a set of outcomes, but negotiation interactions 
themselves shape outcomes and the exercise of power. In summary, both power 
structure and the negotiation process matter. 
 
According to Singh, bargaining strategies like agenda-setting and coalition-building 
allow developing countries to achieve more gains. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, Thai negotiators participated frequently in both formal and informal 
meetings, as well as using the popular frame of ‘freer and fairer trade’ to influence the 
agenda-setting process. Also, Thai negotiators utilised coalitions such as the ASEAN 
and the Cairns Group to acquire more bargaining power on the issues being 
negotiated, particularly in agriculture. In fact, credible unilateral threat is another 
tactic, falling into the distributive strategy category that can be used to influence the 
outcome. Nevertheless, without ability and credibility, unilateral measures or 
domestic policy means were used mainly by major players to constrain the other 
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parties’ choice during the negotiation. As noted earlier, this was the United States’ 
chief instrument. Particularly in intellectual property, unilateral sanctions and 
pressures consistent with its own domestic section, 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and 
refusal to renew privileges like the GSP were very effective. The unilateral measure 
or sanction was not a viable or sensible option of strategies for developing countries. 
Likewise, despite the fact that in theory even the weakest state is equipped with an 
authority to block a consensus in the decision making process, the truth is that this 
seemingly sensible tactic to shift the outcome of the agreement in favour of that state 
is very unlikely to be used. The de facto norm of consensus-based decision-making in 
the GATT/WTO, rather than majority voting, means that every member either assents 
or, if none of the members disagree with a decision, it is assumed that a consensus has 
been arrived at. Commonly, developing countries choose to remain silent because 
they would otherwise definitely face a lot of pressure both inside and outside the 
organisation. Plus, they are reluctant to block a consensus because other countries 
would be aware of their vulnerability and their need on other issues being discussed at 
all levels of negotiations, whether bilateral, regional, or multilateral. Hence, it is 
highly unlikely that developing countries or small countries like Thailand would 
utilise this bargaining tactic. At first glance, bilateral negotiations might offer another 
path via which developing countries are able to improve bargaining power when 
multilateral negotiations do not look promising. It is, therefore, clear that developing 
countries do have fewer options in the variety of bargaining strategies and tactics 
available to them in international trade negotiations.   
 
In order to assess the effectiveness of the strategy, it is necessary to examine whether 
the objectives set out before entering the negotiations have been achieved; with that in 
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mind, Thailand was reasonably successful in her achievements. In the eyes of Thai 
negotiators, what was achieved in the Uruguay Round was very much acceptable, 
although it was not an ideal outcome. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Thai 
negotiators, mainly dominated by officials from the Ministry of Commerce, most of 
whom are free-trade enthusiasts317, had three main objectives in mind. Firstly, trade 
rules were to be strengthened enough in order to shield a small country like Thailand 
from unilateral action or bilateral pressures from the powerful trading counterparts. 
Secondly, agriculture would remain under the GATT and there was to be 
disarmament from the US and the EU in the farm wars; and finally, the textiles quota 
under the MFA would be eliminated in order for new issues to be negotiated. 
 
As summed up in the previous section, Thai negotiators participated actively in the 
agenda-setting process to make sure that trade rules would be emphasised. Seemingly, 
the overall objectives of the trade negotiators were met. Although a power distribution 
theorist would argue that the overall package of outcomes of the Uruguay Round still 
pretty much revealed gains in developed countries’ favour, the Uruguay Round 
Agreements suggest that the outcome for Thailand was deemed rather a success in the 
sense that trade rules were being strengthened and agriculture was included in the 
Final Act. Although Thailand had to make more concessions in the area of intellectual 
property, it should not be seen as a total disadvantage resulting from failing 
bargaining strategies. Instead, it should be viewed as a direct consequence of bilateral 
pressure from the United States on the renewal of the privileges under the GSP 
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 This may be due to their educational background. Most of the trade negotiators interviewed 
graduated in the US. This might be one possible explanation as to why most of them are free-trade 
enthusiasts. Also, it was observed during the interviews with the Thai trade negotiators that they all 
have similar preference in liberal ideology and are more free-trade oriented, as well as pro WTO. 
Personally, the author feels that this may also be derived, apart from their educational background, 
from the culture of or the dominant ideology within the trade bureaucracy. 
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programme on Thai exports. For many, the concession on intellectual property 
protection was seen as a quid pro quo for the grant of GSP for Thai exports, 
notwithstanding the fact that it should have been granted unconditionally.  
 
If it is argued that the fact that agriculture issues were eventually included in the Final 
act was a success, then the strategies used by Thai negotiators, especially coalitions, 
can be regarded as considerably effective in that sense. Although it has to be accepted 
that without the desire of the US to bring agriculture into the UR negotiations, 
pressured by its own agribusiness interests, agriculture might still remain outside the 
GATT. In fact, that might have been the determinant factor why agriculture was 
finally brought back under the GATT rules.  
 
From the point of view of Thai negotiators, the coalition strategy, coupled with the 
merging interests of Thailand and those of the US, improved the status quo of 
Thailand in agriculture. However, when specifically looking into the agreement, the 
gain was not so substantial. In the case of rice, the apparent objective of Thailand in 
participating in the agriculture negotiations was to see a halt to the US rice export 
subsidies, which had a direct impact on the world market price. A protest about the 
Farm Act 1986 in front of the US embassy in Bangkok by Thai farmers might have 
been a real driver for Thai governments to seek an outcome through multilateral 
channels. Thailand opted to join the Cairns Group coalition and, to a certain extent, 
Thailand was able to employ the use of the Cairns Group coalition to achieve the 
agricultural liberalisation. However, it is important to note that, although Thai 
negotiators achieved substantial outcomes in the Uruguay Round through the use of 
coalition, coalition-building was not the only factor that contributed to their success.  
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Additionally, there were cases where Thailand did not utilise the coalition to fully 
achieve its gains. For example, the negotiators from the Cairns Group focused on the 
US export subsidies under the Export Enhancement Program (EEP) because this had a 
greater effect on exports from Australia, New Zealand, and Argentina, especially 
wheat. In fact, the US rarely employed the EEP to support rice exports. Instead, they 
used domestic supports in order to subsidise exports on rice, since most of the rice 
produced in the US was not for domestic consumption, but rather for exports.  The US 
deficiency payments programme was one of the domestic support policies that had a 
direct effect on rice exports from Thailand.318 Surprisingly, given the importance of 
the negotiations, Thai negotiators overlooked this fact and did not emphasise this 
information to the Cairns Group to help negotiate on this point. This was an error on 
the Thai negotiators’ part. However, they stressed that this kind of error could be 
avoided if there had been more involvement from domestic businesses and more 
policy coordination among relevant bureaucrats.319 As a result, Thai interest in trying 
to limit the use of this kind of domestic support, on the basis that in some cases 
domestic supports would have the same effect as export subsidies, did not appear in 
the Final Act. Nor did it appear in any other proposals by Thailand or the Cairns 
Group. In addition, the US deficiency payments programme, along with the EU 
compensation payments, was later included in a separate ‘Blue Box’ as part of the 
Blair House bilateral deal between the US and the EU.  
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It is vital to note that, in the case of Thailand during the Uruguay Round, agriculture 
negotiations were normally and typically negotiated by diplomats unfamiliar with 
agricultural conditions. And the diplomat or officials responsible for agricultural 
conditions or agricultural policy are, more often than not, not fully aware of the 
linkages between issues. Hence, it is necessary to have a working collaboration in 
place between the trade negotiation office and other relevant bureaus. However, in 
Thailand’s case, collaborations between offices and departments posed a rather 
problematic situation. Generally, officials in other departments and ministries 
regarded trade negotiations as the direct responsibility of the Ministry of Commerce 
and did not consider them to fall within the scope of their duties. As noted earlier, this 
was a result of the lack of awareness of the GATT in general and the importance of 
the Uruguay Round negotiations in particular. Therefore, very little attention was paid 
to following the process by officers in other departments. As a matter of fact, the 
situation of the miniscule number of Thai trade delegates was exacerbated by the fact 
that they did not have proper negotiation training. Neither were they instructed on the 
issue or agenda being negotiated beforehand. Additionally, with the expansion of the 
agenda through the inclusion of such very complex and slippery issues as services, 
intellectual property, technical barriers, and sanitary and phytosanitary standards, the 
trade negotiators’ capacity for analysis and for turning such analysis into sound 
negotiating positions was a wearisome burden, although conditions and the 
environment for trade negotiators have significantly improved since then. This 
resulted in a lack of cooperation on information transfer to advise the trade 
negotiators on how to proceed in Geneva. Plus, without a full understanding from 
other bureaus of how time-constrained trade negotiators were and without the 
authority of trade representatives, trade negotiators, most of the time, could not 
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directly contact officials in other offices to get the information they needed. They had 
to send documents asking for information needed to make decisions on bargaining 
strategies formation to the office of the permanent secretary of other ministries; then, 
the office of the permanent secretary of those ministries would pass the work down to 
officials who were responsible. Typically, this very hierarchical version of 
bureaucracy hindered the process of producing an effective national interest 
formation, as well as the formulation of strategies. 
 
For instance, in the case of poultry, the Department of Foreign Trade only found out 
after the conclusion of the Round in Marrakesh that the EU formula for calculating 
the quotas for Thai poultry was not in line with those of the GATT. However, 
Thailand was not able to complain that the EU modalities violated the GATT rules, 
since the signing in Marrakesh indicated that Thailand agreed to accept the attached 
formula calculation for market access from the EU. This case of the EU quota for 
poultry illustrates a lack of resources and cooperation between relevant departments 
on the Thai team. This, however, could be avoided if other domestic actors such as 
businesses had paid attention and helped inform the positions. Besides, this 
information gap could have been avoided if officials in other departments and 
ministries had been more aware of the significance of trade negotiations and the 
GATT.  
 
This thesis seeks to explore the roles of politics of agriculture within Thailand’s 
position in the Uruguay Round negotiations by examining different sectors and 
different domestic actors to see the influence over the position taken by trade 
negotiators in the Uruguay Round. As discussed in previous chapters, according to 
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Odell, every official trade negotiator will have three types of objectives: economic 
gain, relational power, and domestic political popularity; and, these goals may not be 
fully consistent with one another. 320 As a consequence, negotiators for any country 
may vary their priorities according to the issue, environmental conditions, or 
experience. It is with these environmental conditions that all government economic 
negotiators are embedded in complex two-level games.321 Odell also made clear that 
different domestic political conditions have a different impact on the effectiveness 
and success of the strategies used in international negotiations.  
 
For that reason, the prawn and poultry industry in Thailand were chosen to see if there 
is any active domestic lobby group affecting the process of trade policy and 
bargaining strategies formation in Thailand; and if there are such groups, what are 
their roles and importance to domestic political conditions for negotiations at the 
Uruguay Round? Therefore, further probing into the influence of these two industries 
on Thailand’s trade positions and bargaining strategies would at least yield insight 
into how negotiators balance farm interests at home, if any. It could also test the 
hypotheses by seeing if the trade positions and interests are indeed the outcome of 
well-balanced interests at home. 
 
That being said, the finding was somewhat different from what had been presupposed 
by theories of domestic interest groups and was, in fact, rather disappointing. In the 
case of bargaining strategies used during agriculture negotiations in the Uruguay 
Round, the positions and strategies were, in fact, influenced and formulated by the 
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policy makers themselves. At the beginning, it was believed that the choice of 
coalitions such as the Cairns Group was affected by the locally abundant factors – 
agriculture in the case of Thailand, as proposed by Rogowski, based on the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model. In the initial phase of the study, the decision to include these 
two different agricultural industries was based on the hypothesis that participation in 
the globalising world is no longer the privilege of state actors but also includes non-
state actors such as NGOs and civil societies. However, the study has shown that this 
was not the case in Thailand. The positions and trade policies of Thailand during the 
Uruguay Round largely came from a handful of officials who were interested in 
international trade or at the time were assigned to be responsible for negotiations 
within the Ministry of Commerce. As mentioned earlier, the next-to-nonexistent 
influence of Thai farmers or interest groups on the issue of the negotiating position of 
Thailand shows that Thai interest or negotiating behaviour is not explained by the 
theories of domestic interest groups. Although Thailand, as a state-unit, coalesces 
with other agriculture commodity exporters at the international level, Thai farmers do 
not influence decisions. Domestic theories of international bargaining depict 
international trade negotiations as a two-level game, where domestic bargaining 
affects the positions that states adopt in the international sphere. Domestic forces may 
influence international negotiations with regards to a concern about foreign policy or 
for pure private interest. In Thailand’s case, especially in the Uruguay Round, 
domestic constituencies did not and could not influence trade negotiations conducted 
internationally.  It is salient in the case of the domestic participation of the two 
industries, which are amongst the top exports of Thailand, that theories of domestic 
interest groups are inadequate in explaining Thai negotiating behaviour. 
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Although a small number of public consultations were held with academics and local 
businesses, a belief that the GATT was distant from their responsibilities and 
economic interests made them indifferent to the negotiation processes and agenda. 
One amusing statement by the former Deputy Minister of Commerce and the leader of 
the Thai delegation to Punta del Este, Mr. Prachuab Chaiyasarn, actually sums up the 
lack of awareness of the GATT negotiations by the public during that time. To recap, 
most people did not understand what GATT was; and amusingly many Thais actually 
confused the word “GATT” with “gas”.322 He once mentioned in a conference that 
when he discussed the GATT, occasionally he would receive a question on whether 
the price of gas was to be increased.323 During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the 
role of business in helping to form the positions in negotiations was rather modest.324 
The interconnectedness of the international political economy was not felt by many 
local businesses until the implementation period. It was only after the Uruguay Round 
was concluded that domestic businesses started to pay attention. Plus, the media did 
not pay sufficient attention to trade negotiations under the GATT, presumably due to 
a lack of awareness on the topic from both the media and wider public. 
 
As stated earlier, given the failure of Thai trade negotiators to swiftly devise 
information on the EU modalities on poultry, this problem could have been overcome 
if domestic constituencies and alignments had paid adequate attention and displayed 
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sufficient concern. Fortunately, this has changed since the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round. Domestic constituencies and alignments including businesses, academics, and 
NGOs are now more aware and concerned about the negotiation processes under the 
WTO and participate actively in the formulation of trade policies, bargaining 
positioning as well as bargaining strategies. In a sense, the Uruguay Round was 
therefore a learning curve for Thailand in the international trade arena. This, in turn, 
reflects the process of globalisation which heralds the evolution of a different kind of 
state where business and civil society can have a new role in actively participating in 
the international economic order. 
 
Nevertheless, it is still important to point out that, although the role of businesses and 
civil societies in influencing trade policies and the choice of bargaining positions and 
strategies have changed since the end of the Uruguay Round, Thai farmers, in this 
case chicken and prawn farmers, mostly still remain marginalised in the process of 
trade policy and bargaining positioning at all levels of trade negotiations. The 
influence of both poultry and prawn farmers over the formation of bargaining 
positions has not significantly transformed and has remained trivial since the Uruguay 
Round. Having had little knowledge of the GATT and the Uruguay Round, nowadays, 
while on familiar terms with the term the ‘WTO’, they still have little understanding 
of what is being negotiated and how it in turn may affect them. 
 
In conclusion, with the use of coalition and agenda-setting strategies, Thailand 
noticeably achieved the objectives it went to negotiate. The agenda-setting process 
helped Thai negotiators to place their objectives onto the negotiating table, and the 
strategy of coalition helped Thai trade diplomats to maintain their proposals on the 
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table. These two strategies complemented each other; and both strategies assisted in 
increasing the bargaining power of Thailand’s position in the Uruguay Round. The 
fact that agriculture remained in the Final Act and that international rules for trade 
were not dismissed from the negotiations is considered to be a satisfactory outcome in 
the eyes of negotiators. Yet, in the eyes of outsiders, there are ways for negotiators to 
overcome the shortcoming of the negotiations and to improve the gain on the status 
quo of Thailand. 
 
Evaluation of Thailand’s bargaining strategies in the Uruguay 
Round 
As discussed in detail in the previous chapters, Thailand, like most developing 
countries, went into the Uruguay Round with objectives to be fulfilled. With a small 
share of market in the global economy, it was thus difficult for them, along with other 
developing country delegates, to influence the outcome of the negotiations without 
resorting to ways to enhance their bargaining power. The previous chapters have 
discussed the limited range of bargaining strategies Thailand could employ, the 
actions Thai negotiators adopted to increase the bargaining leverage for Thailand, as 
well as Thailand’s achievement from the Uruguay Round negotiations.  
 
With regards to the case study, the thesis argues that the most effective and viable 
bargaining strategies in trade negotiations for Thailand, and presumably for most 
developing countries, are in effect coalition-building and agenda-setting. Small 
countries like Thailand, constrained by the power structure of the global political 
economy, did not enjoy much bargaining power. Additionally, bargaining strategies 
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were limited and constrained. For instance, its small market share made it impossible 
to use domestic unilateral measures as a threat, or in other words, as a distributive 
tactic. Furthermore, coalition-building and agenda-setting seemed to be the only 
feasible options in the eyes of most Thai trade negotiators, hence the best option. 
 
Unquestionably, a threat by less developed countries or by smaller or poorer countries 
is less likely to be believed in general. Although the consensus-building process 
should theoretically allow developing countries to block the agreements, the authority 
to block any agreement by a small country seems, in practice, to be an illusion. 
Undeniably, the strategy of credible unilateral threat, viewed as falling into the 
distributive strategy category, would only be an effective tool for small countries like 
Thailand if the country either acquired more market share or became more 
competitive in the global political economy, when achieving a larger market size is 
considered next to impossible.  
 
During the Uruguay Round, India and Brazil, along with Argentina, Egypt, and the 
former Yugoslavia, called the Big Five, became the leader of the G-10, which also 
included another five active members: Chile, Jamaica, Pakistan, Peru, and 
Uruguay.325 Although many of these countries had  a similar level of GDPs per 
capita as  Thailand, Thai negotiators chose not to be involved in the G-10 grouping 
because they recognised that the ambiguity of the service issue could be a valuable 
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bargaining counter with which trade offs in other areas could be sustained.326 In 
addition, the negotiators feared that the hard-line blocking strategies of the G-10 
would deprive Thailand of potential benefits and possibly impose unfavourable costs. 
Although Thailand may have been perceived as ‘soft’ on the position of new issues 
like services, Thai negotiators had two justifications in mind. Firstly, they did not 
wish to see the start of the new Round of trade talks delayed because Thailand wished 
to address the problem of agricultural issues in the GATT as quickly as possible. 
Secondly, in their view, it was always wiser to bring new issues under the GATT than 
to leave them to be negotiated bilaterally with the US.327 
 
The G-10 pursued bloc diplomacy, whereby it threatened to block the talks, and 
insisted that the talks should only proceed after old commitments and promises from 
the previous Round had been implemented. This threat to block is seen as a utilisation 
of distributive strategy tactics by the G-10 in order to shift value from the north, 
especially from the US, thus denying any gain to the developed countries and the so-
called ‘Enthusiasts’ until the group had been granted their demands . Although the G-
10 had both successes and failures to its credit, the shifting position of the group from  
hard resistance, to eventually allowing a new Round, to the inclusion of the GATS 
and TRIPS within the Final Act was seen as an implicit weakness of the group itself 
or of the pure distributive strategy.  
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Despite the G-10’s seeming failure, an initial hard line may represent a good 
bargaining strategy.328The slow implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements 
has raised questions over Thailand’s successful outcome in the negotiations, 
particularly in the case of intellectual property rights. Due to constraints on resources 
and expertise, there is currently only one legal officer, who is in charge of the 
conformity of domestic legislation to the GATT/WTO rules.329 It is widely accepted 
that the developing countries have been having problems implementing their 
commitments under the rules due to capacity constraints. Thailand is no exception and 
is now faced with problems in implementation commitments, since the domestic legal 
infrastructure had not been readily adjusted prior to the implementation period; hence, 
the bargaining strategies Thailand pursued failed to achieve substantive results in a 
real sense.330 However, it is possible to counter the above claim by pointing out that 
the reason behind Thailand adopting more strict intellectual property protection 
measures was more of a result of bilateral demands from the US in return for grant of 
the GSP. 
 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the choice of Thailand’s bilateral agreements 
during the Uruguay Round was mainly a result of the US carrots and sticks for the 
grant of the privilege of the GSP. Hence, it can be contended that negotiating 
bilaterally would yield the country another effectual bargaining strategy if the country 
possessed more bargaining power in the first place. More often than not, Thailand 
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would fall prey to the unilateral threat of the other side if the other party is a more 
powerful trading country like the US.  
 
With the limited options available, coalitions and agenda-building seem to be the best 
strategies small countries like Thailand could utilise. In fact, agenda-setting and 
coalition-building can be seen as a subtle element of distributive strategies. However, 
the effectiveness of agenda-building and coalition-building depends very much on 
how domestic constituencies can help define interests and contribute to research and 
information gathering. During the Uruguay Round, Thai domestic constituencies 
played a limited role in helping to define interests and make contributions to research 
and information gathering. Typically, each government is represented by individuals, 
but in practice an economic diplomat is limited to some degree by instructions and 
politics in his or her country. It is widely believed among negotiation theorists that all 
government economic negotiators are embedded in complex two-level games.331 
Domestic-political conditions or domestic alignments operating at level two can 
influence official agents interacting at level one. Domestic lobbies can tie the hands of 
negotiators. To sum up, domestic alignments help to specify the zone of agreement 
for officials. However, the study found that, in the case of Thailand in the Uruguay 
Round negotiations in general and in the agriculture negotiations in particular, 
domestic constituencies play very little role in shaping the zone of agreement, 
particularly in agriculture where there was almost non-existent proactive interest from 
farm lobbies. Most farmers, including prawn and chicken farmers, did not understand 
the significance of the GATT and trade negotiations in the Uruguay Round. As stated, 
                                                 
331
 See, for example, Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, Double-Edged 
Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. London: University of California Press, 
1993. 
Chapter 7: Analysis of the case study and evaluation of Thailand’s bargaining 
strategies    227 
the farmers in the interview revealed that they had never heard of the GATT. 
Although, during the time of the interview, they told the author that they then knew 
what the WTO was, they never interacted with officials from the department of trade 
negotiations. The only group of officials they knew of was from the department of 
fishery and livestock, who regularly came to update on what chemicals to be allowed 
to use in their farms. Moreover, most private sector organisations remained passive in 
the trade policy making process and the formulation of Thailand’s negotiating 
positions. The only business sector that was aware of the negotiations in the Uruguay 
Round was the textile manufacturers. This is due to the fact that they had to monitor 
the negotiations under the MFA anyhow. Although the fact the Thai negotiators had 
to respect cabinet orders or negotiating guidelines from the capital signifies a two-
level game logic, Thailand’s experience seems to signify that most negotiation 
process research and theories have underrepresented the experience and needs of 
developing countries.  
 
It is significantly important to note that, at the personal or individual level, Thai 
negotiators did not only use integrative tactics, but also both defensive and offensive 
variants of a distributive or value-claiming strategy. These tactics included, for 
example, avoiding revealing information about their own genuine objectives and 
priorities; criticising the other countries’ actions or proposals; and simply denying the 
capacity to deliver what was demanded. 
 
It can be argued that Thailand, as a unit, attempted several bargaining strategies, both 
distributive and integrative, to enhance its participatory ability at the Uruguay Round. 
By incorporating tactical elements from both ends, Thailand employed a so-called 
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mixed strategy. Nevertheless, as discussed in detail in this chapter, Thailand drew 
more on mixed-integrative strategies. There may be one plausible explanation for this 
choice. The preference for compromises and avoidance of confrontation in Thai 
negotiating custom, coupled with the negotiators’ beliefs of the unlikely effective 
results of a pure distributive strategy, led the Thai delegates to balance the strategies 
into a mix. Thus, the past experience of Thai negotiators at the Uruguay Round 
appears to reaffirm that a mixed strategy is likely to be more effective. Therefore, the 
thesis argues that, apart from coalition-building and agenda-setting, Thailand needs to 
use a mixed bargaining strategy to attain better outcomes. 
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Chapter 8: 
Lessons learned and implications for other 
developing countries 
The preceding chapter discussed an assessment of the effectiveness of each 
bargaining strategy utilised by Thai delegations in the Uruguay Round and evaluated 
the inherent weaknesses of each strategy. Discussion in this chapter now turns its 
attention to the picture of the Thai trade policy formation process nowadays and how 
it has transformed and improved since the end of the Uruguay Round. The section 
also explores how the transformation has affected the development of the bargaining 
strategies structure in Thailand. Finally, it explores the implications that the Thai case 
study bears for other developing countries, particularly new entrants to the WTO. 
 
The changing negotiating context and the adaptation of 
Thailand’s bargaining strategies: from the Uruguay Round to 
present 
 
The context of international relations has changed dramatically since the end of World 
War II. The development of a global political economy has becoming increasingly 
apparent and many countries have come to recognise the process of globalisation 
rather than communism. This has changed relationships among countries from being 
based on military and security diplomacy to being formed by economic and trade 
relations. The global community has also witnessed the changing structure of the 
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institution accountable for trade relations, from the GATT to the more formal 
structure of the WTO in the past half century. 
 
As discussed in the earlier chapter, Thailand has a long history of trade relationships 
with other countries. However, negotiations were mainly focused on simply trading, 
since the productivity and industry structure of the Thai economy was still in its 
infancy and the attitude of most officials towards negotiations was more of a passive 
rather than a proactive nature. Additionally, the fact that the agenda was limited to 
buying and selling made trade negotiations appear insignificant. However, the 
environment for negotiations has changed both internally and externally, inducing 
Thailand to actively participate in all levels of international trade negotiations. 
 
There have been several factors contributing to Thailand’s engagement in 
international economic negotiations up to now. Firstly, Thailand has become more 
competitive in international trade over the past forty years, propelled by the export-led 
development policy of successive governments. Secondly, protectionism has started 
to decline and given rise to the process of globalised liberalisation, more so than in 
some countries. Similar to other developing countries, Thailand has become a 
competitive exporter. This created a predicament for major trading countries, who 
then sought competitive advantages in new areas of trade such as services and 
investments. Most trade officials and negotiators believe that restriction and 
protection do not benefit any country in the long term. Liberalisation attracts foreign 
investment and, at the same time, boosts productivity and exports, thus improving the 
quality of life for local consumers. However, they recognise that protectionism 
prevails in the sphere of international trade politics, but perhaps in a new disguise by 
Chapter 8: Lessons learned and implications for other developing countries    231 
introducing issues such as the environment, workers’ rights, workers’ standards, and 
competition policy. In the eyes of Thai negotiators, the only way to at least ease the 
ferocious trend of liberalisation and to protect national interests is to directly engage 
in economic negotiations. Certainly, economic activities across the globe have been 
evolving and will continue to evolve and may change form. Thus, there can never be 
the best or the most perfect trade rules of law; there can only be compromises reached 
by trade negotiations.  
 
Indeed, Thailand has been engaging in all levels of trade negotiations as a result of 
being more or less forced to undertake trade negotiating activities by a range of 
drivers. Change and improvement in production structure, economic expansion, and 
the impact of globalisation were among the factors causing Thailand to inevitably 
participate in negotiations and learn the tricks of trade negotiations on the job. 
 
Thailand began to negotiate bilaterally because of the trade deficit with Japan. 
Negotiating bilaterally was the starting point for Thailand to learn and accumulate 
experience in trade negotiations. Since 1986, the country has experienced rapid 
economic development and growth. The fact that it was doing relatively well in 
international trade obviously invited bilateral negotiations from both the US, 
concerned with Thai exports of textiles, and the EU (or the EC), concerned with 
cassava.    
 
It is necessary to point out that most of the bargaining strategies were a product of 
learning by doing and of trial and error within the institution of the GATT. However, 
the process of multilateral negotiations has evolved both for Thailand and for the 
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global community. The creation of the WTO, a newer economic organisation, is now 
part of trade negotiators’ context. Now that Thailand has been a member of the 
GATT/WTO for 25 years, there have been apparent changes in the domestic 
bureaucratic structure to enhance participatory ability in the WTO, partially as a result 
of the learning process from past bargaining experiences and partially as a direct 
result of the Uruguay Round agreements. Figures 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3 below show the 
renewal of economic strategies as a result of the learning process and past 
experiences.    
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Figure8. 1: Renewal Strategy in Response to Globalisation. 
Source: Department of Trade Negotiations 
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Figure8. 2: Cross-Cutting Strategies among FTA Regional and WTO Agendas. 
Source: Department of Trade Negotiations 
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Figure8. 3: International Trade & Investment Policy. 
Source: Department of Trade Negotiations 
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What has Thailand learned from the Uruguay Round? 
Because of the immaturity of Thailand’s experience in multilateral trade negotiations 
in the past, negotiators were inevitably faced with problems both domestically and 
internationally. However, the Uruguay Round was the stepping stone for Thailand to 
learn its weaknesses in international negotiation, which are inherent at a national 
level. 
 
Lack of clarity in trade policies 
Domestically, there was a lack of clarity in trade policies. Domestic politics paid little 
attention to international trade negotiations. Multilateral trade negotiations only 
became part of the policies of the government in 1989, driven by permanent trade 
officials.332 Even among permanent officers, trade negotiations seemed to be a waste 
of time, unlike trade promotion which offered more tangible results and, hence, was 
better for their careers. Furthermore, the direction and objectives of trade policies and 
negotiating strategies fell within the responsibility of a handful of permanent trade 
officials because most political officials did not fully comprehend the dominant 
globalising trend of the international political economy.  
 
In addition, disagreements in trade negotiations vary in scope and degree. If a dispute 
arises from policies or trade measures, it can be solved relatively easily. However, if 
the international dispute arises from the difference in domestic jurisdictions, it is 
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accordingly more complicated to solve because the resolution process has to go 
through the due process of the law. In the past, national economic interests in the 
formation of negotiating positions have not been explicitly understood by all the 
domestic players. Policy-makers had a modest vision of the international trade 
negotiation processes. On the other hand, economic requests or proposals by other 
countries in trade negotiations have been utilised as a political tool to topple the 
government. More often than not, the dispute is a politically sensitive issue. For 
example, the amendment to the copyright law in 1989, as well as the objection to the 
modification of the patent law in order to protect international pharmaceutical 
products, was used as a political means to topple the existing government at that 
time.333 On the one hand, this can sometimes be a strategic advantage in trade 
negotiations, since Thai negotiators can mobilise this as an excuse not to take action 
according to demands from other parties. On the other hand, it can be misleading 
because it limits the range of opportunities in trade negotiations. Occasionally, policy-
makers did not have the courage to make political choices. Generally, trade disputes, 
especially in the case of intellectual property with the US, arose from differing 
bureaucratic systems and internal law-making. In Thailand, amendments to the law 
were difficult to execute because of the political structure. The balancing political 
system, as well as the coalition-party government and parliament, were the main 
impediments to the amendment of laws. Consequently, those in power avoided 
making decisions or used the policy to prolong the time to make decisions. This 
creates a problem for those involved in trade negotiations at a technical (or official) 
level.  
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Lack of unity in the management structure of trade negotiations 
Another problem in international trade negotiations for Thailand came from the lack 
of unity in the management structure and the negotiating process. There was no body 
dedicated to trade negotiations to gather together all the information needed. In 
Thailand, different forms of information related to trade negotiations in the GATT 
belonged to different departments and ministries. As a result, it was very difficult to 
develop a unified position because of the conflicting loyalty towards different 
ministries. In other words, this represents a ‘silo’ problem or policy chimneys in terms 
of the UK literature.334 In addition, the configuration of trade policy formation was 
normally duplicated among departments. As a result, there was a lack of unity, at both 
policy and implementation levels. Diverse procedures in strategy formation among 
different organisations made officials aware and responsive to only their own 
challenges. The officers or even politicians involved in trade negotiations thus wished 
to maintain the status quo because they did not understand the overall picture of the 
problems and true gains of the negotiations. As a result, they attempted to keep the 
status quo, and they disliked any procedural changes because they were concerned 
more with their individual or personal interests and feared negative effects resulting 
from the changes. This led to the lack of an overall strategy in the bigger framework, 
leading to conflicting interests and strategies among involved officials even in the 
same negotiating forum like the Uruguay Round. For instance, agricultural 
liberalisation was identified as the objective and the national interest; meanwhile, 
officials from the Ministry of Agriculture wanted to maintain the status quo and did 
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not wish to see liberalisation in order to protect some sectors from outside 
competition.  
 
Additionally, the attitudes of many officials from different divisions towards 
international trade difficulties remained conservative in a sense that protectionism and 
rent-seeking remained acceptable and preferable in some cases.335 Without fully 
realising the interconnectedness of the global political economy, the product of 
economic globalisation propelled by technological advancement, most policy makers 
in both domestic and international spheres lacked the willingness to make the 
decisions necessary for strategic actions in multilateral trade negotiations. 
 
Lack of resources 
Another problem that undermined the abilities of Thai negotiators to participate 
effectively in the Uruguay Round, apart from the language barriers, was the small 
number of staff. There were only three staff-members based in Geneva. At the time of 
the Uruguay Round negotiations, these officials were not full time negotiators devoted 
to mere trade negotiations. Rather, they were staff for the Office of Commercial 
Affairs, dealing with general commercial matters such as export and import. Rather 
forced by the situation, the staff had to become engaged in day-to-day negotiations in 
the GATT, as well as all small informal meetings and dinner invitations. It is 
important to note the significance of the dinner parties, since they are vital in a sense 
that they function as a consultative forum, where information on the positions of other 
countries’ delegates can be collected. The fact that Thailand was very small in terms 
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of military and economic power in the global economy made the delegates and 
officials work harder to be recognised by other countries’ delegates. Hence, it was a 
necessity for a negotiator to attend all meetings and negotiations because other 
countries would be aware of the presence of Thailand only if they recognised its 
representatives. One negotiator noted that the politics of negotiations are present at all 
levels. For instance, when the US trade representative made a speech, everyone in the 
negotiation room would go quiet because in some way or the other the trade policy 
adopted by the US would have an impact on each and every country’s economic 
interests, either directly or indirectly. In contrast, hardly any diplomats would pay 
careful attention to what smaller countries’ delegates, for example, those from African 
countries had to say.336  
 
Lack of formal training to increase participator ability 
Also, there was no formal training for negotiators or delegates. For instance, in 
agriculture negotiations, the Thai position was formed by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Cooperatives. However, the representative from the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives who was sent to help with the negotiations had absolutely no 
information concerning the negotiations in general.337 This was seen as a weakness 
of Thai negotiators. 
                                                
 
In fact, the Thai negotiators could have increased participatory ability by increasing 
bureaucratic capacity in order to generate domestic commercial and political interests 
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at the capital. However, the tiny size of delegations in Geneva already indicated that, 
initially, the Thai government was not fully committed to the GATT system and did 
not realise the significance of the Uruguay Round. This was even more so for the 
small businesses and farmers in Thailand on whom the agreements, particularly the 
agreements of agriculture, would have most impacted. Indeed, there have been some 
rumours that those high ranking officials assigned to deal with the trade negotiations 
were the victims of domestic politics; they were sent to Geneva so that they would not 
have an important role in internal politics back home in Thailand. 
  
What has been changed? 
In response to the lessons learned from the past failure of the Thai negotiating 
experiences at the Uruguay Round, there have been changes made to the way the Thai 
government conducts business in the international economic arena, especially in trade. 
This section outlines the changes below. 
 
Attitude of policy makers towards trade and investment policy 
Now, almost twelve years after the creation of the WTO, Thailand tries harder and 
harder to influence the agenda and the outcomes of negotiations. Believing that only 
those who play the game have any chance of winning concessions, Thai negotiators 
frequently chose to pursue a more pragmatic strategy in domestic, bilateral, and 
regional policies. They worked with developing and industrialised countries alike in 
an effort to reach agreements on issues of importance to the country.  
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At present, Thailand’s approach to the WTO ought to be understood within the wider 
context of the country’s global economic strategy. The strategy is inspired by two 
crucial imperatives: the necessity to take account of Thailand’s national, political, 
economic and developmental circumstances; and the obligation to develop the 
growing competitiveness of the Southeast Asian region under conditions of enhanced 
economic globalisation. The direction of policy in Thailand remains committed to 
trade and investment liberalisation as a means of improving competitiveness and 
achieving poverty alleviation objectives. However, at the same time, Thailand has 
pursued the “dual track” approach of strengthening the domestic economy and also 
integrating Thailand more into the global economy.338 
 
At the multilateral level, the strategy seeks to engage assertively with economic 
globalisation. To that end, Thai negotiators have emphasised the importance of 
multilateralism and Thailand remains committed to the implementation of the UR 
obligations. Regionally, it seeks to consolidate trading arrangements towards the 
integration of Thailand in the global economy by engaging in voluntary trade 
liberalisation within APEC, and regional liberalisation within ASEAN. At a bilateral 
level, it identifies specific countries for engagement as strategic trade and investment 
partners. The country is also seeking to expand bilateral trading arrangements with 
various countries, namely Australia, China, India, Japan, and the US, stating 
objectives of enhancing and maintaining competitiveness, protecting economic 
benefits, gaining greater access to overseas markets, and transforming the country into 
an investment hub in the region. The expanding trade negotiations agenda reflects the 
government’s policy of systematically opening the economy to foreign competition 
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and promoting exports and inward investment to support growth and employment. In 
essence, Thailand’s economic strategy has as an overarching objective to reduce the 
disproportionate reliance of the country’s trade on traditional foreign markets, 
particularly the US; the strategy is to facilitate the emergence of Thailand as a 
dynamic, outward-oriented manufacturing economy.  
 
Improvement of strategies and capacity-building 
Obviously, the most efficient way to acquire expertise in the economic negotiation 
process is not to rely completely on learning by doing. Nonetheless, this is exactly 
what often happens. Since the Uruguay Round, the negotiating skills and initiative of 
the Thai delegates have been conventionally Geneva-based. Largely a product of trial 
and error, the improvement of strategies and capacity-building is a response to past 
failures and successes of interaction and experiences within the GATT/WTO. 
Accordingly, there have been some modifications to the working structure of the trade 
negotiations process in Thailand. 
 
During and after the GATT’s Uruguay Round, Thailand shifted its economic policies 
towards reliance on international markets and trade for development purposes. 
Nonetheless, realising its past experience of limitations in negotiating capacity when 
participating in trade negotiations at the GATT, both at the capital and in Geneva, 
Thailand reinforced and established the mission in Geneva. Since then, there has been 
institutional adaptation to improve effective participation within the newer 
organisation of the WTO, suggested to the government and the cabinet by permanent 
trade officials who had been directly involved in the Uruguay Round. 
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At the capital, the Department of Trade Negotiation, a department entirely dedicated 
to international trade negotiation, was created to replace the prior Department of 
Business Economics in 2000. The department was formed within the Ministry of 
Commerce in Bangkok in the hope of facilitating closer links between the Permanent 
Mission to the WTO in Geneva, the Ministry of Commerce at the capital, and various 
stakeholders within the country. Previously, there were only eight officials working in 
the Department of Business Economics, which became responsible for trade 
negotiations due to compelling circumstances. To emphasise, four of the staff in the 
department were administrative. That leaves only four officials working on gathering 
information, cooperating with other departments and divisions, formulating the 
national interests and objectives, and identifying the negotiating positions and 
strategies.339 Moreover, the four officials working on negotiation had not been 
trained as trade negotiating specialists. After the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, 
the new department was established to deal with an increasing agenda and workload 
of international trade negotiations. Among many divisions in the Department of Trade 
Negotiations, the Division of Multilateral Trade, the Division of Bilateral Trade, the 
Division of Regional Trade, and the Division of Services were formed. In addition, 
the Department of Intellectual Property and the library for international trade were 
also created. 
 
Furthermore, following the new restructuring of government agencies which came 
into effect in October 2002, the Ministries of Commerce, Industry, and Finance are 
now the main agencies responsible for formulating trade and investment policies. 
Other agencies such as the Ministries of Agriculture and Co-operatives, Public 
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Health, Energy, Information Technology and Communications and Transport, and the 
Bank of Thailand (the central bank) are also granted authority to act when issues are 
specifically related to their responsibilities. 340 The Committee on International 
Economic Relations Policy (CIERP), chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, was also 
formed. It has subsequently played a major role in coordinating Thailand’s 
international trade and investment policies. Importantly, all matters related to 
international economic policy and international trade policy must be considered by 
this Committee before seeking final approvals and decisions from the Prime Minister 
and his Cabinet. 
 
In Geneva, Thailand reinforced and established the permanent mission in Geneva. 
After the creation of the WTO in 1995, Thailand increased its investment in 
international economic negotiations by establishing the Permanent Mission of 
Thailand to the World Trade Organisation. During the Uruguay Round, there had 
been merely the Office of Commercial Affairs, comprising three staff members, under 
the supervision of the Department of Trade Promotion. As mentioned, they became 
involved in negotiating participation due to compelling circumstances, since there had 
not been a proper set of trade delegates available. Due to the small number of staff 
and the expansive agenda of negotiations, one substitute-like negotiator was normally 
responsible for negotiating in more than three to four issues and had to initiate 
negotiating strategies on the spot by drawing upon their sense of the circumstances. 
Thus, to facilitate better attendance and participation in the WTO meetings, Thailand 
established the permanent mission, as well as increasing the numbers of delegates 
from three to thirteen. The Ambassador, the Permanent Representative, was to come 
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from either the Ministry of Foreign Affair or the Ministry of Commerce. Other 
delegates and experts were to be drawn from various related ministries ranging from 
the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Science, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives.  
 
It is intriguing to note that the big jump in the number of delegates from three to 
twelve seems to signify an increase in government attention and awareness of the 
significance of trade negotiations at the WTO. In fact, the big immediate increase 
from three to twelve was rather the effect of the complex Thai bureaucratic system; it 
was easier to set up a large mission and diminish the number of staff later when 
necessary than to set up a smaller mission and increase the number of staff at a later 
date. Indeed, the number of staff has decreased since the financial crisis because the 
very high living costs in Geneva simply put a strain on the budget for small countries 
like Thailand. In reality, the number of delegates posted has never reached the limit of 
twelve representatives as set out in the beginning. In terms of the increase in official 
training investment, the government has sent representatives and experts to actively 
participate in most negotiations, since on-the-job training is deemed valuable and 
more practical in developing expertise. In addition, Thailand lobbied to get a place in 
the WTO trade policy training scheme by using its own funds to book two seats for 
Thai trade negotiators to be trained at the WTO every year. 
 
Role of Businesses 
Prior to and during the Uruguay Round, Thailand’s trade policies and negotiating 
strategies had traditionally been associated with rather weak input from political 
parties, business or other societal groups. However, this was set to change after the 
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end of the Uruguay Round because the increasingly intrusive and far-reaching nature 
of economic rules at the WTO meant that the adoption of particular rules and the 
outcome of negotiating concessions would have had direct distributional impacts on 
local business and interest groups. Besides, the increasing complexity of the 
negotiated agenda and a wide range of issues covered by the negotiations made it 
extremely difficult for negotiators and trade experts to calculate costs and benefits for 
each strategic action and strategy. Notwithstanding the acceptance of the impossibility 
of having a complete set of information, trade negotiators felt the urge to gather as 
much information regarding an agreement as possible. Learning from past flaws, for 
instance in the Thai negotiating positions relating to frozen fresh chickens and frozen 
fresh prawns, Thai negotiators needed extra accurate information from directly 
involved businesses and industries in order to negotiate competently and achieve 
greater outcomes. Hence, the government, especially the Ministry of Commerce, has 
willingly expanded consultative forums with civil society and business groups to 
create closer links, as well as attempting to increase the frequency of its consultations 
with different stakeholders including academics, NGOs, and business groups. 
 
 
During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the role of business in helping to form the 
positions in negotiations was rather modest341 The interconnectedness of 
international political economy was not felt by many local businesses until the 
implementation period. Nonetheless, since the end of the Uruguay Round, Thai 
domestic political structure and society has witnessed an adjustment to the limited 
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influence of business and interest groups over economic policy in general and trade 
policy in particular. 
 
It was only after the Uruguay Round was concluded that domestic businesses started 
to show interest. Domestic discontent with WTO rules and obligations fuelled 
business group mobilisation and the involvement of businesses and interest groups in 
the process of trade negotiations. Many sector-specific industry organisations have 
begun to improve their relative awareness of Thailand’s negotiating positions in the 
WTO. Top organisations such as the Board of Trade of Thailand, The Federation of 
Thai Industries, and The Thai Bankers Association have sought to ensure greater 
input by forming the WTO Joint Committee to monitor processes in WTO 
negotiations and to communicate positioning and the interests of the domestic 
businesses to trade negotiators. Evidently, the influence of businesses in Thai trade 
policy making and trade negotiating positions has progressively reflected domestic 
voices. 
 
Importance of coalition-building and the proliferation of Preferential 
Trade Agreements (PTAs) 
Towards the end of the Uruguay Round, small developing countries realised the high 
and unavoidable cost of non-participation. Due to their experiences, they began to 
involve themselves fully and actively in the hope that increased participation would 
bring about greater influence and gains. However, it may inevitably bring about 
greater vulnerability if the country at stake does not participate with sufficient 
resources and skills. Thus, small developing countries joined coalitions and like-
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minded groups, platforms for resources and information sharing. Thailand chose to 
focus more on the ASEAN because it had had a long experience of diplomacy with 
the other ASEAN members. Since then, the development of Thai negotiating strategy 
has started to see the incentive to form a rather discriminatory regionally-focused 
group as another viable and feasible bargaining strategy on the global stage. 
Arguably, this development of a trend of regionalism has predominantly and 
paradoxically arisen from the development of the GATT/WTO context itself.342  
 
As an original member of the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
Thailand played an important role in the creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA), which was launched in 1993. Thailand has remained committed to the 
economic integration and effective implementation of AFTA. Nevertheless, it realised 
that, as long as individual markets of ASEAN remain segmented and protected by 
various kinds of trade barriers, the region as a whole will eventually lose its 
competitiveness and attractiveness to foreign direct investment, given the current 
development of regional trading blocs around the globe. With this concern, Thailand 
began to direct the attention to bilateral FTAs. 
 
This was brought about by Singapore, who, disappointed with the slow pace of the 
AFTA, started to focus on bilateral FTAs. Consequently, Thailand also shifted its 
attention to bilateral FTAs. Bilateral FTAs and regional FTAs are seen as belonging 
to the same set of bargaining strategies at the multilateral trade negotiating forum. So 
far, Thailand has concluded two FTAs (with Australia and New Zealand) and is 
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negotiating with Japan, the US, Bahrain, India and Peru. Thailand also has an 
agreement with China that provides for an “early harvest” liberalisation package 
covering certain fruits and vegetables. Other regional FTAs are part of Thailand’s 
strategy to become an investment hub in Asia. Thailand is pursuing other regional 
FTAs (apart from AFTA) through ASEAN, by joining forces with other members in 
the group in the negotiations of ASEAN-China, ASEAN-Japan, and ASEAN-India 
FTAs. It is also currently negotiating FTAs with these respective countries (China, 
Japan, and India) on a bilateral basis. The government claims that the regional and 
bilateral FTAs are not replicating, but rather complementing each other. One with a 
slower negotiating pace will be invigorated by the other with a faster pace. Also, 
conducting FTA negotiations on a parallel track provides Thailand with room to 
manoeuvre in order to shift resources and attention to whichever moves faster. Thai 
negotiators also stress that it is necessary for Thailand to ensure that she diversifies 
her alliances and trade relationships with both developed and developing countries. 
By committing to both bilateral/regional FTAs, Thailand will gain more alliances on 
multilateral levels of trade negotiations. 
 
The government strategy in choosing negotiating partners can be seen in three 
prongs.343  The first group of countries consists of “traditional” markets for Thailand 
such as the US and Japan because Thailand’s exports to these markets are rather well 
established. Thailand’s primary objective in negotiating with these countries is to 
retain the present level of market access and expand access for new products. The 
second group of negotiating partners is the “potential” markets. These are countries 
that have huge a population, but a relatively low level of trade with Thailand. 
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Generally speaking, China and India are in this group. The government aims for these 
markets are to enhance Thai exports aggressively and establish closer trade and 
investment relations – at the national-level, as well as region-specific. Finally, the last 
group of partners are those termed “gateway” countries. They are small but can 
provide access for Thai products into their region. Bahrain and Peru are considered to 
belong within this group.344 It is clear that the highest priorities for Thailand in FTA 
agreements are greater market access on goods, particularly agricultural produce, 
textiles and clothing, automobiles and electrical parts. Greater access for natural 
person service suppliers (mode 4) in some services such as restaurants and health-
related facilities is also of key interest. However, there are also weaknesses in 
pursuing FTAs such as complications of rules of origin, insufficient resources, and 
constraints on implementation.  
 
Last but not least, the other aspect that has been changed in the formulation process of 
trade negotiating strategies in Thailand is the clearer direction of Thai economic 
policies. Among top Thai negotiators, it is generally believed that, in trade 
negotiations at a multilateral forum like the WTO, players that have more bargaining 
power receive substantial attention and notice from other players when they present 
proposals or deliver speeches, as well as being able to rightfully counteract or offset 
any proposals from other parties in given negotiations.345 Accordingly, increases in 
economic might and market power are not the only ways to gain more bargaining 
power at the multilateral forum, although this may not apply to bilateral-level talks. 
With this in mind, Thai negotiators strive to be an active leader of ASEAN. They 
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believe that by doing so, Thailand will receive additional attention and awareness 
from other players because it would speak on behalf of all the ASEAN members. In 
turn, this would strategically render other parties able to also recognise Thailand as 
one of the active and significant players in the WTO. It is hence believed that the 
bargaining power of Thailand in the WTO would rise accordingly. 
 
What has not changed? 
Given the general changes in attitudes towards the multilateral negotiating process 
and increase in training investment for officials and trade negotiators since the end of 
the Uruguay Round, not much has significantly changed structurally in the reform of 
trade policy and bargaining strategy. One problem that remains a constant difficulty 
for Thailand is the lack of human resources and personnel. 
 
As discussed in the preceding section, Thailand has increased the number of trade 
negotiators at the WTO from three to twelve in number. Hence, it is believed by many 
people that Thailand’s participatory capacity would increase accordingly. 
Unfortunately, despite the big increase in representatives in Geneva, this is not always 
the case. Although the enlargement of trade officials does facilitate attendance at 
negotiations on a day-to-day basis, the increasing number of negotiators does not 
automatically translate to greater influence or automatically add further bargaining 
weight for Thailand. 
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Lack of a domestic formal-training-structure for negotiators 
Notwithstanding the increase in official training investment in the WTO, the lack of 
formal training still remains unchanged and the only approach to trade negotiator 
training is learning-by-doing, rather than a fundamental programme especially 
designed to increase negotiating and language skills. The current Director-General 
disappointingly admitted that at present there is no formal negotiating training. 
Instead, negotiators only receive on-the-job training.346 Fundamentally, on-the-job 
training is considered more valuable in developing practical expertise. It is debateable 
whether this trial-and-error practice will achieve more gain than loss for a small 
country like Thailand. 
 
Problem of language skills and a lack of skilled resources   
The disadvantages for Thai negotiators are the problems of language skills and a lack 
of profound knowledge in international trade law and the international political 
economy. Besides a lack of trade negotiators, Thailand is still deficient in think tank 
and international economic legal experts concerning issues and agendas negotiated at 
the WTO. Essentially, what is being negotiated at the WTO is the international 
economic law for conducting economic activities, caused by globalisation and 
Thailand’s objective is to see the rule of law strengthened to prevent bullying from 
bigger trading players. Yet, the country, paradoxically and seriously, lacks legal 
experts in international economic law. Undergraduate-level legal curriculums and 
courses in most educational organisations and universities in Thailand are relatively 
outdated and are not fully au fait with the globalisation process. Law courses related 
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to international economic law and GATT/WTO rules are only offered at post-graduate 
level and are only taught in a small number of leading universities.347 
 
Even though there has been some increase in training investment for trade negotiators, 
Thailand’s human resource management has not enlarged the incentives and 
opportunity in human resource investment for officials to stay working for state 
organisations. In spite of the heavy workload and duties, trade negotiators and 
relevant officials feel they receive a low salary and this generally causes skilled 
negotiators and legal officials to leave the workforce for private organisations, which 
offer better returns for their skills. Plus, the lower level of returns and benefits induces 
officials to become incompetent and inept. 
 
However, akin to the problem raised above, during the interview with the Director-
General of the Department of Trade Negotiation, one official who was newly 
appointed to a post at the WTO joined the interview in order to be briefed regarding 
the negotiation process at the WTO. Rather obviously, he had not been familiarised 
with the negotiation process at the WTO, and sadly, the only training he would 
receive before being posted to the Permanent Mission at the WTO was in fact the 
interview itself. 
 
Passive role and limited inputs from domestic constituencies 
Negotiation alternatives for any country are directly related to the particular alignment 
of domestic actors and their interests. In summary, domestic alignments help to 
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specify the zone of agreement in multilateral trade negotiations, which is dependent 
on the intersection of win-sets of the negotiating countries. Theoretically, the 
importance of the two levels of international relations, international and domestic, is 
now increasingly recognised. The above section shows that these propositions may 
apply to the Thai case as well, since there has been some growing acknowledgement 
of the significance of the GATT/WTO negotiations from civil societies and business 
interest groups. It is thought that now they are included, domestic constituencies can 
build credibility for developing Thailand’s proposals, while also serving to limit or 
expand the alternatives a negotiator might accept.  
 
However, the reality looks somewhat doubtful. Thailand’s foreign and economic 
policy has long been associated, and still continues to be associated, with rather weak 
input from political parties, business or other societal groups, although there has been 
some parliamentary oversight. Despite more engagement of domestic constituencies, 
the domestic business inputs remain rather passive and are limited to only certain 
sectors and major businesses. When compared to the civil society and domestic 
business networks that operate in the formation of trade policy in developed countries, 
Thailand’s domestic trade policy networks remain, at best, in a state of development. 
As noted earlier, consultations with civil societies have purposely increased to inform 
national interests and the choice of bargaining strategy and policy; they are criticised 
by NGOs because consultations are still being principally directed by the Ministry of 
Commerce in general and the Department of Trade Negotiation in particular, and are 
not as frequent as they should be. Where interest groups have mobilised, there is little 
evidence that this has significantly shifted government policy and negotiating 
strategy. In the case of NGOs, the picture is even gloomier. Few are able to engage 
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proactively and constructively in debates relating directly to the technical issues 
covered by WTO negotiations. From the point of view of trade negotiators, 
accompanying a deep-rooted ideological suspicion of liberalisation is a serious lack of 
awareness of WTO issues.  NGOs’ lack of understanding of the WTO has played 
more of a hampering role rather than a supporting one. In the absence of sufficient 
information about the benefits of liberalisation, most constituencies find it safest to 
say no to everything in the WTO. 
 
Although this thesis acknowledges that significant changes have been occurring in 
terms of the impact of domestic factors, in general it is argued that such factors are 
less important than the domestically-driven literature on negotiation analysis would 
suggest. In addition, the state has effectively remained the main force in the 
formulation and conduct of trade policy and negotiating strategy. Evidently, the 
politics of the double-level game are not as salient as many negotiation analyses 
assume. This signifies that Thailand’s negotiating positions and trade policies may 
still largely be top-down and that the limited domestic inputs into the making of 
Thailand’s negotiating positions mean that Thai negotiators are arguably able to 
operate, to a certain extent, with some degree of negotiation autonomy. 
 
Apart from what has been mentioned above, another problem hindering the 
improvement of negotiating strategies, which still persists is the serious insufficiency 
of solidarity of policy and structure, as well as technocrats.  
 
As noted in the previous section, despite there being a number of FTA initiatives 
pursued by Thailand both at the bilateral and regional settings, trade negotiators view 
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such engagements as not having come at the expense of the commitment to the 
multilateral trade negotiations. Rather, the Thai government considers that 
multilateral, regional and bilateral trade liberalisation frameworks are complementary 
and mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, the multilateral trade agreement has 
offered Thailand potential real gains in the areas of agricultural reform, as well as 
established and improved trade disciplines. On the other hand, the bilateral/regional 
trade agreements have been strategically employed as the fast lane toward deeper and 
wider market access on goods and services. Although FTAs are heralded to be a 
strategic move to increase bargaining power in trade negotiations for Thailand at a 
multilateral level, they still appear to simply be a response to a strategic bargaining 
option from developed countries just like bilateral carrots and sticks in the previous 
Uruguay Round negotiations from the outsider perspective. Protectionism prevails 
and disguised trade distortion takes another advanced form and trend. Hence, Thai 
trade negotiators have stressed the intrinsic rationality of economic liberalisation and 
both bilateral and regional FTAs. Unlike in the past, when a deep-rooted ideological 
suspicion of liberalisation and globalisation was present, most trade negotiators now 
embrace FTAs without question. Arguably, FTAs represent more of the apparent 
homogenisation and progressively greater conformity of negotiators’ ideological 
beliefs with liberal norms than simply reflecting the choice of an effective bargaining 
tool, suggesting the superiority of the idea of market liberalism. 
 
Conclusion 
At present, Thailand looks forward to a successful conclusion of the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) in the current engagement in trade negotiations. 
Thailand recognises the potential gains of the DDA in the areas of agriculture reform, 
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improved market access for goods and services, and clarification and improvement of 
trade disciplines, including development considerations. On NAMA (non agriculture 
market access) negotiations, Thailand supports a simple but ambitious tariff cutting 
formula reducing/eliminating tariffs. It includes the elimination of tariff peaks, high 
tariffs, tariff escalation, and non-tariff barriers imposed by both developed and 
developing countries. The country does not oppose the sectoral initiatives as a 
supplementary venue for tariff elimination/harmonisation, provided that the special 
needs and concerns of developing countries are adequately addressed. The interests of 
Thailand regarding service negotiations lie in Mode 4 (movement of natural persons) 
in restaurant service. The negotiators also place greater emphasis on the negotiations 
on rule making elements. Moreover, Thailand welcomes the decision of WTO 
members to launch negotiations on trade facilitation. As one of the APEC members, 
Thailand has already undertaken various activities related to trade facilitation, namely 
movement of goods, standards, mobility of business people, and e-commerce.  Other 
main areas of interest to Thailand include developing-country concerns over TRIPS 
and public health and extension of geographical indications beyond wines and spirits. 
Regarding environmental concerns in relation to trade, Thailand would not accept any 
proposal to weaken WTO rules using environmental protection as a pretext to create 
trade barriers, or the adoption of a non-science-based precautionary principle that 
goes beyond the scope of existing WTO provisions.348 
 
With regard to agricultural negotiations, Thailand aims to achieve substantial and 
meaningful agricultural reform in the three pillars, namely market access, export 
competition, and domestic support. Currently, the country is an active member of The 
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Cairns and G20, which call for deep tariff cuts combined with quota expansions by 
developed countries, elimination of export subsidies, and a substantial reduction in 
domestic support. Thailand supports the view that agricultural products that are to be 
treated as special should be limited in number and truly reflect the rural concerns for 
food security, rural development, and the livelihoods of poor farmers. Evidently, what 
remains the same since the Uruguay Round is the belief of many Thai negotiators that  
coalition-building remains the most viable bargaining tool for Thailand in multilateral 
trade negotiating fora, and likewise presumably for other developing countries. This is 
true, since efforts and resources are still being invested into bargaining coalitions at 
the WTO. 
 
Implications for other developing countries 
As already noted earlier, throughout most of the first four decades of GATT’s 
existence, developing countries remained bystanders in successive rounds of trade 
negotiations, they also insisted on “special and differential treatment”. To the extent 
that they participated in negotiations at all, they often sought to increase the scope of 
preferences rather than reciprocity.349 Developing countries, therefore, had very little 
role in forming the main agreements of Tokyo Round. However, this view changed in 
the 1980s when recognition of developing countries heightened the fact that the 
import-substitution development strategies had failed. Hence attitudes toward the 
GATT then changed. 
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Furthermore, developing countries saw that merely insisting on special and 
differential treatment was not effective because they had to rely solely on concessions 
which were arbitrarily made by industrialised countries and over which they had too 
little influence. Moreover, powerful trading countries more often than not resorted to 
bilateral agreements to decide which small exporting countries would receive the 
preferential treatment. Through negotiating bilaterally, smaller exporting countries 
would be in a rather disadvantaged position compared to their large trading 
counterparts. In the Tokyo Round, the only bargaining power that developing 
countries could enjoy was not to sign the Tokyo accords. Nevertheless, many small 
exporting countries, including Thailand, started to believe that they should use the 
GATT rules to protect themselves from industrialised countries seeking to coerce 
them. For example, the US 301 or even the GSP had become a double-edged sword 
since large importing countries would grant GSP only on conditions that small 
exporting developing countries liberalise their service sector and adopt intellectual 
property protection. Since GSP was very important to exports for these exporting 
countries, as well as Thailand, the US cut of GSP was a threat that they could not 
afford to ignore.350 
  
Meanwhile, the success of the Asian Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) and the 
rapid entry of exports from other developing countries had increased the share of 
developing countries in trade, especially in manufacturing. Growth had increased 
significantly to a level that could no longer be ignored by developed countries. Thus, 
trade representatives from developed countries were concerned and anxious to bring 
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the developing countries into the Uruguay Round negotiations, as well as to find the 
means to bring developing countries more fully under the GATT disciplines. 
Moreover, some policymakers in developing countries, after having liberalised their 
internal trade regimes, simultaneously recognised the importance of participating fully 
in the Uruguay Round. For the first time, the developing countries sought to influence 
the outcome, rather than awaiting reciprocal tariff reductions among developed 
countries and then free-riding on those reductions.351 
 
It can be concluded that this change might have resulted from the harsh lesson 
developing countries had learnt from the Tokyo Round. There are criticisms that 
developing countries did not get the chance to participate effectively in the Tokyo 
Round negotiations. According to Winham, the Tokyo Round accords were reached 
because the negotiations were pyramidal in character, despite coverage being quite 
sophisticated and far-reaching. In the Round, the preponderant trade positions of the 
European Community and the United States gave both parties vast influence over 
most agreements at the negotiations. This influence led to a pyramidal style of 
multilateral negotiation, where issues would first be negotiated bilaterally between the 
larger powers and then later become multi-lateralised by slowly bringing other 
‘middle powers’ and developing countries into the agreement as the negotiations went 
on.352 This set the trend for the later so-called ‘Green Room’ process. Undoubtedly, 
this left developing countries with many disappointments; therefore, only a small 
number of developing countries signed the Tokyo Round accords. 
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Aiming to be rules-setters than rules-takers, developing countries thus made a great 
deal of effort to participate fully in bargaining and negotiations in the Uruguay Round 
from the start. Since the most important goal of the developing countries was an 
increased access to industrialised country markets, developing countries tended to 
focus their efforts in the negotiations on issues such as enforcing the standstill and 
rollback of protectionist measures agreed to at the beginning of the trade Round.353 
Other issues such as bringing agriculture and textiles under GATT discipline, 
strengthening safeguards and discipline over “grey-area” measures, eliminating non-
tariff barriers to trade, tightening GATT rules (e.g. antidumping code) to limit the 
ability of developed countries to invoke their trade laws against alleged offending 
nations, and reform of the dispute settlement mechanism and other GATT procedures 
in order to improve surveillance and enforcement were among the top priorities. The 
developing countries continued to insist on special treatment in recognition of their 
development needs, although a number of them indicated a willingness to be flexible 
on the precise form of such special treatment. Hence, during the preparatory phase, 
developing countries were divided into two groups. The first group, led by India and 
Brazil, was against cooperation with the industrialised countries in initiating the new 
Round of talks. However, Thailand, as part of ASEAN, and some Latin American 
countries saw that it would benefit them most if they could at least manoeuvre the 
drafting of the new rules in some way.354 Their greatest fears were the two giants 
colluding and coming up with an agreement at the expense of the interests of 
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developing countries. As a consequence, Thailand, along with the countries 
mentioned, joined the preparatory committee from the pre-negotiation phase. Later, 
the hard line positions of Brazil and India were softened. Unlike the Tokyo Round, it 
is interesting to note that all 105 contracting parties participated in the negotiations 
and all of them signed the Final Act in Marrakesh. 
 
Indeed, the developing countries have learnt from hard experience that their fears of 
such collusion of the big giants (EU-US) have continued to be highly likely. The 
Agreement on Agriculture in the Uruguay Round was ultimately a product of the so-
called Blair House Accord, a bilateral deal between the EU and the US which has had 
a marginalising effect on most developing countries. 
 
Over a decade after the creation of the WTO, a newer context for trade negotiation, 
developing countries have sought change by actively playing the game of trade 
politics rather than walking away from it. 355  The experiences of the previous 
Rounds of trade talks have taught developing countries some important lessons about 
the costs of non-participation, and also the adequacies as well as inadequacies of some 
of their negotiation strategies. The developing countries concluded that the traditional 
strategies of import substitution and North-South confrontation had yielded few 
concrete benefits; hence, they have pursued more pragmatic policies and sought 
greater engagement in international trade. The strategy of pragmatic engagement led 
to important achievements for developing countries in the Uruguay Round. Ninety-
one developing countries participated in the negotiations, far more than in any 
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previous rounds, and their participation was more active and wide-ranging than ever 
before.356 As a result, developing countries made important progress towards their 
goal of market access. For example, the Uruguay Round agreement provided for 
elimination over a ten-year period of quotas on textiles negotiated under the MFA, 
thus ending over thirty years of managed trade in textiles. Developing countries also 
benefited from the development of new trading rules and the elimination of VERs and 
import surveillance measures through the safeguard codes was a significant 
achievement as well. 
 
International forums such as UNCTAD, which had traditionally been preferred by 
developing countries, became increasingly irrelevant as a focus point for bargaining 
with the north, and developing countries shifted their attention to the new World 
Trade Organisation. Previous non-members of the GATT, including China, also 
joined negotiations for membership of the WTO. As a result of their achievements in 
the Uruguay Round, developing countries have since had a greater stake in the 
successful implementation of obligations from the round. Particularly, developing 
countries have been expected to be strong advocates of the use of the WTO’s new 
rules and dispute settlement mechanisms as tools to defend themselves against 
protectionism from developed countries.357 Table 8.1 below shows the increasing use 
of the dispute settlement mechanism by developing countries in the WTO. 
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Disputes by members    
 
  as complainant as respondent 
OECD As complainants – 267 cases As respondents – 255 cases 
BRICS As complainants – 59 cases As respondents – 55 cases 
Developing 
Countries 
As complainants – 88 cases As respondents – 73 cases 
Table8. 1: Disputes by member. 
Source: the WTO 
 
Trade negotiators from developing countries have gradually become more 
experienced with the institutional standards of WTO diplomacy through repeated 
interaction. The repeated interaction in the GATT/WTO has assisted developing 
countries to adapt accordingly in Geneva, as well as at the domestic level. 
Furthermore, an example of a change in the workings of the WTO as a result of 
developing country pressures is the relatively improved openness of Green Room and 
other small group meetings. At present, small group meetings are usually announced 
in advance, allowing countries to seek attendance if they wish.358 However, while 
developing countries made important gains, the larger tasks – gaining greater access 
to the markets of the developed countries and reforming their own economies to meet 
the challenge of international markets – are far from completed. Among the causes 
that developing countries identify for their marginalisation from the Uruguay Round 
of trade talks, an important one is the weak level of interest that domestic capital and 
politicians have in international trade policy matters. Stakeholders within the 
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countries have also become more aware of the domestic implications of WTO 
membership. Apparently, governments have opened up some more channels for 
consultations with certain domestic interest groups. Having learnt from their previous 
disappointing experiences in negotiating the technicalities of an ever-expanding WTO 
agenda, developing countries have begun to share and coordinate considerably higher 
levels of information in Geneva.  
 
As stated, developing countries, including Thailand, have been very active in the 
WTO to offset the disparity of bargaining power, since they believe that they have a 
great deal at stake. Especially, the middle-income developing countries and the so-
called emerging low-income economies like China and India have been the most 
active participants in the WTO.359 It seems that China has been punching below its 
weight, and that Brazil and India have been the key actors. These countries, together 
with Thailand, have tried to influence the outcome of trade negotiations by using 
various bargaining strategies. Although it is accepted that it is fairly difficult to 
ascertain the relative importance of all the factors that affected the outcome from a 
single case study, it is possible to apply some of the findings from the case of 
Thailand to other developing countries with a similar context. 
 
Extrapolating from the case of Thailand’s participation in the Uruguay Round, the 
thesis aims to find some answers on negotiating processes and bargaining strategies 
with regard to developing countries. It is hoped that the finding will bear implications 
for new entrants into the WTO such as Vietnam. It is clear, from the case of Thailand, 
that developing countries now have to actively participate in trade negotiations on all 
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levels and in every forum to keep the dialogue open, whether they like it or not. 
Afraid of losing out on the market to other exporters with similar produce and 
products, developing countries engage more in both bilateral and regional trade 
agreements. Nevertheless, coalition-building seems to remain the most effective 
bargaining strategy for most developing countries. However, it cannot be assumed 
that other strategies are not used simultaneously. The thesis argues that developing 
countries have less choice in choosing negotiating strategies and that they are not able 
to afford to be selective; it is necessary for developing countries to use as many 
strategies as possible to influence the outcome. Yet, the thesis argues that coalition-
building appears to be the most effective and efficient route for them to put greater 
emphasis on and many trade delegates have formed or joined coalitions and used 
them as bargaining platforms to defend their common negotiating positions through 
both direct and indirect coordination. Meanwhile, they also need to use negotiating 
tactics to be able to influence the agenda-setting process. It is evident that it is not 
wise for Thailand to focus on mere pure distributive strategies or integrative 
strategies. It seems wiser and better to use negotiating elements from both ends of 
bargaining strategies and blend them to a mix. Thailand also used a mixed strategy in 
the Uruguay Round with more integrative elements. From the case study, it seems that 
Thailand would have achieved a better outcome if they had employed a mixed-
distributive strategy. Apart from employing bargaining strategies, it is equally crucial 
that developing countries recognise that they need to somehow increase their presence 
in Geneva, increase coordination between Geneva and their capitals and increase 
resource and research commitment at the national level to allow more informed 
participation at the WTO.  
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Conclusion 
Negotiating international trade agreements at the WTO has become a full-time job for 
most developing countries. Similar to other developing countries, Thailand has 
become drastically more active in trade negotiations, since the policies and the 
societies have become more dependent on trade. Also, Thai delegates are now better 
organised and prepared than in the past. Ultimately, Thailand, together with many 
other developing countries, would like to weight the agreements yield gains in their 
favour and to avoid the burdens of trade which would cause most impact on their 
local communities. 
 
In this chapter, by extrapolating from the Thai case, the thesis shows that developing 
countries cannot rely only on the strategy of coalition-building to gain; it is simply not 
adequate. Equally, bilateral and regional-based coalitions are strategically important; 
it is crucial for a small country like Thailand to use every available forum to keep the 
dialogue open. At least, a small country like Thailand cannot afford to lose out on any 
of the forums available. However, at the same time the thesis argues that the most 
productive negotiating strategy, in terms of influence on outcomes, is likely to be 
coalition-building.  
 
It is again important to note that negotiators’ beliefs do contribute to strategy choice 
and the choice of alternative forums. Triumphing the idea of market liberalism and the 
inclination of developing countries to participate more actively in the WTO may 
simply indicate the changing role of dominant ideas. Liberal ideas seem to take up an 
intrinsic superiority in the trade policy process more and more in developing 
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countries. From past experience, Thailand, as well as other developing countries, has 
learnt that in order for proposals to receive sufficient notice and consideration, they 
have to be rhetorically enmeshed with free trade. Although developing countries 
appear to direct this progressive freely-chosen convergence of trade policy and 
negotiating strategy to market liberalism themselves, the changing role of developing 
countries seems to reinforce the functions of both the material and the ideological 
power of the industrialised states and the private economic interests that drive their 
policies, as well as such global institutions as the WTO, which serve their interests. 
 
However, the picture is not that gloomy. The fact that there are rules can at least 
guarantee that small countries like Thailand will not be arbitrarily bullied by powerful 
countries. Although this research falls into the problem solving category, the 
underlying hypothesis is that there are ways for developing countries to change the 
negotiation structure in the GATT and the subsequent WTO. Although the impetus of 
the thesis is to see a change to the unequal nature of trade negotiations, it accepts that 
at present this is the structure in which Thailand as a unit has to work. Although it 
cannot be changed in the short term, belief that an agent can influence the change to 
the structure leads to a belief that, by using bargaining strategies like agenda-setting 
and coalitions, small trading countries can change the power structures in the 
institutional structure of the WTO, as evident in Cancun from the work of G20. 
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Chapter 9:  
Conclusion  
The Argument 
The central research question of the thesis concerned bargaining and negotiating 
strategy as well as negotiating process at the GATT and the WTO in relation to 
developing countries.  
 
To a large extent, the voice that developing countries were able to exercise in the 
Uruguay Round was unprecedented. Increasingly, developing countries have exerted 
more and more attempts to influence the direction of trade talks in the WTO as shown 
by the past Ministerial Conferences of the Doha Developmental Round. 
 
Based on the findings of the case of Thailand’s participation at the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, the negotiating strategies used, and the evolution of its participation and 
trade strategy, the thesis has examined various courses of negotiating strategy 
Thailand used during the course of the Uruguay Round negotiations. Although it is 
important not to fall into the trap of thinking that the Thai case can necessarily 
represent the developing world more generally, the case of Thailand’s participation is 
still worth probing, since it can at least produce some insight into the politics of 
international trade of one of the developing countries in the specific institution of the 
GATT/WTO.  
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As previously mentioned, case-study methods have long been stereotyped as a weak 
sibling of social science research methods. Nevertheless, the single case-study method 
is one of several ways of performing social research and is actually a research design 
that contributes uniquely to the body of knowledge.360  
 
All in all, considering the close relationship that the empirical analysis bears with 
theory building, the research method should be guided by the research question of the 
enquiry. Given the nature of the enquiry and the argument of the thesis, the country of 
Thailand was selected to be an illustrative case that the most effective bargaining 
tactic in trade negotiations for developing countries would be a mixed-strategy at all 
levels, international, regional, or domestic. It is used to show that the analytical 
frameworks on bargaining strategy provided by Odell, Singh, and Narlikar are useful 
in capturing the developing countries’ experiences at the WTO.  
 
Through the empirical case study of Thailand’s participation in the Uruguay Round 
negotiations in general and in agriculture negotiations in particular, the thesis has 
shown that Thailand, along with other developing countries with the same level of 
economic development and a similar level of experience in multilateral trade 
negotiations, has not been able to rely on merely one negotiating strategy in order to 
attain the sought after outcomes. It has had to strategically rely on all types of 
strategies: coalition with other developing and/or developed countries, engagement in 
bilateral and regional forums, or even the empowerment of national economic 
negotiators both at home and in Geneva. The thesis then also argues that bargaining 
strategies have to be exercised in all channels. To further systemise, bargaining 
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strategies could possibly be grouped into three levels: (1) international, where 
coalition building and mixed strategy of distributive and integrative tactics can be 
utilised; (2) regional, where regional agreements/regional-based coalitions can be 
utilised as a springboard for bargaining; and (3) domestic, where the role of individual 
officials and ministers can feed into the effectiveness of the bargaining strategies 
being conducted. In addition, the thesis argues that the limited bargaining power of 
developing countries in international trade talks makes coalition-building an 
especially crucial and most appealing tool for their effective diplomacy. In effect, 
coalition-building has remained the most effective and viable bargaining strategy in 
trade negotiations for Thailand, and presumably for many other developing countries, 
especially in the agenda-setting process. 
 
Relatively small countries like Thailand, constrained by the power structure of the 
global political economy, did not enjoy much bargaining power. Additionally, 
bargaining strategies were limited and restrained. Thailand - like most developing 
countries - went into the Uruguay Round with certain objectives to be fulfilled. With a 
small share of the global market economy, it was difficult for Thai negotiators, along 
with other developing countries’ delegates, to influence the outcome of the 
negotiations without resorting to ways to enhance their bargaining power.  
 
Chapter 4-5 discussed the limited range of bargaining strategies Thailand could 
employ and the actions Thai negotiators adopted to increase the bargaining leverage 
for Thailand. Chapter 7 discussed Thailand’s achievement from the Uruguay Round 
negotiations.  
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According to Mr. Kirkkrai Jeerapat, from the past experience of trade officials with 
the MFA, the US301, and the cigarette cases, the top priority was, to achieve a 
strengthened system of trade rules, although Thailand was seen to be very active in 
agriculture negotiations.361 In the mind of Thai trade negotiators, the creation of 
common rules is the key mechanism by which the multilateral system of trade rules 
reduces the importance of market power. Thailand wanted rules of trade law and 
dispute settlement mechanisms to be strengthened in order to help small countries 
with less market power cope with pressure from unilateral threats from the trade 
superpowers.  
 
Although Thailand had a supporting role in the Cairns Group in the liberalisation of 
agricultural trade, it can be said that not all internal bureaucrats fully support the 
notion. Even though Thailand supports agricultural liberalisation, domestic politics 
still tend to give rise to agricultural protection. In some cases, politicians propose that 
Thailand raises export subsidies for some agricultural products, for example rice, and 
price insurance for agricultural products, which goes against the Uruguay Round 
agreements. Obviously, the objectives of Thailand in Agriculture negotiations are to 
prevent the US from implementing export subsidies for rice which have a tremendous 
effect on the world price of rice, as well as to pry open the close knit Japanese and 
South Korean markets for Thai rice exports. It, thus, can be roughly concluded that 
Thailand wishes the world agricultural market to be a free market, under 
unambiguous trade rules. 
 
                                                 
361
 The interview, Mr. Kirkkrai Jeerapat, currently the Minister of the Ministry of Commerce. He was 
the former Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the Permanent Mission of Thailand to the World 
Trade Organisation. September 2005. 
Chapter 9: Conclusion   272 
It was a common belief among Thai negotiators that GATT was formed as a result of 
the objectives of the powerful trading countries. Notwithstanding this fact, Thailand, 
as one of the smaller emerging powers, tried to overcome that bargaining-power 
shortcoming by deploying a number of strategies and negotiating tactics. The aims of 
the strategies in the Uruguay Round were as follows: (1) to increase bargaining power 
or to make the voice of Thailand louder; (2) to place agriculture onto the table; (3) to 
achieve a hidden agenda – trade rules being strengthened; and (4) not to be coerced to 
enter bilateral negotiations to negotiate new issues which were not in the interests of 
Thailand. 
 
Basically, trade delegates drew upon their sense of the situation to come up with the 
necessary negotiating strategy. Additionally, Thai delegates believed that Thailand, 
similar to other less developed countries, was at a disadvantage when negotiating with 
more powerful counterparts. Hence, to increase its bargaining leverage, Thailand had 
to join coalitions as well as influence the issues being negotiated through agenda-
setting, since experience has shown that countries do not shift positions in big 
meetings.  
 
Generally, the term agenda-setting, when used in negotiation literature, only indicates 
the agenda at the beginning of any negotiation – in the diagnostic phase setting stage 
of negotiations. Contrary to a common misperception, agenda-setting takes place 
throughout a negotiation and Thailand participated actively in the pre-launch phase of 
the round in order to keep agriculture on the negotiating table. 
 
Chapter 9: Conclusion   273 
Evidently, Thailand was not able to use bilateral negotiations as another way to gain 
leverage in bargaining power in the GATT. Thailand’s terms of trade were highly 
reliant on exports to industrialised countries’ markets, and the US market in 
particular. This increased Thailand’s bilateral vulnerability vis-à-vis major trading 
partners. Particularly, although Thailand is a major agricultural exporting country, 
Thailand’s exports are highly dependent on the markets of industrialized countries, 
namely the EU, the US, and Japan. The US was employing a two-track approach as 
trade strategies. US 301 was used in parallel with GATT negotiations for trade 
liberalisation in trading partner countries, especially developing countries, while 
maintaining its own protection at home. Likewise, in the absence of bargaining 
power, Thailand could not use unilateral measures such as the US 301– disguised 
trade-distorting measures - like the major trading countries. 
 
Compared with bilateral arm-twisting, a multilateral Round was certainly the 
preferred option for Thailand, whose economy has been heavily involved in world 
trade. In the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, Thai negotiators aimed 
to increase their bargaining power, out of frustration, by joining coalitions as a first 
priority; they felt that they had no other viable option. By joining coalitions, Thailand 
was able to influence the agenda of the negotiations from the start of the Round 
through more channels. Thailand was very active in joining all the pre-round 
negotiations. Coalitions that Thailand joined during the Uruguay Round were the 
ASEAN, the Café Au Lait, and the Cairns Group. The reason why the Thai 
negotiators joined the Cairns Group, however, derived from their agricultural focus. 
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According to Odell, ‘strategy’ in trade negotiations is ‘a set of behaviours or tactics 
that are observable in principle and associated with a plan to achieve some objective 
through negotiation.’362 Although Odell’s typology of bargaining strategies is an 
attempt to identify and to make generalisations about negotiation processes and 
bargaining strategies at the behavioural level, it is useful in the sense that it helps to 
describe the observed negotiating behaviours. At the multilateral level, it can be 
assumed that Thailand used a mixed strategy in the GATT during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. In the realm of agriculture negotiations, Thai delegates employed more 
of a distributive strategy by joining coalitions like the Cairns Group. Although 
Thailand might use integrative strategy within the coalition or the group might use a 
mixed-distributive strategy, joining coalitions in itself can be classified as a 
distributive strategy; the strategies are perhaps better viewed in terms of an attempt by 
Thailand to improve its BATNA. The mixed strategy continues to appear to be the 
most viable for most developing countries, including Thailand. Moreover, if backed 
by coalitions, Thailand could use a mixed strategy with more distributive elements. 
 
Previous experience and previous failures from the Uruguay Round negotiations have 
taught Thai officials how to participate more effectively in multilateral trade 
negotiations. The negotiating skill and initiative of the Thai delegation has been 
mostly the product of trail and error within both the Thai bureaucracy institution and 
the GATT/WTO. The extension of WTO rules and regulations, coupled with Thai 
trade negotiators’ belief that there is no alternative but to participate in WTO, has led 
Thailand to place greater emphasis on market liberalisation, integration of the Thai 
economy in world markets, and hence effective participation in trade negotiations.  
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In the post Uruguay Round era, there has been a development in economic policy and 
a change in attitude towards trade negotiations in Thailand. Domestic discontent with 
the rules of the WTO – the result of the Uruguay Round – has initiated more 
participation from domestic constituencies. Coupled with the fact that the belief in the 
importance of GSP to Thai exports has diminished, Thailand has renewed economic 
strategy, as well as trade strategy, in response to economic globalisation and global 
competition. Thailand has chosen to engage actively at both bilateral and regional 
levels, along with the multilateral level.  
 
For Thailand the success of its strategic objectives is contingent upon strengthening 
the rules-based multilateral trade regime. The country is committed, therefore, to 
preserving the credibility of the WTO and preventing its fragmentation and it believes 
that the WTO system provides enhanced certainty and security for market access, 
while reducing the scope for unilateral trade measures. Furthermore, it has argued that 
a rules-based global trade order is crucial to guaranteeing that trade dispute resolution 
is not determined exclusively by economic power manoeuvrings.  
Despite the preference for multilateralism, Thailand has gone through phases of 
investing its diplomatic energies in regional arrangements and has also opened other 
options for its trade. In effect, as the number of FTAs the country has been exploring 
can attest, it has not refrained from pursuing bilateral or regional FTAs where it has 
felt that these would further its broader economic objectives. Unlike the past, 
Thailand has now been cultivating various bilateral options as part of a strategic 
approach to the global political economy. Accordingly, Thailand has been willingly 
engaged in bilateral and regional options since they are seen as an integral part of 
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policy initiatives in response to globalisation. The Thai case also reinforces the 
relationship between regionalism and multilateralism. For Thai trade negotiators, a 
regionalist project such as AFTA is seen as a means of embracing globalisation as a 
positive force for change. However, from an outsider’s point of view, it poses tensions 
and contradictions between regionalism and multilateralism. Moreover, it also 
consumes excessive resources from the insufficient bureaucratic capacity of Thailand. 
On the one hand, the WTO could fulfil the best hopes of its creators, strengthening the 
global trade system, with countries recommitting themselves to global cooperation. 
On the other hand, the WTO could prove to be little different from the previous 
GATT regime; an inability to live up to expectations could weaken its credibility and 
thus hinder rather than promote the trading system. These are polar positions. Indeed, 
the reality suggests that the WTO is an improvement on the GATT, but it still falls 
short of its aspirations.  
 
Moreover, Thailand also aspires to gain international recognition of its status as a 
significant international player. In the mind of Thai negotiators, this is the other way 
to gain more bargaining power at the international level, apart from increasing 
economic might and coalition-building. The head of Thai negotiators emphasises the 
importance of leadership.363 While acknowledging and stressing the importance of 
backing any proposals in the WTO with substantive research and adherence to 
GATT/WTO ideology and institutions, the dominant strategy was that the Thai 
negotiators aspire to become a leader of ASEAN, since this would increase the 
significant role and voice of Thailand in international fora. It is believed that this 
leadership and the strength of the coalition within the region would at least give 
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Thailand some confidence with which the country could express demands and bargain 
with other parties, especially the developed countries. Indeed, developing a more 
prominent international role and acquiring international recognition of the country’s 
status as an important player in the politics of international trade will give Thailand a 
louder voice in economic negotiations. Increased bargaining influence is no longer a 
fruit of the increase in economic or political resources, but of the external legitimacy 
that the particular country enjoys. The leadership status of Thailand is thus important 
because it will give rise to additional external legitimacy. This strategy has been quite 
successful in the sense that, despite the perception of Thai trade negotiators that 
Thailand still has a relatively small amount of bargaining power and thus does not 
have many options or alternatives to the agreements in the WTO, Thailand is still 
viewed and accepted by many outsiders as one of the most influential players in the 
developing world.    
 
Although Thailand has employed various negotiating strategies and tactics in previous 
trade talks including bilateral and regional-based agreements, coalition has been 
deemed its most effective negotiating strategy. Since the WTO is considered to be the 
best international trade and investment policy in response to globalisation, coalition is 
by far the most appealing negotiating strategy in international trade negotiations. The 
strength of coalition behind the proposals will facilitate the agenda-setting process for 
Thailand, although the strength or the longevity of any coalition depends on how 
particular coalitions can cope with internal differences and how they can maximise 
their effectiveness.364 
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A further motivation behind Thailand’s bargaining strategy is national interest.  
The trade negotiators insist that the motivation behind any choice of negotiating 
strategy is interest, even the motivation behind any choice of coalition. This is why 
Thailand chose to join the Cairns Group in the Uruguay Round and the G20+/- in the 
Doha Round. However, the determinant factors of any negotiating strategy are indeed 
context, issues, and negotiators’ belief in the feasibility of strategy.  
 
In the research, the issue chosen for the study was agriculture, since it has played an 
important role in the country’s economic growth. Also, like most countries, Thailand 
has given domestic support to agriculture and farm votes have remained significant. 
Hence, agriculture was among the top priorities of the issues Thailand wished to 
achieve from the Uruguay Round; and negotiators were keen to use coalitions such as 
the Cairns Group to increase the bargaining power of Thailand. 
 
Moreover, the world agriculture price and the global political economy also feed in 
the international context to the agriculture negotiations at the GATT. On agriculture, 
the top US priority was to regain its market share of world trade in cereals and other 
agricultural products. The United States entered the negotiations with a firm 
bargaining position to press for long term agricultural reform and for more liberal 
agricultural trade policies, since agricultural protectionism had been deep-rooted and 
farm lobbies had always been the stumbling block to agricultural policy reform, both 
in the US and other developed countries. While the US entered the negotiations with 
an interest in liberalising agricultural trade, by the same token, the EC wished to 
protect its farm support measures. Differing national positions within the EC greatly 
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complicated the EC standpoint in the Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations. Other 
developing country exporters of agricultural products had an incentive to see trade 
barriers lowered. 
 
The ensuing war between the EC and the United States in agricultural trade provided 
the stimulus which brought many countries together to form a coalition of 
comparatively efficient agricultural exporting countries. This coalition, aiming to 
achieve satisfactory outcomes in agriculture negotiations, was called the Cairns 
Group. By contrast, the policies of Cairns Group countries tended to offer 
comparatively little support to their agricultures, with an exception of Canada. The 
Cairns Group was formed out of frustration among comparatively efficient 
agricultural exporting countries over a series of changes in the conduct of world 
agricultural trade over which they, as individual countries, could have no influence. 
The strength of the Cairns Group was sustained during the Round by the continuing 
trade war between the EC and the United States which has further impaired their 
terms of trade.365 Moreover, the new importance of developing countries in other 
aspects of the Round, especially in the negotiations on services trade and on 
intellectual property rights, also helped the group to sustain their strength and 
significant role. The Group had been aided by the new importance of developing 
countries in other aspects of the Round, namely negotiations on services and 
intellectual property rights. The developing countries in the Cairns Group have been 
able to make progress in these areas conditional on progress on agriculture. Evidently, 
the fact that Thailand hosted the14th official trade meeting  in Pattaya in July 1986, in 
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order to form the Cairns Group, clearly shows Thailand’s vigorous effort to influence 
the outcome by utilising bargaining strategy – coalition - to achieve it. 
 
Along with the international context, Thai trade negotiators were also faced with a 
domestic context to the negotiation. Generally, the international trade negotiations are 
depicted as a two-level game, wherein domestic bargaining affects the positions that 
states adopt internationally. Domestic forces may seek to influence international 
negotiations for one of two reasons: a concern about foreign policy or private 
interests. Tariff negotiations and commercial agreements make characteristic 
battlegrounds for such private interests.366 That said, government officials often feel 
handicapped in the pursuit of national objectives if domestic interest groups become 
involved in their negotiations.  
 
As discussed, the fact that agriculture was being domestically politicised and farm 
votes were still crucial in internal politics contributes to the reason why Thailand’s 
main objective was to see the incorporation of agricultural trade in the Uruguay 
Round. It is evident, however, that farm voters had little knowledge of the GATT and 
were mostly motivated by handouts, particularly to their village heads.367 Yet, the 
fact that farm votes still accounted for more than half of the votes in the country was 
the reason why Thai politicians used agricultural policy as a means to gain popularity 
amongst farm voters. Agriculture was also being domestically politicised in Thailand, 
as in other developed countries.  
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However, the strategy and positions in the agriculture negotiations, in fact, came from 
a handful of permanent officers from the Ministry of Commerce. As already 
mentioned, the strategy choice was seen as a careful calculation of these trade 
negotiators themselves. The agendas they pursued, as well as the choice of bargaining 
strategies, directly came from these trade negotiators, since there were little inputs 
from domestic constituencies. With the lack of understanding of trade negotiations 
from most domestic constituencies, politicians, policy makers, business interests, and 
other civil groups, trade negotiators did not face much internal domestic opposition. 
Hence, they based the choice of negotiating strategy on their reading of the situation 
and chose what they believed best served the national interest. Moreover, in the Thai 
case, bureaucratic and institutional links between trade and foreign policy were less 
direct. Notwithstanding the increased effort to liaise between ministries, institutional 
links between trade policy, foreign policy, and agricultural policy establishments in 
Thailand remain significantly weak. 
 
The discussion of the Thai case found that domestic politics played very little part in 
the Uruguay Round. Although that has changed since the creation of the WTO, 
domestic politics still continues to play only a supportive role. In the Uruguay Round 
of agriculture negotiations, domestic businesses consultations rarely existed. The 
quality of representation of business interests remains largely ineffective. As 
previously mentioned, the chicken and prawn farmers interviewed stated that they had 
never heard of the Uruguay Round and the GATT. Although many of them now know 
what the WTO is all about, they have no involvement in the negotiating strategy 
formulation process, despite being most affected by trade and the force of economic 
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globalisation process in the global political economy. This suggests that negotiating 
positions and trade policies in Thailand are still largely top-down. 
 
Apparently, this seems to confirm that Thai negotiators based their decisions of 
negotiation tactics on their personal beliefs and judgement on which strategy might 
best serve the interests of the Thai economy as a whole. Indeed, trade policies and 
negotiating strategies must have been in line with the framework that had been 
predetermined by the cabinet. Therefore, the positioning of Thai delegations was the 
result of the calculation of domestic political pressures by trade negotiators based in 
Geneva. For instance, the trade negotiators prioritised agriculture because they 
realised that it was still significant in domestic politics. Thai negotiators put more 
effort and energy into coalition because they felt it was the most viable option for 
Thailand. 
 
Furthermore, the increasing homogenisation and policy convergence adopted by Thai 
policy makers around the norm of economic liberalism reflects the role of ideas in 
Thailand’s policy formation process. Most trade negotiators believe that there are few 
alternative options to economic globalisation in the contemporary world order. Hence, 
negotiating mechanisms have been substantially reinforced and renewed in order to be 
capable of dealing with economic globalisation. For instance, the renewal of trade and 
investment policy is evidence of the change of attitude towards bilateral options. In 
the Uruguay Round, bilateral trade negotiations were deemed to be the channel 
through which the superpowers exercised their power; and Thailand would prefer to 
engage multilaterally in the GATT. The bilateral option was very much to be avoided, 
whereas it has now been seen as an opportunity to potentially assert more bargaining 
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strategy, or at least to maintain the status quo. Apparently, this progressively greater 
conformity with liberal norms can be seen as the product of both material and 
ideological power of the industrialised countries, as well as the transnational business 
interests, reinforced by institutions like the WTO. 
 
Finally, the thesis bases the arguments on the premise that Thai delegates process 
information and make decisions using bounded rationality. The assumption of rational 
choice continues to prove fruitful in the sense that trade negotiators are rational, since 
they aim to achieve objectives as effectively as they can; however, the fact remains 
that trade officials and policy makers lack complete information and the ability to 
perform the computations necessary to optimise. Hence, rationally bounded 
negotiators, in practice, cannot simply assume a single optimal negotiating strategy 
since they are unable to forecast the future result of each alternative. This is also true 
in the case of Thai negotiators. Learning from past experiences, trade negotiators have 
evolved negotiating strategies to keep the dialogue open as much as possible, since 
they are not able to identify the single optimal strategy.  
 
Thai negotiators have chosen to influence their counterparts’ beliefs by framing their 
proposals in terms of the rules of the WTO and in line with the broad liberal 
paradigm. Basing the proposals on expanded research, they have chosen to make 
demands for change within the WTO regime. Apart from the expanded research base 
and an appeal to a different set of principles that fitted within the normative 
framework of the WTO, Thai negotiators have also chosen to influence their 
counterparts’ beliefs through the agenda-setting process. Generally, the term agenda-
setting, when used in negotiation literature, only indicates the agenda at the beginning 
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of any negotiation – in the diagnostic phase setting stage. However, the term agenda-
setting when used here is ‘a process variable to inclusion or exclusion of issues being 
negotiated’ which is not restricted only to when a negotiation begins, in keeping with 
Singh’s definition.368 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that maintaining good relationships between Thai 
trade representatives and representatives from other countries is equally important to 
effectively influence others’ beliefs. Engaging in bilateral and regional FTAs can also 
facilitate this process, Thai negotiators believe. 
 
Despite its limitations, drawing upon the case study of Thailand, the thesis argues that 
there have been changes to the way developing countries conduct the politics of 
international trade in the WTO. The source of change comes from outside pressures in 
the international political system and in the global economy, as well as from the 
changing way in which those pressures are understood within the domestic politics of 
developing countries. In order to bargain over the rules by which globalisation is 
managed; developing countries have sought ways to participate meaningfully and to 
direct the negotiations to improve their status quo. Within the specific institution of 
the WTO and a specific set of negotiating processes, Thailand, along with most 
developing countries has made a rational adaptation to the way they negotiate trade 
rules from their past experience in the earlier rounds of trade talks. The thesis has 
contended that, in the eyes of Thai negotiators and those from other developing 
countries, coalition and alliance continue to be the most proficient way for the weak 
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in the WTO diplomacy. Finally, the thesis argues that it is evident that Thailand’s 
experience seems to signify that most negotiation process research and theories have 
underrepresented the experience and needs of developing countries.  
 
 
The Contribution to the Study of IPE  
A contribution of this thesis to IPE has been to throw light on the inadequacies of the 
conventional accounts of domestic-driven negotiation analysis. In the Thai case, there 
is a significant domestic side to trade policy. Yet, domestic constituencies have played 
more of a reinforcing role rather than a proactive one. The finding from the study has 
some potentially intriguing implications for some theories of International Political 
Economy that assume the great role of domestic institutional inputs in the formulation 
process of trade policy. They assume that trade negotiators and officials arrive at the 
negotiating position after having calculated and balanced inputs from diverse interests 
within the state. It is believed that negotiation alternatives for any country are direct 
outcomes of the particular alignment of domestic actors and interests. However, the 
finding suggests that a very different dynamic is at work in Thailand, and supposedly 
for many other developing countries as well.369 
 
The thesis has maintained that the driving force in trade policy and negotiating 
strategy in Thailand still remains in the hands of the state and mainly bureaucratic 
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officials.370 Given the fact that most negotiation analyses and theories are drawn on 
cases based in the industrialised countries, these theories have underrepresented the 
experience and needs of developing countries. Therefore, new development in 
negotiation analysis is needed that is of relevance to developing countries’ 
experiences, since many developing countries with very different political structures 
and societies have reacted in very similar ways at the international level. A sole 
reliance on domestic politics to explain developing countries’ negotiating strategy 
choice is, hence, insufficient. The thesis has challenged domestic-driven literature to 
explain trade negotiation and the negotiating process to the exclusion of other vital 
considerations. 
 
Future Research Agenda 
A key aim of this thesis has been to sketch a systematic and detailed analysis of the 
bargaining strategies and negotiating tactics used by the Thai trade negotiators at the 
agriculture negotiations during the Uruguay Round negotiations. The method of the 
thesis is to learn more about the multilateral negotiation process through a single case 
study and attempt to generate a potential generalisation for further investigation in 
other cases.  
 
Hence, in order to understand the nature of participation of developing countries and 
their bargaining strategies, both in the Uruguay Round and the present round of trade 
negotiations, more empirical work on other developing countries’ experiences may be 
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needed. To see what bargaining strategies work best for developing countries, it is 
necessary to also look at the different bargaining strategies deployed by developing 
countries in general. It is also necessary to address the questions: which is the most 
used bargaining strategy amongst the developing world?; what is the most effective 
negotiating strategy, in the eyes of trade negotiators from developing countries?; and 
is coalition the most appealing bargaining tool for other developing countries in trade 
negotiations, as in the Thai case?.  
 
Clearly, an obvious follow through for future research would be Thailand in the Doha 
Round. In relation to Thailand in the Doha Round, the bargaining strategies used by 
Thai negotiators in the Doha Round should be examined to see if the changing 
institutional context has had any impact on the choice of tactics. The choice of 
bargaining strategies should also be scrutinised to see if coalition continues to be the 
most appealing bargaining tool for Thailand. With more experience in trade 
negotiations, has Thailand achieved in gaining more bargaining power, and how? 
 
Another agenda for future research would be bargaining experiences of new entrants 
into the WTO such as Vietnam. As similar to Thai case, Vietnam has experienced a 
locomotive of growth, propelled by international trade. From 1985, Vietnam’s exports 
have increased from $0.5 billion to $37.2 billion.371 Realising the increasing 
importance of trade, Vietnam became a full member on 11 January 2007. This reflects 
that Vietnam regards the WTO as a useful international forum for negotiating their 
terms of trade. It would be very intriguing to see a choice of bargaining strategies a 
new entrant like Vietnam employs, as well as it is interesting to see if the driving 
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force in trade policy and negotiating strategy in Vietnam remain in the hands of 
bureaucratic officials as in the case of Thailand. Moreover, it is also interesting to see 
if domestic theories under-represent the experience and needs of developing 
countries, as stipulated in this thesis. 
 
Finally, more empirical work is also needed on different domestic constituencies of 
the domestic political economies of both Thailand and other developing countries to 
see the varying influence of differing domestic institutional inputs in the formulation 
process of trade policy. The thesis has made an attempt to tackle this query by 
addressing the case of prawn and chicken farmers in Thailand. The findings on the 
prawn and chicken farmers in the study of the Thai case suggests that the driving 
force in trade policy and negotiating strategy in Thailand has still remained in the 
hands of the state and mainly bureaucratic officials. Yet, the understanding of the role 
of domestic institutional inputs in trade policy formulation process remains important 
and needs further sector-by-sector research. This issue may constitute an agenda for 
future research to aid the internal factor of developing countries’ experiences at 
international trade negotiations. 
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Appendix A: List of Interviewees 
Group 1: Government Officials 
Kirkkrai Jeerapat 
The Minister, Ministry of Commerce. 
A former Ambassador, the Permanent Representative of the 
Permanent Mission of Thailand to the World Trade Organisation. 
 
Bangkok,
September 5, 2005.
Chutima Bunyapraphasara 
Director-General, Department of Trade Negotiations. 
A former Commercial Advisor, Ministry of Commerce and a 
former trade negotiator in Geneva during the Uruguay Round. 
 
Bangkok,
September 7, 2005.
Sirinart Jaiman 
Director-General, Office of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the 
Department of Trade Negotiations 
The Ministry of Commerce 
 
Bangkok,
September 9, 2005.
Pimchanok Vonkorporn 
Trade Negotiator, 
Bureau of Service Investment and Negotiations, 
The Department of Trade Negotiations, the Ministry of Commerce 
 
Bangkok,
September 9, 2005.
Sopida Heymakom 
Legal Officer, the Information Technology Centre, the Department 
of Agriculture, The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. 
 
Bangkok,
September 13, 2005.
Pisan Leuthongjak 
Director of Agricultural Technology and Sustainable Agriculture 
Policy. The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 
A former delegate of the Permanent Mission of Thailand to the 
World Trade Organisation during the Uruguay Round. 
 
Bangkok,
September 15, 2005.
Panisa Suwanmethacharn 
Legal Officer, 
The Department of Intellectual Property, the Ministry of Commerce 
 
Bangkok,
January 29, 2007.
Pornnika Khunpalin 
Legal Officer, Treaty Division, Department of Treaties and Legal 
Affairs, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
Bangkok,
June 9, 2006.
Kanokporn Khunnawatre 
Legal Officer, Department of South Asia, Middle East, and Africa,  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
Bangkok,
January 29, 2007.
Thanit Ngarnsampanrit 
Trade Representative, the Ministry of Commerce. 
Bangkok,
September 9, 2005.
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Delegate of the Permanent Mission of Thailand to the World Trade 
Organisation. 
 
Group 2: Academics, Non Governmental Organisation, and 
Private Sector 
Supachai Aungsupakorn 
Vice-President, CP Corporations. 
 
Telephone Interview, 
January 11, 2007.
Dr. Preeyanuch Malakul Na Ayudhaya 
Vice Chairman, Food & Pharmaceuticals Cluster 
The Federation of Thai Industries 
 
Telephone Interview,
September 15, 2005.
Prof. Pol. Gen. Dr. Keartipong Meepiarn 
Senior Lecturer, 
The College of Law and Politics, Mahasarakam University. 
 
Bangkok,
June 12, 2006.
Kwanjai Lekakul 
Researcher, 
The Thailand Development Research Institute Foundation. 
 
Bangkok,
September 15, 2005.
Pornsri Raorujisawad 
Vice-President, CP Corporations. 
President, Thai Broiler Processing Exporter Association. 
 
Bangkok,
January13, 2007.
Pimpacha Piyakesin 
Lecturer, 
School of Law, Thai Chamber of Commerce University. 
 
Bangkok,
June 9, 2006.
Dr. Patreeya Kitcharoen 
Lecturer, 
The Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University. 
 
Bangkok,
June 12, 2006.
Kriengsak Chaivinich 
Researcher, 
WTO Watch Project 
 
Bangkok,
January 13, 2007.
Krongkwan Traithongyoo 
Researcher, 
Thailand Research Fund 
 
Bangkok,
January 13, 2007.
Sharin Hansuebsai 
Director of the Institute for Trade and Development 
Bangkok,
September 5, 2005.
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Group 3: Chicken and Prawn Farmers 
Sutin Lamangthong 
Prawn Farmer 
 
Prajinbury,
June 15, 2006.
Tipvarinthorn Taworlanan 
Prawn Farmer 
 
Prajinbury,
June 18, 2006.
Krongpol Prasatsarn, 
Prawn Farmer 
 
Prajinbury,
June 18, 2006.
Manatchaya Prasatsarn 
Prawn Farmer 
 
Prajinbury,
June 18, 2006.
Pasit Taworlanan 
Prawn Farmer 
 
Prajinbury,
June 18, 2006.
Baworn Siriprapreud 
Chicken Farmer 
 
Saraburi,
June 25, 2006.
Waraporn Siriprapreud 
Chicken Farmer 
 
Saraburi,
June 25, 2006.
BoonChana Siriprapreud 
Chicken Farmer 
 
Saraburi,
June 25, 2006.
Sirinan Promduang 
Chicken Farmer 
 
Saraburi,
June 15, 2006.
Supakrit Promduang 
Chicken Farmer 
Saraburi,
June 15, 2006.
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Appendix B: Thailand’s commitment, a result from the 
Uruguay Round Agriculture Agreements 
 
Agreement Details 
1. market access • To reduce tariffs for 740 agricultural products (according 
to HS 6-7) or 997 product lines (according to HS 10) and 
to bind tariffs for 717 products, no custom duties for 14 
product lines (HS 6-7) 
• Market access through tarrification methods for 23 
product lines*  
• Identify Special Safeguard (SSG) for 111 agricultural 
products  
2. Domestic support • Domestic support in the base year was 22,126 million 
Baht** 
• Domestic support for the year 1995 – 2004 as following:  
1995 – 21,816 million Baht 
1996 – 21,506 million Baht 
1997 – 21,197 million Baht 
1998 – 20,887 million Baht 
1999 – 20,577 million Baht 
2000 – 20,268 million Baht 
2001 – 19,958 million Baht 
2002 – 19,648 million Baht 
2003 – 19,338 million Baht 
2004 – 19,028 million Baht 
3. Export Subsidy • Thailand did not notify of any export subsidy for 
agricultural products. Therefore, Thailand has no 
commitment to bind export subsidy. However, Thailand is 
no longer able to use any export subsidy policy. 
Source: Thailand (1994), Final Schedule: Submitted by Thailand, Schedule LXXIX –         
   Thailand.  
 
*  23 products include:  
- milk (not concentrated), milk (concentrated), potatoes, onions and 
shallots, garlic, coconut, longans (dried), coffee, tea, pepper, maize, 
rice, soya beans, copra, onion seeds, soya bean oil, palm oil, coconut 
oil, cane or beet sugar, instant coffee, soya bean cake, unmanufactured 
tobacco, and raw silk. 
 
** Domestic support is calculated from (1) sugar, (2) rice, (3) milk, (4) maize, 
and (5) coffee. 
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Appendix C: National Team? responsibility and interests of officials over the UR, the GATT, 
and the WTO during different governments 
Prime Min  i erst             
Deputy Prime 
Minister 
            
Minister of 
Foreign 
Affairs 
            
Minister of 
Commerce 
     
Prem 
Pong 
Chatichai 
Supachai 
Chuan Anand 
Amnuay 
Banharn 
       
Deputy 
Assistant 
Secretary 
            
Permanent 
Secretary to 
Ministry of 
Commerce 
     
Sith Asa 
Uthai Subin Amaret Chuchip 
Kasem Prasong 
Montri 
       
 1985 
Prajuab 
Vicharn Pachara Sompon Kirkkrai 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Punta del 
Easte 
Montreal  
mid-term review
Brussels 
ministerial 
Dunkel 
final draft
Marrakech Blair 
House Singapore  
WTO ministerial 
WTO 
launch
URUGUAY ROUND 
Bold name = leader Underlined name = leading role italic name = little or no role
Source: พีเตอร์ ไมตรี อึง้ภากรณ์, แกตต์ รอบอุรุกวยั กับประเทศไทย: เศรษฐกิจการเมืองของระบบระหว่างประเทศ และการตัดสินจุดยืนของไทย. สถาบนัวิจัยเพื่อการพัฒนาประเทศไทย. ตุลาคม 2539 [Ungphakorn, Peter, The GATT’s Uruguay Round and 
Thailand: international political economy and the position of Thailand. Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute Foundation, October, 1996, p. 67.] 
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Useful Websites 
 
CIA, the World Fact Book www.cia.gov  
Joint WTO Committee www.wtothailand.or.th  
Office of Agricultural Economics, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives, Thailand 
www.oae.go.th 
 
Office of the Permanent Secretary 
Ministry of Commerce, Thailand 
www.ops.moc.go.th 
 
Thai Broiler Processing Exporter 
Association 
www.thaichickenandduck.com 
 
The Department of Fisheries, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives, Thailand 
www.fisheries.go.th 
 
The Department of Trade Negotiations, 
the Ministry of Commerce, Thailand 
www.dtn.moc.go.th 
The Ministry of Commerce, Thailand www.moc.go.th 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand www.mfa.go.th 
The Thailand Development Research 
Institute (TDRI) 
http://info.tdri.or.th 
WTO Watch Project www.thailandwto.org 
 
 
 
